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ABSTRACT 
Law can be an effective instrument for bringing social change. Law is 
power. It has been used successfully to achieve equilibrium by regulating socio-
legal relationships, particularly by enacting specific laws for women employees. 
The policy of reservations in favour of the weaker sections in respect of 
employment and education are examples of social justice, which have been 
achieved through the instrumentality of law. 
Men and women are like two wheels of the chariot of life. Just like a house 
needs a beam as well as a pillar, the world needs men and women. Since about half 
of the population of the world comprises of women, the neglect of women implies 
that humanity is deprived of about half of its energy and creativity. For this reason, 
the progress of any country is unthinkable unless women move forward in all 
fields. 
The women rights are nationally accepted and constitutionally guaranteed 
to uplift women through socio-economic and educational opportunities to satisfy 
the constitutional goal and social Justice for historical reasons. 
The history of labour legislation in India is more than a century old. 
However, early labour legislation aimed mainly at governing the relationship 
between employers and employees. The measures enacted before India's 
independence for women employees were limited in their scope and were not 
adequate to meet the social and economic needs of the vast number of women 
workers of the country. 
The notion of social justice and economic equality, as regards women, 
was not even thought of by the government. 
After independence, our government enacted laws for the benefit of 
women employees such as provisions that prohibit their employment during 
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night hours; jn the underground mines and hazardous occupations; restrict 
them from carrying heavy loads; provide for equal pay to men and 
women for identical work; prevent discrimipatieo4n their recruitment and 
promotion opportunities; provide maternity relict; yelfare measures such 
as creches, separate toilets, rest-rooms, w^hing^il i t ies, and free legal-
aid for women employees. 
More importantly, the Constitution of India, through Article 14, 
provides for equal status to all in the eyes of the law, that is, not only 
between men and men, women and women, but also between men and 
women. Apart from this, the Constitution, under Article 15, specifically 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, 
or any of them. 
Further, our Constitution provides, by virtue of Article 15(3), that the 
State is empowered to make special laws in favour of women. The logic 
behind this provision is that women are understood as a historically 
disadvantaged group and as such, in need of compensatory or corrective 
treatment. Under this approach, rules or practices that treat women differently 
from men can be upheld, if such rules are designed to improve the status of 
women. 
In addition to these Fundamental Rights, the Directive Principles 
enshrined in the Constitution of India provide, through Article 39(d), that 
the State shall endeavour to provide all men and women an adequate means of 
livelihood and that there shall be equal pay for equal work for both men and 
women. Above and beyond, Article 42 enunciates that the labour must be 
provided just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief 
Apart from economic exploitation, there is widespread sexual abuse of 
women workers in establishments cutting across industries. Sexual harassment 
is sex discrimination as it undercuts women's equality at work. Further, when 
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sexual harassment occurs, an unsafe and hostile working environment is 
created. The harmful effect of sexual harassment at the workplace is so much 
that it alone is capable of undoing the little that women have achieved and 
also hampering their onward march. Candidly speaking, the entire concept of 
gender equality enshrined in the Constitution is futile if a woman's right to live 
with dignity or right to work in a conducive environment or her right to be 
treated on an equal footing with her male counterpafh t^s not ensured by the law 
enforcement agencies and also by society;/ Inspire of the Supreme Courts 
guidelines in the Vishaka case for conibatiag^ sexual harassment at the 
workplace, women employees, frequently do face this menace, Women 
continue to suffer denial of justice, delay injustice and distortions in the delivery 
of justice. Consequently, the need for a separate law on the prevention of 
sexual harassment at the workplace has been duly stressed. In this regard, the 
Draft prepared by the Ministry of Women and Child Development, on the 
Protection of Women against Sexual Harassment at Workplace Bill, 2007, is 
of paramount significance and therefore, the same has also been dealt with at 
the appropriate places. 
The role of working women today is a necessary characteristic of modem 
society although women's work is activity for her and her family's 
empowerment vis-a-vis the development of society. But the reality is that there is 
very less recognition and economic valuation of her work in market because it is 
assumed that "she performs her work for love and affection of her family 
members." 
There has been a great impact of liberalization on women workers. 
Liberalization implies privatization of public sector, lifting of restrictions of 
imports, fi-ee entry of multinational corporations, abolishing subsides for the 
erstwhile priority sector, mergers, takeovers, etc. The structural changes have 
caused a large scale "Shedding of labour." Certain studies have shown that 
structural adjustment polices have an<^  adverse effect on women's employment. 
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It is also said that these structural changes have curtailed job opportunity in the 
organized sector. The distress sale of female labour, is predicted. Export based 
industrialization using cheap labour, is increasingly used a'competitive strategy. 
Recently, the Ministry of Women and Child Development has prepared a 
draft entitled the protection of Women against Sexual Harassment at Workplace 
Bill 2007, to Provide for the prevention and redressal of sexual harassment of 
women at the workplace and for matters connected therewith or incidental 
thereto. 
AIM OF RESEARCH 
The aim of this research is to find out the causes for the sexual 
harassment, exploitation and increase in crime against working women. 
Her human rights are also to be protected which she is entitled under 
different Conventions, Laws, Conferences. Utmost important is to protect the 
women employees fi"om sexual harassment at work place which is one of the 
basi^  human rights violations of women employees. 
Though the present women participation in workforce of the country is 
encouraging still more participation can certainly bring a radical change in the 
a 
economic progress this could only be possible when the wom^n is protected at 
her workplace. 
In the present day society criminal victimization of working class 
women is rampant in domestic sphere and in outer world. While adjusting to 
her world of work, she is victimized in family either due to her future as good 
wife or an ideal mother, or victimized at her workplace as an uncommitted 
worker which is violation of her human right and against her dignity as she 
required a workplace which is helpful, cordial so that she can work with her 
full potential. When she ventures to come out from the traditional family 
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boundary without any protection to work in the outer world, she is threatened 
by fear of variety of crime^ She is being doubly squeezed due to her dual role 
of house wife and working woman. Thus while encouraging women 
participation, which consis^of about half of total population into the work force 
in India, their protection and responsibility is now ultimately cast on 
government. 
To encourage large number of women to join the workforce first of all 
sexual harassment is to be eradicated from the workplace by enforcing string 
Suvn 
law and awarding huge some of compensation to the victim by the harasser 
then only she will feel safe at the workplace. 
Hypothesis 
The position of working class women in present day society is found to 
be precarious. In the new role while adjusting to her world of works, she is 
failing in all her dimensions and proves to be a fiasco. In society, either in 
domestic sphere or in the outer world, she is encountering varieties of crimes 
0 
due to her inferior social position Organizations, social workers and 
government has proved to be fruitless. Criminal exploitation of working class 
women that is sexual harassment can neither be prevented only by new 
enactments nor by enlarging the law enforcing agency but mindset of the 
society has to be changed with regard to woman because several other 
contributing factor are also responsible for the act of sexual harassment at 
workplace. 
Hence in the modem age, in spite of many women oriented enactments 
programmes and policies, the societal out look could not be changed in favour 
of working class women. They are still in one form or other victimized in all 
walks of their lives. 
Various conventions, covenants, protocols on human right have assumed 
t vce-^ ^ 
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the responsibility to provide and protect human rights of women but are not 
used in latter and sprit. 
Methodology 
Law is a normative science that is a science which lays down norms and 
standard for human behaviour in a specified situation or situations enforceable 
through the sanctions of the state. What distinguishes law from other social 
sciences is its normative character. This fact along with the fact that stability 
and certainty of law, desirable goals and social values to be of primary concern 
to a legal researcher. Doctrinal research of course, involves analysis of case 
law, arranging, ordering and systematizing legal propositions and study of legal 
institutions, but it does more it creates law and its major tools to do so is 
through legal reasoning or rational deduction.. 
The present study is based on the doctrinal method of research. The 
researcher has drawn help from various books, articles, newspaper, reports, 
conventions, commissions committee and judicial decisions 
Chapter wise Introduction 
Introduction - It gives an insight on rights which have been given to 
women in Constitution and other different social security legislations where 
women are deprived and treated inhumanly. It also talks about the pending bill 
which is related to sexual harassment at workplace. Women rights are 
nationality accepted and constitutionally guaranteed to uplift the status of 
women in all sphere of life. 
Chapter -I 
It deals with the concept of human rights. They, by virtue of their being 
human, possess certain basic and inalienable rights which are commonly 
known as human rights. Since these rights belong to them because of their very 
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existence these become operative with their birth. It also covers different 
declarations and conventions which are supposed to be the backbone of human 
rights particularly with reference to women who are being discriminated in 
every sphere of life. 
Chapter-II 
It deals with the position of women in different periods and position in 
the historical perspective in the course of history from prehistoric to modem 
times. It covers Vedic |>eriod, Medieval Period, Pre-independence and Post-
independence. Because if you have to judge, the status of a nation, first you 
have to study the status of its women. 
Chapter-Ill 
It deals with the provisions of Constitution. Being a signatory to various 
international conventions, covenants and protocols on human rights India has 
assumed the responsibility to provide and protect various rights of women. 
Therefore, as regards the Indian Constitution it guarantees not only the equality 
before law and equal protection of laws to women but also confers certain 
affirmative rights. Articles 14, 15, 16 have been provided with equality 
provisions. 
The expression "Equality before law" finds a place in almost all written 
Constitution that guarantees fundamental rights and also has been used in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The Directive principles of state policy contained in part IV of the 
Constitution directs the state to protect the human rights of women including 
the right to equal pay for equal work for men and women both, the right to 
health and work in hygienic condition, the right to maternity benefit and right 
to gender justice etc. 
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Chapter-IV 
It is relegated to the position and the important problems concerning life 
and work of the women workers and what are the offences common to the 
working women. To improve the position of women workers recommendations 
are also made for the improvement of existing conditions it also gives an 
insight on what are the factors responsible for the decorating position of 
working women. Lastly, it deals with the provisions of Indian Penal Code 
which are related to offences against women. 
Chapter-V 
It is related to sexual harassment at work place. First it defines sexual 
harassment and then judicial response in protecting women against sexual 
harassment at work place. 
It is not only a crime against the society and the individual but it also a 
bar to achieve and exercise women's right to work in a way it is symptomatic 
of a larger problem of gender violence. 
Conclusion Suggestion: 
Towards its obligation to eliminate discrimination against women, a 
state is to pursue all appropriate means by undertaking, among other things, to 
embody the principal of equality of men and women in its national 
Constitution." to adopt appropriate legislative and other measures including 
sanctions," to establish legal protection of all right of women on equal basis 
with men. Through competent national tribunals and other public institutions, 
and to take all appropriate measures, to modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations customs and practices, constituting discrimination. It also mandates 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organization or enterprise. 
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The concept of "equality and non-discrimination" find its due place in 
the Constitution of India and many other legal document, but its is the social 
and cultural factors which impede the realization of this concept and in some 
cases, even in enacting the legal prescriptions to eradicate discrimination 
against women since India is a party to the Discrimination against women 
convention, it is obliged to give effect to conventions provision and eliminate 
discrimination against women in all its manifestations. There are many areas, 
viz, legal, cultural and social friend where necessary action is required by the 
Government. 
The elimination of discrimination at work is central to social justice. But 
discrimination at work will not vanish by itsdf, nether with the market on its 
own take care of its elimination. As a flatter of fact elimination of 
discrimination requires deliberate, focused, and consistent efforts by all parties 
concerned. Apart from the duty of the government to combat discrimination it 
is also the responsibility of employers, workers^organizations and NGOs to 
play an active role in achieving equality at work. Sexual harassment violates 
human dignity and undermines the woman worker's self esteem. But these are 
widespread sexual abuse of women employees in establishments cutting across 
all kind of industries. 
Bearing in mind the far reaching and dangerous consequence of sexual 
harassment at the workplace, the punishment provided either under Section 354 
or Section 509 of the Indian penal code, 1860 is not adequate and deterrent 
enough. Hence the punishment under these sections should be increased 
considerably. Further offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 
1860, should be non-bail able and non-compoundable. Besides if a person is 
found guilty more than once for the same offence, then he must be awarded the 
maximum punishment provided under the Section coupled with heavy fine. In 
*is backdrop, it is of grea. consequence to point out that the stringent penal 
provision and exemplary large compensation will be helpful to control the 
Abstract 
problem significantly. 
The existing laws have not successfiilly been enforced in the 
unorganized sector which constitutes a fairly major position of the workforce. 
That is why in the unorganized sector of employment, there is excessive 
exploitation of women employees resulting in long working hours, no 
overtime, carrying heavy loads, and unsafe working conditions further women 
employees in the unorganized sector are more vulnerable as they continue to do 
hazardous jobs without any protection. Apart from this they are not getting the 
most needed welfare facilities at the workplace. 
1. The cases of sexual haigg^ si3XenL„at_ work place and that sexual 
discrimination on the basis of sex need to be distinguished very 
carefully. 
2. The personal engaged in the administration of criminal justice be trained 
and educated about the nature of violence against women, violation of 
their human rights at workplace and gender equality. 
3. A grievance redressal cell for women employees should be established 
which may hear and try all cases of sexual harassment of women at 
workplace like a criminal court. They must be autonomous in nature. 
4. The women employees must be educated about the legal provisions and 
procedure relating to the offence of sexual harassment at workplace and 
they be provided a copy of such rules and regulations. 
5. Some protective measures are also necessary like counselling to and 
rehabilitation of victims of sexual harassment at workplace. 
6. To shed the myth of feminism and masculinism public awareness and 
educational programs, gender sensitive training of judges/ magistrate 
and other enforcement agencies is to be made. 
7. Strengthening of women cells in Women Police Station, Counseling 
Centers, Legal Aid Centre, Nyaya Nanchayats to eliminate the violence 
against women. 
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8. Express prohibition of sexual harassment which includes physical 
contact and advances, a demand or request for sexual favour, sexually 
coloured remark, showing pornography or any other unwelcome 
physical, verbal/non-verbal conduct of sexual nature should be noticed, 
published and circulated in appropriate ways. 
9. The rules and regulation of government and public sector bodies relating 
to conduct and discipline should include prohibiting sexual harassment 
and provide appropriate penalties in such rules against the offender. 
10. As regards private employers, steps should be taken to include the 
aforesaid prohibition in the standing orders und the industrial 
employment (Standing Order) Act 1946. 
11. Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of work 
leisure, health, hygiene, to further ensure that there is no hostile 
environment towards women and no woman should have reasonable 
ground to believe that she is disadvantaged in connection with her 
employment. 
12. Where such conduct amounts to specific offence under Indian Penal 
Code or any other law the employer shall initiate appropriate action in 
accordance with the law, by making a complaint with the appropriate 
authority. 
13. Victims of sexual harassment should have the option to seek transfer of 
the perpetrator or their own transfer. 
14. Sexual harassment should be discussed at worker's meeting, employer -
employers meeting and at other appropriate forums. 
15. To make the victim feel more comfortable and free there should be 
special courts to deal with cases of sexual harassment by women 
prosecutors and Judges. This will prevent male point of view 
determining sexual harassment of women. 
16. Court should award high sums of damages especially against 
multinational because of fear of high cbriipensatdry and punitive 
damages most of the multinational companies will prefer to settle sexual 
harassment claim soon. 
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17. The definition of sexual harassment must specifically declare that it is 
for a person to create a sexually hostile or intimidating work 
environment. 
18. Sexual harassment should be declared tort and the court should be 
empowered to award not only ordinary, but also exemplary and punitive 
damages. This would deter not only the wrong doer from repeating his 
conduct but also other like minded people. 
19. Women employees must be educated about their rights because, in most 
of the cases of sexual harassment they do not report the mater due to 
fear of loss of reputation, loss of job, consequent hostile work 
environment, and fear of retaliation in public places. 
20. Employer should ensure confidentiality, protection of the complainant 
from victimization, timely redressal of the complaint, and a work 
environment. They empower women to raise their concerns. 
21. Law relating to indecent representation of women by the media should 
be sternly enforced to stop women being shown is sexual object in films, 
advertisement, and hoardings. 
22. Law should be framed in such a maimer that it not only gives a weapon 
in the hands of women only. 
23. It should be legally ensured that "Women who abstain from work or are 
inefficient in their work do not misuse it. 
24. It should also be ensured that Women employees do not use the law to 
get them transferred. 
25. Employer and senior officer at workplace should be given sufficient 
rights to defend themselves against the charges of sexual harassment. 
26. If it is found that the charges are false then complainant women should 
also be punished. 
27. At the time of framing the laws in favour of women it should be 
maintained that natural justice is not violated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
You can tell the condition of a nation by looking at the status of 
its women. 
Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru 
Men and women are like two wheels of the chariot of life. Just like a house 
needs a beam as well as a pillar, the world needs men and women. Since about half 
of the population of the world comprises of women, the neglect of women implies 
that humanity is deprived of about half of its energy and creativity. For this reason, 
the progress of any country is unthinkable unless women move forward in all 
fields. 
Law can be an effective instrument for bringing social change. Law is 
power. It has been used successfully to achieve equilibrium by regulating socio-
legal relationships, particularly by enacting specific laws for women employees. 
The policy of reservations in favour of the weaker sections in respect of 
employment and education are examples of social justice, which have been 
achieved through the instrumentality of law. 
The women Rights are nationally accepted and constitutionally 
guaranteed to uplift women through socio-economic and educational 
opportunities to satisfy the constitutional goal and social Justice for historical 
reasons.' 
The history of labour legislation in India is more than a century old. 
However, early labour legislation aimed mainly at governing the 
relationship between employers and employees. The measures enacted before 
India's independence for women employees were limited in their scope and 
1. Aruna Goel, Violence and Protective Measures for Women Development and Empowerment, p.49. 
(2004). 
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were not adequate to meet the social and economic needs of the vast number of 
women workers of the country. 
The notion of social justice and economic equality, as regards women, 
was not even thought of by the government. 
After independence, our government enacted laws for the benefit of 
women employees such as provisions that prohibit their employment during 
night hours; in the underground mines and hazardous occupations; restrict 
them from carrying heavy loads; provide for equal pay to men and 
women for identical work; prevent discrimination in their recruitment and 
promotion opportunities; provide maternity relict; welfare measures such 
as creches, separate toilets, rest-rooms, washing facilities, and free legal-
aid for women employees. These laws include the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, 1923; Factories Act, 1948; Minimum Wages Act, 1948; 
Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948; Plantation Labour Act, 1951; Mines 
Act, 1952; Maternity Benefit Act, 1961;Beedi & Cigar Workers' (Conditions of 
Employment) Act, 1966; Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970; 
Medical Termmation of Pregnancy Act, 1971; Equal Remuneration Act, 1976; 
Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976, Inter-State 
Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) 
Act, 1979; Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987; and the Building and Other 
Construction Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of 
Service) Act, 1996. 
However, despite all these labour laws, women's work is still not 
considered to be at par with men's work. Discrimination against women in the 
economic sphere is rampant. Women employees are still being paid less than 
men for the same or similar nature of work. They are also being 
discriminated against in the matters of recruitment and promotion. The 
Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, has, thus, failed to remove these 
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inequalities. Minimum wages for women employees are lower in 
comparison to men, wherever they have been fixed. With regard to 
legislation that provides for special amenities for women employees like 
health and welfare facilities, maternity benefits and creche facilities, violation 
by the employers is common. As a result, women employees often do not get 
the prescribed maternity relief, creche facilities, nursing breaks, separate 
toilet and washing facilities. It is, thus, quite evident that though the 
government passed several laws, which have been in existence for the last 
many decades, the benefits outlined have not yet reached the women 
employees. 
The framers of the Indian Constitution were inspired by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and they saw it that the essence and the spirit 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were incorporated in the 
Constitution of India.^ 
More importantly, the Constitution of India, through Article 14, 
provides for equal status to all in the eyes of the law, that is, not only 
between men and men, women and women, but also between men and 
women. Apart from this, the Constitution, under Article 15, specifically 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, 
or any of them. 
Further, our Constitution provides, by virtue of Article 15(3), that the 
State is empowered to make special laws in favour of women. The logic 
behind this provision is that women are understood as a historically 
disadvantaged group and as such, in need of compensatory or corrective 
treatment. Under this approach, rules or practices that treat women differently 
from men can be upheld, if such rules are designed to improve the status of 
women. 
2. Gonsalves Lina, Women and Human Rights, p.22 (2008). 
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In addition to these Fundamental Rights,^  the Directive Principles 
enshrined in the Constitution of India provide, through Article 39(d), that 
the State shall endeavour to provide all men and women an adequate means 
of livelihood and that there shall be equal pay for equal work for both men 
and women. Above and beyond, Article 42 enunciates that the labour must be 
provided just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief 
Further, our Constitution was amended by the 73rd'' and 74th^  
Amendments to provide for reservation of one-third seats for women in all the 
institutions of local government and posts of chairpersons in such bodies. 
Another proposed Constitution Amendment (84"' Constitution Amendment), 
which contains provision for the reservation of 33 per cent of seats for 
women in the composition of the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly of 
the State, is in the pipeline. The object of these provisions is to raise the 
political status of women and the removal of obstacles preventing the 
participation of women in political life, 
However, the ground reality is that constitutional guarantees have not 
made women really equal. We have miles to go before we can claim any 
laurels. 
Women work harder and for longer hours than men in agriculture, 
industry, and services; in organized and unorganized sectors; in rural as well as 
urban settings; in public and private sectors. But in all these sectors, locations, 
and capacities, in general, it is still the women who occupy the lower ranks and 
earn the lower wages. Their significant contribution to family, society, and to 
the economy is rarely acknowledged.^  Women employees in these sectors are 
treated as bonded labourers and suffer the highest form of discrimination and 
exploitation. Society being male-dominated, women workers receive little 
3. M Nagaraj v. Union of India AIR 2007 SC 71. 
4. Article 280 was amended and Article 243,243A to 2430 was inserted on 20 April 1993. 
5. Article 280 was amended and Article 243P to 243Z,243ZA to243ZE was inserted on 20 Apri] 1993 
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recognition and as such, their socio-economic condition is not up to the 
desired level; the reasons are many. 
In the first instance, laws are not being properly implemented in the 
organized sector and are virtually not being applied at all in the 
unorganized sector where, in fact, women are working in substantially large 
numbers. 
Women and their problem have acquired growing importance both 
in develop and under develop countries and it is widely recognized that 
they have been victim of discrimination everywhere which is manifested 
in many sphere, political, social, economic and employment.^ 
A critical factor that mars the employment prospects of women is the 
reluctance of employers to implement measures beneficial to them. One of the 
main reasons for the nonchalant attitude of employers towards the benefits of 
women is that the punishment is not severe. The penalties laid down in our 
labour laws need to be stiff so that they can act as deterrents. Also, there are 
certain drawbacks in the labour legislation itself which have reduced the 
employment opportunities for women. For example, under the Maternity 
Benefit Act, 1961, employers are required to bear full burden of the 
maternity benefits and as such, they avoid employing women and prefer 
to keep men. Apart from this, some legal measures, although enacted for 
the protection of women employees, have instead proved counter productive 
as the same result in discrimination against women. Also, there are certain 
lacunae in the existing labour legislation. Just for instance, neither the 
Employees' State Insurance Act. 1948, nor the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, 
provide maternity protection to the woman who adopts a newly bom child; both 
these statutes do not provide for paternity leave; Employees State Insurance 
Act, 1948, does not have a provision to give light work to the pregnant 
6. Aruna Goel, Manvinder Kaiir, Ameer Sultana, Violence against Women Issues and Perspective, p. 
171(2004). 
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woman during the advanced stage of pregnancy nor does it provide nursing 
breaks. 
Further, most labour legislation is limited in its coverage and does not 
apply to the unorganized sector, which, in fact, employs the overwhelming 
majority of women workers. Thus, in a way, a large number of women 
employees in the unorganized sector are deprived of legal as well as social 
protection. Overcrowding of women in the unorganized sector is yet another 
factor that is adversely affecting the economic life of women. Hence, 
viable solutions have been proposed as a way to ensure that the female 
workforce in the unorganized sector is not deprived of essential benefits and 
protection. 
Moreover, women employees do not get the stipulated benefits and 
facilities to the desired extent largely due to the fact that they are not 
organized, in the sense that they do not have trade unions of their own. 
Women voicing their feelings, dissent, or preferences are an exception rather 
than the rule. The trade unions are generally male-dominated who do not take 
much interest in the women employees' problems. Apart from this, the trade 
unions as well as the enforcement officials consider the problems of women 
employees as very minor issues. Accordingly, the necessity of encouraging 
women employees to organize themselves and form their own trade unions 
has been appositely emphasized. 
Apart fi-om economic exploitation, there is widespread sexual abuse of 
women workers in establishments cutting across industries. Sexual harassment 
is sex discrimination as it undercuts women's equality at work. Further, when 
sexual harassment occurs, an unsafe and hostile working environment is 
created. The harmful effect of sexual harassment at the workplace^ is so much 
that it alone is capable of undoing the little that women have achieved and 
7. Work place is an area where the employee is required to represent, carryout, perform, or implement 
any duty obligation or service. 
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also hampering their onward march. Candidly speaking, the entire concept of 
gender equality enshrined in the Constitution is futile if a woman's right to live 
with dignity or right to work in a conducive environment or her right to be 
treated on an equal footing with her male counterpart is not ensured by the law 
enforcement agencies and also by society. Inspire of the Supreme Courts 
guidelines in the Vishaka case for combating sexual harassment at the 
workplace, women employees, frequently do face this menace, Women 
continue to suffer denial of justice, delay injustice and distortions in the delivery 
of justice. Consequently, the need for a separate law on the prevention of 
sexual harassment at the workplace has been duly stressed. In this regard, the 
Draft prepared by the Ministry of Women and Child Development, on the 
Protection of Women against Sexual Harassment at Workplace Bill, 2007, is 
of paramount significance and therefore, the same has also been dealt with at 
the appropriate places. 
But the other side of the picture is that it has led to many evils, such as 
gender discrimination physical and mental harassment and more specifically 
sexual harassment at work place.^ 
Women must enjoy full legal rights and they must also be aware of the 
economic, social, and developmental schemes run by the government for their 
benefit. For example, most of the women employees do not know what the 
minimum wages applicable to their category are, or that they are entitled to 
maternity benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, even if the 
Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, is not applicable to them, or that they 
can demand light work during advanced stage of pregnancy without any 
reduction in their remuneration, that they can demand nursing breaks twice a 
day for child up to fifteen months, that their employer, under the Factories Act, 
1948, is required to maintain a creche if there are thirty or more than thirty 
8. Vishaka v. State ofRajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011. 
9. Sttpra note 3 p. 172 
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women in the premises, that their employer is required to provide a separate 
toilet for women and that they can demand a safe work environment. 
Moreover, most women employees do not even know that they are entitled to 
free legal aid in case of dismissal of service and sexual harassment at the 
workplace. Ignorance of statutory provisions is one of the main causes 
leading to continued injustice to women. It is, therefore, absolutely essential 
to make women employees conscious of their rights and help them to 
recognize that they are as integral a part of the society as men. The necessity of 
creating awareness amongst women with regard to their rights, benefits, 
and protections has been vitally accentuated. 
The majority of women employees lack proper education and skill-
training vis-a-vis economic and technological changes. Women should be 
empowered^ with proper education, skills, and training. The year 2001 was 
declared as the Women's Empowerment Year. The National Commission for 
Women considers 'economic empowerment of women' as a thrust area 
affecting the welfare and development of women in the country. 
Necessary steps are required to change society's attitude towards 
women employees and sharing of family responsibilities with men. Moreover, 
women themselves should become instrumental in bringing about the 
desired changes in the society for the reason that they, as mothers, play a key 
role in shaping the welfare of future generations. The dilemma of the dual 
role of a woman employee is a stark reality. The need is to secure and 
sustain a balance between the two, which no doubt is a Herculean task. At 
the same time, it is certainly not impossible if sincere, serious, and pragmatic 
efforts are made in this direction. 
The role of working women today is a necessary characteristic of modem 
society although women's work is activity for her and her family's 
empowerment vis-a-vis the development of society. But the reality is that there is 
very less recognition and economic valuation of her work in market because it is 
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assumed that ''she performs her work for love and affection of her family 
members." 
There has been a great impact of liberalization on women workers. 
Liberalization implies privatization of public sector, lifting of restrictions of 
imports, free entry of multinational corporations, abolishing subsides for the 
erstwhile priority sector, mergers, takeovers, etc. The structural changes have 
caused a large scale "Shedding of labour." Certain studies have shown that 
structural adjustment polices have and adverse effect on women's employment. 
It is also said that these structural changes have curtailed job opportunity in the 
organized sector. The distress sale of female labour, is predicted. Export based 
industrialization using cheap labour, is increasingly used a competitive 
strategy.'^  
Recently, the Ministry of Women and Child Development has prepared a 
draft entitled the protection of Women against Sexual Harassment at Workplace 
Bill 2007, to provide for the prevention and redressal of sexual harassment of 
women at the workplace and for matters connected therewith or incidental 
thereto. 
Now that the Ministry of Women and Child Development has prepared a 
draft entitled 'The Protection of Women Against Sexual Harassment At 
Workplace Bill, 2007', it is abundantly evident that the stage has been set to have 
an exclusive law on prevention and redressed of sexual harassment of women at 
the workplace in due course. The draft Bill makes it mandatory to have 
Internal Complaints Committee. The draft Bill also proposes the appointment 
of a district officer to deal with such complaints. 
According to this Draft Bill, an aggrieved woman," may make a 
complaint of sexual harassment at workplace to the committee in writing . 
10. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti and Schachi Chakarabarly (ed), Gender Justice Working Women and 
Human Rights ,p.\i9. 
11. As per section 2(a) of the Draft Bill. 
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Every employer of a workplace shall constitute an Internal Complaints 
Committee, which shall consist of (a) a chairperson, from amongst 
employees, who shall be a senior level woman, committed to the cause of women. 
In case a senior level woman employee is not available, the chairperson shall be 
appointed from a sister organization or a non-governmental organization; (b) 
not less than two members from amongst employees committed to the cause 
of women or who have had experience in social work; and (c) one member 
from amongst such nongovernmental organizations or associations or other 
interests committed to the cause of women, as may be specified.'^  
The draft entitled 'The Protection of Women against Sexual 
Harassment at Workplace Bill, 2007' further stipulates that during the 
pendency of enquiry, on a written request made by the aggrieved woman, the 
committee may recommend to the employer to transfer the aggrieved woman 
or the respondent to any other workplace; or grant leave to the aggrieved 
woman or grant to the aggrieved woman any other relief which may be 
prescribed."'* The Draft Bill also prescribes punishment for false/malicious 
complaint where the committee arrives at a conclusion that the allegation 
against the respondent is false or malicious or the aggrieved woman or any 
other person making the complaint has produced any forged or misleading 
document.'^ 
Further, the Draft Bill provides for compensation to the aggrieved 
woman. For the purpose of determining the compensation, the committee shall 
have regard to the mental trauma, pain, suffering, and emotional distress caused 
to the aggrieved woman; the loss in the career opportunity due to the incident 
of sexual harassment; medical expenses incurred by the victim for physical or 
12. Section 7 of the Draft Bill. 
13. Section 4 of the Draft Bill. 
14. Section 10 of the Draft Bill. 
15. Section 12 of the Draft Bill. 
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psychiatric treatment; the income and financial status of the respondent and 
feasibility of such payment in lump sump or in installments.'^ 
In addition, the Draft Bill lays down duties of the employer, namely, the 
employer shall provide a safe working environment at the workplace; display 
at any conspicuous place in the workplace the Office Order with regard to the 
Constitution of Internal Complaints Committee; undertake workshops and 
training programmes at regular intervals for sensitizing the members; provide 
necessary facilities to the committee or the local committee, as the case 
may be, to deal with the complaint and conduct enquiry and ensure 
attendance of the respondent and witnesses before the committee and make 
available such information to the committee as it may require with regard 
to the complaint. Notably, the draft bill stipulates that where the employer 
or the district officer fails to constitute internal complaints committee and 
contravenes provisions made there under he or she shall be punished with fine, 
which may extend to Rs. 10,000.'^  
The determination of compensation to be paid to the aggrieved woman 
depends upon the income and financial status of the respondent. If determination 
of compensation depends upon the income and financial status of the 
harasser, then there will be hardly any deterrent effect on the person who 
belongs to the low-income group category. Also, the paltry amount of 
compensation will have no meaning to the aggrieved woman.'' 
Given its large canvas of prevalence, the law-makers had been trying to 
pass an Act which would deal with the menace effectively. After attempts on 
this, the Govt, is presently considering the implementation of The Protection of 
Women against Sexual Harassment at Workplace Bill 2007 and expects to 
16. Section 13 of the Draft Bill. 
17. Section 17 of the Draft Bill. 
18. Section 21 of the Draft Bill. 
19. Section 13 (d) of the Draft Bill. 
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resolve at least some of the anomalies of the Supreme Court judgment on the 
subject and go beyond it. 
The Bill is a progressive one when compared to its predecessor (Sexual 
Harassment of Women at their Work Place (Prevention) Bill, 2003. One of the 
most remarkable features of this Bill has been that the unorganized sector has 
been brought into its fold. The Bill is significant in other respects too; however 
the Bill is not completely devoid of drawbacks. 
The concept of 'workplace' should be interpreted in the context of work 
environment, thus covering the exploitation of power, manifesting in the form 
of harassment in non-working hours and spaces. This will come as a relief to 
those victims who face harassment in informal settings which do not fall under 
the course of employment, but nevertheless still have the hierarchal power 
relations operating. Another problematic area is where the self-employed 
unorganized sector women workers are concerned. For instance, in the case 
of women vegetable vendors whose workplace is the public place/ space, 
when sexually harassed, whom should they approach? Since in most of the 
cases there is no identifiable employer, most of these women are left with the op-
tion of approaching the Local Complaints Committee constituted only at the 
block level. Given the low level of empowerment of these workers and given their 
economic capacity it is clear as how much justice they could get. To cover 
informal workers comprehensively, different grievance mechanisms and 
related procedures for each 'workplace' will need to be defined separately. One 
of the major drawbacks of the bill is that there is neither a provision for the 
third party harassment in the workplace nor an extent of control of the 
employer on such harassment, recognizing outsiders harassing service 
accessory. The proposed Bill is silent about the situations where a third party is 
involved, either as the perpetrator of harassment or as the victim. The Bill 
provides no relief to an employee who is sexually harassed by a third party 
service user. 
12 
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But when one service user is harassed by another, on the same 
premises, a way of holding the service provider accountable needs to be 
worked out. There must be an ombudsperson for sexual harassment in 
custodial situations, such as in police stations. Court premises, remand homes, 
etc, as there the nature of crimes are very serious. Third party to third party 
harassment acquires special significance in the context of educational 
institutions, the major category being comprised of students, and also other 
third party members like the visiting staff, other students visiting the. campus, 
etc. Hospitals also provide an environment where there is an urgent need to 
clarify this issue, owing to the frequency of cases reported in the newspapers 
regarding sexual harassment meted out to patients by neighboring patients, 
and the like. 
Further the involvement of two women employees as members of the 
Internal Complaints Committee is again problematic. 
The question arises as to what if the women employees are in no 
influential or authoritative positions. Will the receptionist, for instance, be able 
to play her role effectively, due to the obvious power hierarchy? It would be 
interesting to note that a 2005 survey by the Confederation of Indian 
Industries reported only 4 percent of women in the organized sector held senior 
management positions. NGO representation in the Committees another 
crucial feature which needs to be properly regulated. A need for specific 
safeguards for the independent functioning of the NGOs is felt. This is 
because if the management selects the NGO, there is quite a possibility of the 
NGO being co-opted by the management. Also, if the NGO members are to 
be paid by the management, once again, it would be doubtful as to how far the 
NGO would be objective and how far will it be able to act unbiased and 
without being under the pres sure of the management. Hence the need of the 
hour is a constant updating of the list of NGOs and group of experts from 
time to time, and ensuring that there is transparency in procedures. The 
13 
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committee formed as proposed by the bill does not have any scope for the 
complainant to participate in the whole proceedings; she should have the 
basic right of being represented, access to documents, being allowed to cross-
examine the witnesses and the accused. Victim's safety as well as that of the 
witnesses should be stressed. She should also be given all the reports of the 
enquiry at the end. However the Bill makes for no such provisions. It has to be 
kept in mind that the sifting of evidence, its corroboration, etc. in such cases 
as these has to done with great care and sensitivity, given the position of In-
dian women. However it would be quite interesting to note that the Bill does 
not lay down any specific guidelines as to how should the Complaints 
Committee conduct the enquiry, completely silent as to whether there is a 
hearing of the parties, who has the burden of proving the same, the standard 
of proof and so on. The proposed Bill does give a choice to the agreed woman 
if she wants to opt for civilization. However it is essential to conduct the entire 
mediation proceedings in an unbiased and sensitive way. It should not bring 
un-called for pressure on the complainant to arrive at a 'settlement'. However 
it is also necessary that the outcome of the mediation process should not affect 
the enquiry proceedings in any way. Rather mediation process should be a part of 
a two fold mechanism. When the offence is minor calling for a warning and in 
case of major offences - a full-fledged enquiry can be conducted. The Bill lacks 
a proper schedule for compensation which would detail the criterion and the 
amount to be given. Further budgetary allocations are an essential aspect that 
needs to be worked out. By this provision, relevant people can be held 
responsible and made answerable to. The Bill is not clear regarding the role of 
the Courts as it relies entirely on the recommendations of the committee but 
does not lay down any specific guidelines as to what should be taken into 
account while giving recommendations. According to the Women Power 
Conglomerate (in 2007), the Bill has to expand its applicability and scope of 
coverage from .a few illustrations to a whole range of incidents of harassment. 
This is because the Bill in the current form does not specify the circumstances 
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under which a woman can bring a charge of harassment. It merely describes 
various scenarios which are more in the way of illustrations and so a 
clarification in the Bill to the same effect shall be beneficial in broadening the 
scope- of the Bill. 
The term 'Protection' in the title of the Act reflects the protectionist 
approach of the State, where the State dons the role of a parents patria. 
Every woman has a Right against sexual harassment. Like Sec, 354 of the 
IPC. The Bill also does not make intention a necessary criterion. Sec. 3 of 
the Bill makes conduct which interferes with work or creates an intimidating 
or offensive or hostile work environment (Sec. 3(iv), hence doesn't really 
talk of intention. 
There is recognition of this menace and there are international 
conventions in place for regulating the same. India has also been a signatory of 
conventions like Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (here in after CEDAW) which has recognized 
the rights of women against sexual harassment. CEDAW enjoins State Parties 
to take measures to eliminate discrimination against women in employment, 
in order to ensure equality, right to safe working conditions and the right to work 
as inalienable rights of all human beings^". All State Parties undertake to adopt 
all necessary measures at the national level to achieve the rights recognised 
under the Convention. '^ The General Recommendation of 1989 recognized 
sexual harassment as a form of violence against women. The General 
Recommendation 19 of 1992 noted that "equality in employment can be 
seriously impaired when women are subjected to gender-specific violence, such 
as sexual harassment in the workplace." The World Conference on Human 
Rights, held in 1993 in Vienna, identified it as human rights violations, while 
the Commission on Human Rights has treated it primarily as a form of 
20. Article 11 of, Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women. 
21. Article CEDAW. 
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violence against women. The Government of India has also ratified the 
Resolution, dated 25.6.1993, undertaking to adopt all necessary measures at 
the national level to work for the full realization of the rights upheld by the 
Convention. Further at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, In-
dia had made an official commitment to formulate and put into operation a 
national policy on women to guide action at every level; and to institutionalize a 
national-level mechanism to monitor implementation of the Platform of 
Action. 
Sexual harassment strips the dignity of the women. It is a crime against 
an individual and against gender. This is why Vishaka concluded that sexual 
harassment is a human rights violation and not an ordinary criminal offence, 
unfortunately, though widely prevalent, there is still no concrete legislation on 
this matter. Hence, taking into account the various drawbacks of the proposed 
Bill, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive Act. 
Aim of Research 
The aim of this research is to find out the causes for the sexual 
harassment, exploitation and increase in crime against working women. Her 
human rights are also to be protected which she is entitled under different 
conventions, laws, conferences. Utmost important is to protect the women 
employees from sexual harassment at work place which is one of the basis 
human rights violations of women employees. 
Though the present women participation in workforce of the country is 
encouraging still more participation can certainly bring a radical change in the 
economic progress this could only be possible when the women is protected at 
her workplace. 
In the present day society criminal victimization of working class 
women is rampant in domestic sphere and in outer world. While adjusting to 
16 
Introduction 
her world of work, she is victimized in family either due to her future as good 
wife or an ideal mother, or victimized at her workplace as an uncommitted 
worker which is violation of her human right and against her dignity as she 
required a workplace which is helpful, cordial so that she can work with her 
full potential. When she ventures to come out from the traditional family 
boundary without any protection to work in the outer world, she is threatened 
by fear of variety of crime. She is being doubly squeezed due to her dual role 
of house wife and working woman. Thus while encouraging women 
participation, which consist of about half of total population into the work force 
in India, their protection and responsibility is now ultimately cast on 
government. 
To encourage large number of women to join the workforce first of all 
sexual harassment is to be eradicated from the workplace by enforcing string 
law and awarding huge some of compensation to the victim by the harasser 
then only she will feel safe at the workplace. 
Although the topic of my research is Protection of Women's Human Right at 
Work Place: A Study of Judicial Response but more emphasis is given on 
Sexual Harassment at Work Place 
Hypothesis 
The position of working class women in resent day society is found to 
be precarious. In the new role while adjusting to her world of works, she is 
failing in all her dimensions and proves to be a fiasco. In society, either in 
domestic sphere or in the outer world, she is encountering varieties of crimes 
due to her inferior social position and sever steps taken by organizations, social 
workers. And government has proved to be fruitless. Criminal exploitation of 
working class women that is sexual harassment can neither be prevented only 
by new enactments nor by enlarging the law enforcing agency but mindset of 
the society has to be changed with regard to woman because several other 
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contributing factor are also responsible for the act of sexual harassment at 
workplace. 
Hence in the modem age, in spite of many women oriented enactments 
programmes and policies, the societal out look could not be changed in favour 
of working class women. They are still in one form or other victimized in all 
walks of their lives. 
Various conventions, covenants, protocols on human right have assumed 
the responsibility to provide and protect human rights of women but are not 
used in latter and sprit. 
Methodology 
Law is a normative science that is a science which lays down norms and 
standard for human behaviour in a specified situation or situations enforceable 
through the sanctions of the state. What distinguishes law from other social 
sciences is its normative character. This fact along with the fact that stability 
and certainty of law, desirable goals and social values to be of primary concern 
to a legal researcher. Doctrinal research of course, involves analysis of case 
law, arranging, ordering and systematizing legal propositions and study of legal 
institutions, but it does more it creates law and its major tools to do so is 
through legal reasoning or rational deduction.. 
The present study is based on the doctrinal method of resjarch^ The 
researcher has drawn help from various books, articles, newspaper, reports, 
conventions, commissions committee and judicial decisions -^ --^  
Chapter wise Introduction 
Introduction - It gives an insight on rights which have been given to 
women in Constitution and other different social security legislations where 
women are deprived and treated inhumanly. It also talks about the pending bill 
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which is related to sexual harassment at workplace. Women rights are 
nationality accepted and constitutionally guaranteed to uplift the status of 
women in all sphere of life. 
Chapter -I 
It deals with the concept of human rights. They by virtue of their being 
humans, possess certain basic and inalienable rights which are commonly 
known as human rights. Since these rights belong to them because of their very 
existence these become operative with their birth. It also covers different 
declarations and conventions which are supposed to be the backbone of human 
rights particularly with reference to women who are being discriminated in 
every sphere of life. 
Chapter-II 
It deals with the position of women in different periods. It is 
complicated to know the position of women therefore to trace her position in 
the historical perspective in the course of history from prehistoric to modem 
times. It covers Vedic period, Medieval period, Pre-independence and Post-
independence. Because if you have to judge the status of a nation, first you 
have to study the status of its women. 
Chapter-Ill 
It deals with the provisions of Constitutions. Being a signatory to 
various international conventions, covenants and protocols on human rights 
India has assumed the responsibility to provide and protect various rights of 
women. Therefore, as regards the Indian Constitution it guarantees not only the 
equality before law and equal protection of laws to women but also confers 
certain affirmative rights. Articles 14, 15, 16 have been provided with equality 
provisions. 
19 
Introduction 
The expression "Equality before law" finds a place in almost all written 
Constitution that guarantees fundamental rights and also has been used in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The Directive principles of state policy contained in part IV of the 
Constitution directs the state to protect the human rights of women including 
the right to equal pay for equal work for men and women both, the right to 
health and work in hygienic condition, the right to maternity benefit and right 
to gender justice etc. 
Chapter-IV 
It is relegated to the position and the important problems concerning life 
and work of the women workers and what are the offences common to the 
working women. To improve the position of women workers recommendations 
are also made for the improvement of existing conditions it also gives an 
insight on what are the factors responsible for the decorating position of 
working women. Lastly, it deals with the provisions of Indian Penal Code 
which are related to offences against women. 
Chapter-V 
It is related to sexual harassment at work place. First it defines sexual 
harassment and then judicial response in protecting women against sexual 
harassment at work place. 
It is not only a crime against the society and the individual but it also a 
bar to achieve and exercise women's right to work in a way it is symptomatic 
of a larger problem of gender violence. 
Conclusion & Suggestion 
In the last chapter conclusion have been given and various suggestions have 
been provided 
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9{uman <Bigfits of Women: 
Jin Overview 
Chapter-I 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN'S: AN OVERVIEW 
Human Rights are basic rights and freedoms that all people are entitled 
to regardless of nationality, sex, national or ethnic origin, race, religion, 
language or other status. 
Human rights include civil and political rights such as right to life 
liberty and freedom of expression, and social, cultural and economic right 
including the right to participate in culture, the right to food, and the rights to 
work and receive an education. Human rights are protected and upheld by 
international and national laws and treaties.' 
A human right is a universal moral right, something which all men, 
every where, at all times ought to have, something of which no one may be 
deprived without a grave affront to justice, something which is owing to every 
human simply because he is human.^ 
Human rights are fundamental to the stability and development of 
countries all around the world. Great emphasis has been placed on International 
conventions and their implication in order to ensure adherence to a universal 
standard of acceptability. 
With the advent of globalization and the introduction of new technology 
these principles gain importance not only in protecting human beings from the 
ill effects of change but also in ensuring that all allowed a shore of the benefits. 
The concept of human rights can be found as far back in time as the age 
of the Greek Philosophers Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Their writings on the 
idea of natural rights contain many of the same principles that are associated 
with human rights. 
1. http://www.amnestryusa.org/human_rights/page.do?id=l 031002. 
2. S. Augender, "Questioning the Universality of Human Rights," 28(1 & 2) 
Indian Socio legal Journal (2002) at 80. 
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On the national level, the conception of Human Rights got its breed to 
originate and develop in the form of religion in different countries and in 
different times. The conception may be felt to originate in the ideas of mercy, 
kindness and pity on human beings in various scriptures. Vedas are the most 
ancient or the first, religious book of mankind, revealed in Aaryaavarta the 
Great Land of Aryans. The following preaching in the Yajurveda throws a 
prism of light on friendly dealing and behaviors with all creatures of the 
world what to say of only human beings: 
Oh Lord Let my eye view is firm in order that all creatures may look 
at me by friendly sight. In the same way I also may see all creatures with 
friendly sight and all of us creatures may see each other in friendly view. 
In most references, leaving lust, anger etc. mental derelictions and 
narrowness, to deal with others with truth and liberality has been preached 
in the Vedas 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' the whole world is certainly one 
family, has been preached and pressed in Vedic literature. And on the 
national level India is the first who have originated and respected the 
conception of International law. In the Babylonian Laws the seeds of 
International Law may be traced in the reign of Laigas Uruka of Laigas (3260 
B.C.) Sergon of Akkar (2300 B.C.) and Hammubaric of Babylon (1792-1750 
B.C.). Similarly, in the Assyrian Laws, in the reigns of Tighalat Pilashar 1^ ' 
(1115-1077 BC) and in the Hittites Laws, in the reign of King Telpenus. 
Similarly, these laws may be found in the jurisprudence of Laoj and 
Confucius (550-478 B.C.). In the city states of Greece the right of equal 
freedom of speech-isogorie, equality before law-isonomia, the right of vote-
jus subragie, the right to be elected to public office- jus honorum, the right to 
trade-jus commercial, the right of access to justice-jus actionis may be found 
to have been prevalent. The roots of protection of human rights may be 
found in the civil law -jus civil and the law of nations -jus gentium of the 
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Romans.^  
JVUgna Carta,—Magna Carta was imposed upon King John by 
the Pretates, Earls and Barons, after having defeat at the hands of the King 
of Franee. This declaration of freedom dealt with the rights of different 
contemporary sections of the society; for instance, that the churches will be 
independent of the control of the King, London and other cities will be free 
to utilize or practice their freedoms and customs. Unjust taxes will not be 
imposed upon traders or businessmen and so on. A very important Article of 
this declaration was Article 39 which provided that no free person shall be 
made a prisoner, evicted by unjust means, exiled from the country, or will 
not be killed or murdered or executed in any way unless such action was 
permissible by some decisions of the House of Lords or the law of the land 
and neither anyone shall be deprived of justice.'* 
Human Rights are derived from the principle of Natural Law. They 
are neither derived from the social order nor conferred upon the individual 
by the society. They reside inherently in the individual human beings 
independent of and even prior to his participation in the society. 
Consequently, they are the result of recognition by the State but they are 
logically independent of the legal system for their existence. Their origin may 
be sought in the natural law and not in the positive law. They are based on 
their intrinsic justification and not on their enactment or recognition by 
certain individuals. They do not depend on any formulation or accepted 
authority. To conclude it may be said that a positive legal system which 
does not recognize human rights is not law. 
The idea that the individual has rights claims upon society, or against 
society: that these rights which society must recognize, on which it is obliged 
3. M P Tondon, Rajesh Tondon, International Law and Human Rights p. 2 (2006). 
4. Vide Wade and Philips, Constitutional Law, p. 6. 
5. Vide Carlos Santigo Niuo ,The Ethics of Human Rights, Clarindon Press, Oxford 1991. p. 10,24. 
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to act, are intrinsic to human rights.^ 
The human rights are inalienable. "Human person possesses rights 
because of the very fact that it is a person, a whole, a master of itself and 
of its acts by natural law, the human person has the right to be respected, is 
the subject of rights, and possesses rights. These are things which are owed 
to a man because of the very fact that he is a man."'' 
Human Rights are the rights that a human being has in virtue of 
whatever characteristics he has those are both specifically and universally 
human. If the only relevant condition for enjoying certain rights is being 
human, and if this property does not admit of degrees, there cannot be 
differences of degree in the extent to which the rights in question are held; 
this is, all human beings have them to the same degree.^ 
Of late the Human Rights Movement has come to the fore. By his 
very nature and fact of birth the human being is said to have natural rights. 
Later, the American Revolution gave rise to a character of the Rights of Man; 
The Russian Revolution has retreated and enlarged it in certain spheres. 
The Indian Constitution has formulated Fundamental Rights. As time 
passed and centuries elapsed after the rumbling of dissent and protest on part 
of Women, they too have been given an equal status in the Constitution of the 
civilized words. Women, constituting half of humanity are coming into their 
own. The irrevocable link between human rights and women's demands is 
becoming, apparent and manifest day by day. Yet there is great disparity 
between theory and practice. Laws are not the only ones to be changed. 
Women's situation has to undergo a transformation. No doubt, the Constitution 
of India has given right to women to contest for legislature and executive 
6. Elaine Pagels, The Roots and Origins of Human Rights, Human Dignity- the internationalization of 
Human Rights, (ed) by Alince H. Hanbin, 1979 p. 2. 
7. J. Mertain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p 65 (D. Anson. Trans. 1951). 
8. Vemard Mayo ,fVhat are Human Rights" Political Theory and the Rights of Man, Ed. By Raphail, 
D.D. Mac Millan, 1967 p.68. 
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bodies, yet in reality women's are denied these rights.' 
Women do not derive greater privileges nor higher status than men, 
what they demand is equality with men. Of course for her service to humanity 
in perpetuating the human race, she has to be respected and honoured. 
The rights of women irrespective of constitutional guarantees of equality 
before the laws and equal protection of the laws remain today by the 
large unrealized aspirations. As women became more and more conscious of 
discrimination against them in various forms they started asserting their right 
to equality. All over the globe to begin with women had no political rights. 
Initially the right to vote was restricted to propertied men only.'" 
In the USA by the 19"' amendment of the Constitution women acquired 
equal rights. In Canada until 1916 women were denied to participate in 
federal as well as provincial elections. From 1916 onwards various 
Dominion Acts were passed to enfranchise women. 
In U.K universal adult franchise was granted only in 1949. 
Later on Switzerland granted equal political rights to women. India 
straight away look the plunge when its framed its Constitution and granted the 
right to vote to all its citizens who have had no meaning of a preponderant 
majority of its population had been dewed the right to vote on grounds of 
poverty, illiteracy and sex. Then it could not have provided a Government of 
the people and by the people." 
Equality is the cornerstone of every democratic society which 
aspires to social justice and human rights. In virtually all societies and 
spheres of activity women are subjected to inequalities in law in fact. This 
situation is both caused and exacerbated by the existence of discrimination 
in the family, in the community and in the work place. While causes and 
9. Laxmi Devi ,Crime, Atrocities and Violence Against Women and Related Law and Justice, (ed). 
p.335(I998). 
10. Raj Kumar; Violence against Women, (ed) p.23 (2000). 
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consequences may very from country to country, discrimination against 
women it wide spread. 
The concept of equality means more then treating all persons in the 
same way. Equal treatment of persons in unequal situations will operate to 
perpetuate rather than eradicate injustice. True equality can only emerge 
from efforts directed towards addressing and correcting these situational 
imbalances it is this broader view of equality which has become the 
underlying principle and the final goal in the struggle for recognition and 
acceptance of the human rights of women. 
The International Community has become aware of the need to 
achieve equality between the sexes and of the fact that on equitable society 
cannot be attained if fundamental human rights of half of human society, 
i.e. women, continue to be denied and violated. However, the bleak reality 
is that the harmful traditional practices focused on in this fact sheet have been 
performed for male benefits. Female sexual control by men, and the 
economic and political subordination of women, perpetuate the inferior 
status of women and inhibit structural and altitudinal changes necessary to 
Eliminate gender inequality.'^  
UN and Human Rights of Women 
The first time agreement was reached that women's rights and human 
rights were indivisible was the declaration and programme of Action in 
1933 at Vienna, calling for integration of women's rights in United Nations 
human right initiative it asserted that certain gender specific attack which 
violate human rights constitute violating of women's right also. Declaring 
that the elimination of violence against women is an obligation upon state 
under the human right charter. 
W. Ibid, 02. 
12. Digumasti Shaskara Rao, Digumarti Pushpalatha Rao, Women and International Action, (ed)- p. 107 
(1999). 
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The principle of equal protection and non-discrimination on the basis 
of sex is clearly enshrined in the United Nations Charter. The United 
Nations charter call for promoting respect for human rights for all without 
distinction on the basis of face, sex, language or religion.'^ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 
further elaborated the scope of human rights. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the basic 
international statement of the inalienable and inviolable rights of all 
members of the humanity family, it is intended to serve as "the common 
standard of achievement for all people and all nations" in the effort to 
secure universal and effective recognition and observance of the rights and 
freedom it tests. The declaration is accepted almost universally as a gauge 
by which Government can measures their progress in the protection of 
human rights. In the United Nations organs, the declaration has an 
authority surpassed only by the charter. 
Member states have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with 
the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect and observance of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Thus, Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual 
and every organ of society, keeping the declaration constantly in mind, shall 
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of 
member states themselves and among the people of territories under their 
jurisdiction. 
13. Anu Saxena, Gender and Human Right, (ed) p.l 2004. 
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UDHR symbolized an incredible achievement and signaled 
humanity's comprehensive attempt to deal with four freedoms freedom 
of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and 
freedom from fear.'"* 
The hope of the UN that the UDHR would enshrine a new world 
order rooted in the dignity of the person and a commitment to eliminate 
material inequalities and enable freedom, peace and justice to flourish 
was a commendable. Initially propose 1947, it was guided through the 
General Assembly procedure by first lady Elearnor Roosevelt and 
adopted with out dissent on lO"" December 1948, when fourth eight 
member Nation of the UN General Assembly voted in favour, eight 
abstained and to were absent. Given the range of regimes, political 
philosophies, and cultural understanding among this group their 
agreement in defense of human rights was a bold move forward in the 
history of humanity and for the first time made human rights universal 
issue." 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should, act towards 
one another in a spirit of brotherhood '^  
Article 1 of UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
thus proclaims the inherent freedom and equality in dignity and rights of all 
human being. 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. 
14. Elisabeth Relichart,(ed) Challenges in Human Right A social work perspective, ;». 19(2009). 
\5. Ibid. p. 20. 
16. Article I of Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. 
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Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the 
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory 
to which a person belongs, whether it is independent, trust, non-self-
governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty." 
As noted above, a remarkable thing about the Universal Declaration 
is that it is neither addressed to nations nor member State of the U.N but to 
every individual. 
Civil and Political Rights 
Right to life, liberty and security of person." 
Prohibition of slavery and slavery trade. " 
Prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.^ " 
Right to be recognized as a person before law.^ ' 
Equality before the law and equal protection of law against any 
discrimination in violation of the Declaration.^ ^ 
Right to effective remedy by the competent national tribunals." 
Prohibition of arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.^ " 
Right to a full equalit>' to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal." 
Right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in public 
17./*/•</., Article 2. 
18./6/rf., Articles. 
19.//>/</., Article 4. 
20. Ibid., Article 5. 
2\.Ibid, Article 6. 
22. Ibid, Article 7. 
23. Ibid. Article 8. 
24. Ibid. Article 9. 
25. Ibid. Article 10. 
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trial.'' 
Freedom from ex-post facto laws." 
Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, 
correspondence or attack on honour or reputation and right to protection by 
law against such interference.'* 
Right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of State." 
Right to leave any country, including his own and to return to his country.'" 
Rights to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from prosecution respect 
or political crimes.'' 
Right to nationality. 32 
Freedom from arbitrary deprival of nationality and right change 
nationality." 
Right to marry and to found a family and equal right as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution.^" 
Right to own property and freedom form arbitrary deprival of property." 
Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
Right to freedom of opinion and expression." 
Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.^ 
36 
38 
26. Ibid., Article 11 para 1. 
27. Ibid., Article 11 para 2. 
28./fe/rf. Article 12. 
29. Ibid, Article 13 para 1. 
30. Ibid, Article 13 para 2. 
31./6/rf, Article 14. 
32. Ibid, Article 15 para 1. 
33. Ibid., Article 15 para 2. 
34. Ibid., Article 16 para 1. 
35./6W., Article 17. 
36./6/rf, Article 18. 
37./6/V/., Article 19. 
30 
_ ^ Cfiapter-I 
Right to take part in the government of his country." 
Right of equal access to public service in his country."" 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Right to social security and the right to realization of the economic, social 
and cultural rights indispensable, for his dignity and the free development of 
his personality."' 
Right to work free choice of employment, just and favourable conditions of 
work and protection against unemployment."^ 
Right to equal pay for equal work."^  
Right to just and favourable remuneration."" 
Right to form and to join trade Unions."^ 
Right rest and leisure."^ 
Right of living adequate for the health and well-being himself and his 
family."' 
Right of all children to enjoy same social protection."* 
Right education."' 
Right of parents to choose the kind of education for their children.'" 
38. Ibid, Article 20. 
39. Ibid, Article 21 paral. 
40. Ibid, Article 21 para 2. 
41./Wrf, Article 22. 
42. Ibid, Article 23 para 1. 
43. Ibid, Article 23 para 2. 
44. Ibid, Article 23 para 3. 
45. Ibid., Article 23 para 4. 
46. Ibid, Article 24. 
47. Ibid, Article 25 para !. 
48. Ibid, Article 25 para 2. 
49 .Ibid, Article 26 para 1. 
50. Ibid, Article 26 para 3. 
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Right to protection of moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author" 
1. Men and women of fiill age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. 
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. 
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of 
the intending spouses. 
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by society and the State. 
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized." 
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible. 
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing 
due recognition and respect for the rights and fi-eedoms of others and of 
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society. 
3. These rights and freedoms welfare may in no case be exercised contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations," 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at 
the destruction of any of the rights and fireedoms set forth herein.''* 
51 ./6/V/., Article 27 para 2 
52. Ibid. Article 28. 
53. Ibid, Article 29. 
54. Ibid, Article 30. 
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It provides the basis for the formulation by the United Nations of covenants 
and conventions declarations and recommendations on specific aspects. The 
rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration can be broadly divided into two 
kinds. The first refer to civil and political rights, which include the right to life 
Liberty and security for person, freedom from slavery and torture, equality 
before the Law: protection against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, the right to a 
fair trial, the right to own property, political participation, the right to marriage, 
the fundamental freedoms to thought conscience and religion. Opinion 
and expression freedom of peaceftil assembly association and the right to take 
part in the govt, of his/her country, directly or through freely chosen 
representative. The second, UDHR sets out 30 articles, Article 1 and of the 
declaration state that all human beings are bom equal in dignity and a rights are 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the declarations without 
distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion political 
or other opinion national or social origin, property birth or other statute. 
Article 3 to 21 of the Declaration set forth the civil and political rights to whidi all 
human beings are cultural, including: 
- The right of life liberty and security of person 
- Freedom from slavery and servitude 
- Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment 
- The right to recognition every where as a person before the law, the right to an 
effective judicial, remedy, freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile the 
right to a fair trail and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. 
- Freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home or 
correspondence freedom from attacks upon honour and reputation; the right to 
protection of the law against such attacks. 
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- Freedom of movements, right of asylum; right to a nationality. 
- The right to marry and to have a family, the right to own property. 
- Freedom ofopinion and expression. 
- The right to peaceful assembly and association.' 55 
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not equally 
binding over the years, its main principles have acquired fee status of 
standards, which should be respected by all states. When the Declaration was 
adopted, there were only 58 members States of the United Nations. Since that 
time this number has more than tripled. The continuing impact of the 
Declaration and the use made of it bears out it universal acceptance and it 
become a common reference in human rights for all nations. 
Above all the declaration has realized that everyone is entitled to a social 
and international order in which the right and freedom set forth in the declaration 
can be fully realized." However the rights recognized in the Declaration are not 
absolute. Such limitation as determined by law may be impose for the purpose of 
securing due recognition and respect for the rights freedom of other and of meeting 
the just requirement of morality, public order and General welfare in a democratic 
society." These right and freedom may in no case be exercise by State, group of 
individual contrary to the purpose and principle of the United Nation.'* 
The declaration is a common standard of achievements for all people and all 
nations it is a set of fundamental principles that applies to all people because it is 
rooted in the universal needs of the human conditions. 
The declaration insists, however that this recognition and observance of 
human rights has to be universal and effective. It is not enough that the State sign 
55. N.K. Padhi, Protection of Human Rights and National Human Rights Commission Reflection, p. 33 
(2007). 
56. Article 28, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
57. Ibid.. Article 29 (2). 
58. Ibid. Article 29 (3) 
34 
Cfiapter-I 
up to human rights treatise, if they continue to violate rights within their country. It 
is not enough for States to appraise other countries according to the standards of 
human rights, if they are not prepared to accept such standards themselves/'' 
The provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are cited as 
justification for actions taken by the U.N. They have also inspired international 
conventions both within and outside the U.N. in a large number of instances, the 
Universal Declaration has been used as a conduit ad a yardstick to measure the 
degree of respect for and compliance with the international standard of human 
rights. 
It has a great moral and political force behind it and serves as a general 
guide, code of conduct or yardstick from which the action of men and women 
and nations are judge so far as the respect for and observance of human rights are 
concerned. 
The Universal Declaration which was originally conceived as a 
Statement of objectives to be achieved by Government and as such, no part of 
binding law, has now (53 years later) been accepted by so many States to be 
an international standard against which their behaviour is measured. Indeed 
the Universal Declaration has become legally binding constituting an 
authoritative interpretation of the Charter and as new rules of customary 
international law binding on all States. To some extent at least the 
Declaration has by custom recognized, as laying down rules binding upon 
States. 
Convention on The Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, 1979 (Cedaw) 
The convention sets out in legally binding form, internationally accepted 
principles on the right of women which are applicable to all women in all fields. 
This milestone in the protection of women's human rights was adapted by 
59. A.N. Roy, Human Rights, Task, Duties and Function, p. 35 (2007). 
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United Nation General Assembly in December 1979 60 
The convention seeks to address pervasive social, cultural and 
economic discrimination against women, declaring that state should. 
Endeavour to modify social and cultural patterns of conduct that stereotype 
either sex or put women in an inferior position. It also declares that state 
should ensure that women have equal rights in education and equal access to 
information, eliminate discrimination against women in access to health care, 
and end discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and 
family relations. The convention declares that State must act to eliminate 
violations of women's rights whether by private person groups or 
organizations. 
The convention set clearer definitions and standards than the earlier 
covenants with respect to gender equality and expands the protection against 
discrimination. In particular it recognizes that because socially defined 
gender roles differ, provisions against discrimination and abuse can not 
simply require equal treatment of men and women.*' 
CEDAW seeks to advance women's human rights protection by 
applying a gender perspective to principles enunciated in the UDHR. CEDAW 
was the first human right treaty to define discrimination against women. Its first 
16 Articles call on governments to ensure the eradication of such abuses in 
practically all walks of life. 
In Articles 5, CEDAW also hold government's responsible taking steps 
to modify practices based on stereotypes about women's inferiority. The 
implication of this article is that discriminatory cultural, traditional, or religious 
practices may be harmful to women and girls and that government is responsible 
to take steps to modify or eliminate them. 
For the purposes of the present convention, the term "discrimination against 
60. Mohini Chatterjee, Women's Human Rights, p. 88 (2005). 
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women" shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of 
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis 
of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.*^ 
Provides a comprehensive definition of discrimination which is then 
applicable to all provisions of the convention. In contrast to the International 
Bill of Human Rights, which simply refers to "distinction" or 
"discrimination" on the basis of sex, Article 1 gives a detailed explanation 
of the meaning of discrimination specifically against women. Such 
discrimination encompasses any difference in treatment on the grounds of 
gender which: Intentionally or unintentionally disadvantages women; 
Prevents society as a whole from recognizing women's rights in both the 
domestic and public spheres. 
Prevents women from exercising the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms to which they are entitled. 
In a number of countries throughout the world, women are denied 
their basic legal rights, including the right to vote and the right to own 
property. Such instances of legally entrenched differentiation will be 
easily identified as discriminatory. At the same time, not every 
differentiation will constitute discrimination. The definition set out above 
makes it clear that, in addition to establishing the criterion of 
differentiation sex, it is also necessary to consider the outcome of the 
differentiation. If the result is a nullification or impairment of equal rights in 
any of the forms set out above then the differentiation is discriminatory 
and therefore prohibited under the Convention. 
Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to 
61. Indrani Sen Gupta (ed), Human Rights of Minorities and Women's p. 3 (2005). 
62. Article 1 of Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, 
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pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: 
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their 
national Constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet 
incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate 
means, the practical realization of this principle; 
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including 
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against 
women. 
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis 
with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other 
public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of 
discrimination. 
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against 
women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in 
conformity with this obligation. 
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against 
women by any person, organization or enterprise. 
(Q To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women. 
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination 
against women." 
Establishes, in a general way, the obligations of States under the 
Convention and the policy to be followed in eliminating discrimination 
against women. By becoming parties to the Convention, States accept the 
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responsibility to take active steps to implement the principle of equality 
between men and women into their national Constitutions and other 
relevant legislation. States should also eliminate the legal bases for 
discrimination by revising existing laws and civil, penal and labour 
codes. It is not enough merely to insert anti-discrimination clauses into 
legislation. The Convention also requires States to protect women's rights 
effectively and provide women with opportunities for recourse and protection 
against discrimination. They should incorporate sanctions into legislation that 
deter discrimination against women, and establish a system for filing complaints 
within national tribunals and courts. States to the Convention must take steps to 
elimmate discrimination in both public and private spheres. It is not enough to 
strive for vertical gender equality of the individual woman vis-a-vis public 
authorities, States must also work to secure non-discrimination at the horizontal 
level, even within the family. 
Article 2 recognizes that legislative changes are most effective when 
made within a supportive framework, i.e. when changes in the law are 
accompanied by a simultaneous change in the economic, social, political and 
cultural spheres. Under sub-paragraph (f) States not only requires to modify 
laws, but also to work towards the elimination of discriminatory customs and 
practices. 
States shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, 
economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for 
the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men "^ 
Defines the appropriate measures in all fields which should be taken to 
implement the policies set out in Article 2. It also serves to demonstrate the 
63. Ibid., Article 2. 
64. Ibid., Article 3. 
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indivisibility and interdependence of the rights guaranteed by the Convention 
and the basic human rights to which all persons are entitled. Other United 
Nations instruments already guarantee equal dignity and rights for all human 
beings. Article 3 recognizes that, unless States take active steps to promote the 
advancement and development of women, they will not be able to enjoy folly 
the basic human rights guaranteed in the other instruments. 
1. Adoption by States of temporary special measures aimed at 
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be 
considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but 
shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or 
separate standards, these measures shall be discontinued when the 
objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. 
2. Adoption by States of special measures, including those measures contained 
in the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be 
considered discriminatory." 
Recognizes that, even if women are given legal (de jure) equality, this 
does not automatically guarantee that they will in reality be treated equally (de 
facto). To accelerate women's actual equality in society and in the workplace. 
States are permitted to use special remedial measures for as long as inequalities 
continue to exist. The Convention thus reaches beyond the narrow concept 
of formal equality and sets its goals as equality of opportunity and equality of 
outcome. Positive measures are both lawful and necessary to achieve these 
goals. 
At its seventh session, in 1988, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women noted that significant progress had been made 
in guaranteeing women's legal equality, but that further steps needed to be 
taken to promote their de facto equality. In its general recommendation No. 5 
65./ft/o'., Article 4. 
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adopted at that Session, the Committee recommended that. 
States make more use of temporary special measures such as positive 
action, preferential treatment or quota systems to advance women's integration 
into education, the economy, politics and employment. 
These special measures should be used simply to speed up the 
achievement of de facto equality for women, and should not create separate 
standards for women and men. In other words the appropriateness of any 
special measures should be evaluated with regard to the actual existence of 
discriminatory practices. Consequently, once the objectives of equality of 
opportunity and treatment are reached, these special measures are no longer 
needed and should be discontinued. 
There will, however, always be exceptional cases where special 
treatment is the only way to guarantee true equality, the individual and 
community interests of children, for example, require continuous 
consideration of the health, income and earnings of mothers. Special 
measures to protect maternity are therefore always necessary and should 
never be abandoned. 
States shall take all appropriate measures; 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the 
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles 
for men and women. 
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of 
maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common 
responsibility of men and women in the upbringing and development of 
their children, it being understood that the interest of the children is the 
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primordial consideration in all cases, 66 
The importance of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women lies in the fact that it adds new, 
substantive provisions to the other instruments which also deal with equality 
and non-discrimination. Article 5 recognizes that, even if women's legal 
equality is guaranteed and special measures are taken to promote their de facto 
equality, another level of change is necessary for women's true equality. 
States should strive to remove the social, cultural and traditional patterns 
which perpetuate gender-role stereotypes and to create an overall framework 
in society that promotes the realization of women's full rights. The 
prevalence of gender-role stereotypes is seen most particularly in the 
traditional concept of women's role in the domestic sphere. Many women are 
denied an education because their role is considered primarily as one of caring 
for the family. Moreover, this role is often viewed as unimportant and not, 
in itself, worthy of an education. Sub-paragraph (b) of Article 5 calls on 
States to ensure that education includes a proper understanding of the 
important role of maternity as a social fiinction. It also requires that States 
recognize the raising of children as a responsibility that should be shared by 
women and men, and not as a task that is borne by women alone. This 
may well require the development of social infrastructures (e.g. paternal leave 
schemes) which would make possible a sharing of parental duties. 
States shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of 
women." 
Urges States to take all appropriate measures to combat traffic in 
women and exploitative prostitution. In addressing these problems, it is 
essential for States to consider and act upon the conditions which are at the 
66. Ibid, Article 5. 
67. Ibid, Article 6. 
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root of female prostitution: underdevelopment, poverty, drug abuse, illiteracy, 
and lack, of training, education and employment opportunities. States should 
also provide women with alternatives to prostitution by creating 
opportunities through rehabilitation, job-training and job-referral 
programmes. 
States which tolerate the existence of exploitative prostitution, 
girl-child prostitution and pornography (which are always exploitative), 
and other slave-like practices are in clear violation of their obligations under 
this Article. It is not enough to enact laws against such injustices; in order 
adequately to discharge their responsibilities. States must ensure that 
measures are taken to implement penal sanctions fully and effectively. 
States shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country 
and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal tenns with men, the 
right: 
(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for 
election to all publicly elected bodies. 
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the 
implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all 
public functions at all levels of government. 
(c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations 
concerned with the public and political life of the country.^ * 
States shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal 
terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to 
represent their Governments at the international level and to 
participate in the work of international organizations. 
68. Ibid. Article 7. 
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Requires States to undertake two levels of action to create equality 
for women in political and public life. First, States must broaden the rights 
guaranteed in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil arid Political 
Rights and ensure to women the right to vote in all elections and public 
referenda of particular importance for women is the right to vote 
anonymously. Women who are not allowed to vote anonymously are 
often pressured to vote in the same way as their husbands and are thus 
prevented from expressing their own opinions. 
Secondly, Article 7 recognizes that, while it is essential, the right to 
vote is not in itself sufficient to guarantee the real and effective 
participation of women in the political process. The article therefore requires 
States to ensure to women the right to be elected to public office and to hold 
other government posts and positions in non-governmental organizations. 
These obligations can be realized by including women on lists of 
governmental candidates, affirmative action and quotas, eliminating 
gender restrictions for certain posts, increasing promotion rates for 
women and developing government programmes to attract larger numbers 
of women into meaningful (as opposed to merely nominal) political 
leadership roles. 
1. States shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain 
their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage to an 
alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall 
automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force 
upon her the nationality of the husband. 
2. States shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality 
of their children. States shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to 
women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, 
the opportunity to represent their Governments at the international level 
and to participate in the work of international organizations. While many 
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of the decisions which directly affect the lives of women are made within 
their own countries, important political, legal and social trends are both 
forged and reinforced at the international level. For this reason it is 
essential that women are adequately represented in international for a as 
members of government delegations and as employees of international 
organizations.*' 
The goal of equal representation of women at the international 
level is still far from being realized. In general recommendation No. 8 
adopted at its seventh session, in 1988, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women recommended that, in implementing Article 8 
of the Convention, States make use of temporary special measures such as 
affirmative action and positive discrimination as envisaged by Article 4. States 
should also use their influence in international organizations to ensure 
adequate and equal representation of women. 
States shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or 
retain their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage 
to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall 
automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force 
upon her the nationality of the husband. States shall grant women equal 
rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children.™ 
There are two basic obligations contained in Article 9. First, it requires 
States to guarantee women the same rights as men to acquire, change or 
retain their nationality. For example, many countries discriminate against 
female nationals who marry foreigners. Foreign wives of male nationals 
may be permitted to acquire their husband's nationality, but foreign husbands 
of female nationals are not granted the same right. The result in such cases 
is that men who marry foreigners are allowed to remain in their country of 
69. Ibid, Articles. 
70. Ibid., Article 9. 
45 
Cfiapter-I 
origin, whereas women who marry foreigners may be forced to move to their 
husband's country of origin. Such a law would be considered 
discriminatory and should therefore be amended. 
Secondly, Article 9 requires States to extend to women the same 
rights as men regarding the nationality of their children. In many countries, 
children automatically receive the nationality of the father. In implementing 
this article, States must establish formal legal equality between men and 
women with regard to acquiring, changing or retaining nationality and 
conferring it upon their spouse or children 
States shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of 
education and in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women. 
(a) The same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to 
studies and for the achievement of diplomas in educational 
establishments of all categories in rural as well as in urban areas; this 
equality shall be ensured in ore-school, general technical, professional 
and higher technical education, as well as in all types of 
vocational training; 
(b) Access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff with 
qualifications of the same standard and school premises and 
equipment of the same quality. 
(c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and 
women at all levels and in all forms of education by encouraging 
co-education and other types of education which will help to achieve 
this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks and school 
programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods. 
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(d) The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and other study 
grants. 
(e) The same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing 
education, including adult and functional literacy programmes, 
particularly those aimed at reducing, at the earliest possible time, any 
gap in education existing between men and women. 
(f) The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the organization of 
programmes for girls and women who have left school prematurely. 
(g) The same opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical 
education. 
(h) Access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health 
and well-being of families, including information and advice on family 
planning. '^ 
Recognizes that equality in education forms the foundation for women's 
empowerment in all spheres, in the workplace, in the family and in wider 
society. It is through education that traditions and beliefs which reinforce 
inequality between the sexes can be challenged, thereby helping to break 
down the legacy of discrimination handed from one generation to the next. 
The obligations of States under Article 10 can be conveniently divided into 
three categories. The first obligation is equality of access. There are very 
few places in the world where women are denied a formal right to 
education. However, true equality in education requires the development of 
specific and effective guarantees to ensure that female students are provided 
with access to the same curricula and other educational and scholarship 
opportunities as male students. In many countries, parents do not expect 
their daughters to have careers outside the home. Consequently, girl-children 
are encouraged to leave school after completing only a basic or elementary 
71./6/c/., Article 10. 
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education- Even at the elementary level; male students may be given a more 
rigorous and demanding, curriculum than their female classmates- States 
should reform the education system so that it no longer creates or permits the 
existence of separate standards and, opportunities for females and males. In 
addition. States should, where necessary, create special programmes to encourage 
female students to further their education and to encourage parents to permit 
this. Such encouragement could take the form of scholarship funds designed for 
female students attending universities and technical and vocational schools. 
1. States shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis 
of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular. 
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings. 
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the 
application of the same criteria for selection in matters of 
employment. 
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to 
promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of service 
and the right to receive vocational training and retraining, 
including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and 
recurrent training. 
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal 
treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of 
treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work. 
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases retirement, 
unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other 
incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave. 
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working 
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conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction. 
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of 
marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States 
shall take appropriate measures. 
(a) To prohibit subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the 
grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in 
dismissals on the basis of marital status. 
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable 
social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or 
social allowances. 
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social 
services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work 
responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through 
promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-care 
facilities. 
To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types 
of work proved to be harmful to them." 
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be 
reviewed periodically in the light of scientific and technological 
knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or extended as necessary. 
States Cleary that women shall enjoy the basic human right to work. It 
then sets out a comprehensive list of obligations of States in order to ensure 
that this right can be fully and effectively realized. 
First, States must guarantee women the same employment rights and 
opportunities as men. It is not sufficient for a State to outlaw discriminatory 
hiring practices. Equal employment opportunities, for example, presume 
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equality in opportunities to prepare for employment through education and 
vocational training. In the recruitment process, women must be subject to 
the same hiring criteria as men. 
Secondly, women must have the right to free choice in selecting a 
profession, and must not be automatically channelled into traditional "women's 
work". To discharge this obligation, States must grant women full equality in 
education and employment opportunities and must work towards the creation 
of social and cultural patterns which allow all members of society to accept and 
work towards the presence of women in many different types of career. 
Thirdly, women in the workplace must have the right to equal 
remuneration and all work-related benefits. States must guarantee women equal 
pay for equal work, as well as equal treatment for work of equal value and 
equal treatment in evaluating the quality of work. Women are also to enjoy 
the protection of social security. Provision should be made for paid leave as 
well as retirement, unemployment, sickness and old-age benefits. 
Fourthly, women in the workplace must be protected from discrimination 
based on marital status or matemity. The wording of this provision is very clear. 
States must prohibit employers from using pregnancy or marital status as a 
criterion in the hiring or dismissal of women employees. States must also take 
measures that allow parents to combine family obligations with work 
responsibilities, by giving them benefits such as paid matemity leave, child-care 
subsidies and special health protection during pregnancy. 
Finally, true equality in employment requires the implementation of 
measures to protect women from all forms of violence in the workplace. One 
of the most prevalent forms of violence against women in the workplace is 
sexual harassment of women by male co-workers. Instead of being treated as 
equal co-workers, women are often treated as sexual objects. In. response to this 
72./*/(/., Article 11. 
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widespread problem, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, in general recommendation No. 12 adopted at its eighth session, in 
1989, called on States to include in their reports to the Committee information 
on legislation against sexual harassment in the workplace. In 1992, the 
Committee recommended that States adopt effective legal measures, including 
penal sanctions, civil remedies and compensatory provisions, to protect women 
against all kinds of violence, including sexual assault and sexual harassment 
in the workplace. 
1. States shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, access to health care services, including 
those related to family planning. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, States shall 
ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, 
confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where 
necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation. 
Specifically requires States to ensure the equality of women and men in 
access to health care services. This requires the removal of any legal and social 
barriers which may operate to prevent or discourage women from making full 
use of available health care services. Steps should be taken to ensure access 
to health care services for all women, including those whose access may be 
impeded through poverty, illiteracy or physical isolation. 
While not yet a universally recognized right in itself, the ability of a 
woman to control her own fertility is fundamental to her full enjoyment of 
the full range of human rights to which she is entitled, including the right to 
health. In recognition of this fact. Article 12 makes specific reference to the area 
of family planning. Both women and men must have a voluntary choice in 
planning their families, and States must accordingly make available 
information and education about medically approved and appropriate 
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methods of family planning. Any laws which operate to restrict a woman's 
access to family planning or any other medical services (e.g. by requiring prior 
permission of her husband or a near relative as a prerequisite for treatment or 
for the provision of information) would be contrary to this article and 
consequently should be amended. Where laws requiring the spouse's 
authorization for medical treatment or for the provision of family planning 
services have previously existed and subsequently been amended, States 
should ensure that medical workers as well as the community are informed that 
such authorization is not required and that the practice is contrary to the 
rights of women. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 12 recognizes that women need extra care and 
attention during pregnancy and the post-natal period. States must recognize 
women's needs both as providers and receivers of health care during these 
times, and must ensure that they have access to adequate health care facilities 
and resources, including adequate nutrition during and after pregnancy. 
It is estimated that, each year, at least half a million women die from 
causes related to pregnancy and childbirth, most of these deaths occurring in 
the developing countries of Asia and Africa. Implementation of the 
provisions of Article 12 is an essential first step in reducing the high rate of 
maternal deaths. 
In its examination of the scope and application of Article 12, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has focused 
particularly on ending discrimination against women in national AIDS 
strategies. General recommendation No. 15, adopted by the Committee at its 
ninth session, in 1990, calls on States to enhance women's role as care 
providers, health workers and educators in the prevention of infection with 
HIV, and to give special attention to the subordinate position of women in some 
societies which makes them especially vulnerable to HIV infection. 
1. States shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
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areas, 
2. States shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on a basis of equality 
of men and women that they participate in and benefit from rural 
development and, in particular, shall ensure to such women the right. 
(a) To participate in the elaboration and implementation of development 
planning at all levels. 
(b) To have access to adequate health care facilities, including 
information, counselling and services in family planning. 
(c) To benefit directly from social security programmes. 
(d) To obtain all types of training and education, formal and non-formal, 
including that relating to functional literacy, as well as, inter alia, 
the benefit of all community and extension services, in order to 
increase their technical proficiency. 
(e) To organize self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain 
equal access to economic opportunities through employment or self-
employment. 
(f) To participate in all community activities. 
(g) To have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing facilities, 
appropriate technology and equal treatment in land and agrarian 
reform as well as in land resettlement schemes. 
(h) To enjoy to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, 
transport and communications.'"' 
1. States shall accord to women equality with men before the law. 
73./Wo:, Article 13. 
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2. States shall accord to women, in civil m^¥terl,MTegal capacity identical to 
that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In 
particular, they shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to 
administer property and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure 
in courts and tribunals. 
3. States agree that all contracts and all other private instruments 
of any kind with a legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal 
capacity of women shall be deemed null and void. 
4. States shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard 
to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to 
choose their residence and, domicile. Recognizes that rural women are a 
group with special problems needing careful attention and consideration by 
States. In addition, by extending the Convention to women in rural areas. 
States are explicitly recognizing the importance of the work of rural 
women and their contribution to the well-being of their families and the 
economy of their countries. This emphasis on development is unique in a 
human rights treaty and represents clear acknowledgement of the 
fundamental link between achieving equality and involving women in 
the development process. Article 14 requires States to eliminate 
discrimination against women in rural areas, to implement their right to 
adequate living conditions; and to take special measures to ensure them, 
on a basis of equality with men, the same participation in and benefits of 
rural development. Special measures to achieve these goals could include 
ensuring the participation of women, especially rural women, in the 
elaboration and implementation of development planning in order that they 
may work to create a better environment for themselves encouraging and 
providing assistance for the establishment of self-help groups and 
cooperatives and providing rural women with access to adequate health 
care, family planning facilities and social security programmes to give 
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them greater financial and social control over their lives. States should also 
give women in rural areas the opportunity to break out of traditional roles 
and choose different lifestyles by ensuring them equal access to training 
and education programmes, as well as to agricultural credit, loans and 
marketing facilities. 
1. States shall accord to women equality with men before the law. 
2. States shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal capacity identical 
to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. In 
particular, they shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to 
administer property and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in 
courts and tribunals. 
3. States agree that all contracts and all other private instruments of any kind 
with a legal effect which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of 
women shall be deemed null and void. 
4. States shall accord to men and women the same rights with regard to the 
law relating to the movement of persons and the, freedom to choose their 
residence and domicile.^' 
Confirms women's equality with men before the law, and additionally 
requires States to guarantee women equality with men in areas of civil law where 
women have traditionally been discriminated against. For example, in many 
countries, women do not have the same property rights as men: traditional 
property law often discriminates against women in that only male children are 
able to inherit the family land, and that husbands have automatic ownersljip 
over all of their wife's property upon marriage. Similarly, legislation in a number 
of countries establishes that the administration of family property is to be 
undertaken by the male head of the family— thereby excluding women. Many 
legal systems do not allow a woman to enter into contracts in her own right 
15. Ibid, Anide 15. 
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but require the signature of her husband before a contract is considered legally 
binding, even in cases relating to her own property or earnings. Article 15 
requires States to take positive steps to ensure women full equality in civil 
law. States must therefore repeal or amend any laws or instruments which have 
the effect of restricting women's legal capacity. 
Paragraph 4 of Article 15 requires equality in the law regarding movement 
of persons and freedom to choose one's own residence and domicile. A law 
which makes a woman's domicile dependent upon her husband's would be 
considered discriminatory under this provision, as would a law which operated 
to restrict the right of a woman (including a married woman) to choose where 
she lives. 
1. States shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family 
relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of 
men and women. 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage. 
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into 
marriage only with their free and full consent. 
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its 
dissolution. 
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of 
their marital status, in matters relating to their children, in all cases 
the interests of the children shall be paramount. 
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number 
and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, 
education and means to enable them to exercise these rights. 
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard of 
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guardianship, warship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or 
similar institutions where these concepts exist in national 
legislation, in all cases the interests of the children shall be 
paramount. 
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to 
choose a family name, a profession and an occupation. 
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, 
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and 
disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable 
consideration. 
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, 
and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to 
specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration 
of marriages in an official registry compulsory.'* 
Addresses the problem of discrimination against the women in the 
private sphere, including discrimination in the area of family law. Much 
discrimination against women takes place in their own homes by their 
husbands, their families and their communities. In some societies, 
young women or girls are forced into arranged marriages. It many areas 
of the world, married women are not permitted to participate equally in 
deciding how many children they will bear, how these children will be 
brought up, and when and whether or not they themselves should work. 
Even in countries where women enjoy a greater say in their family life, 
deeply ingrained stereotypes regarding the proper role of women as 
being that of housewife and homemaker may prevent them from 
pursuing outside careers or taking part in important decision-making 
with their husbands. 
76./Z^/c/., Article 16. 
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This area of discrimination is usually based on long-standing cultural 
or religious practices, it is thus one of the most difficult areas to penetrate 
and one of the most resistant to change. Yet the drafters of the 
Convention realized that change in this area is essential in order for 
women to attain full equality. To bring about this change. States must 
first take all appropriate measures to eliminate or amend existing laws or 
instruments relating to marriage and the family which discriminate 
against women. Such laws would include, for example, those which do 
not give women the same legal rights to divorce and remarriage as men; 
laws which do not allow women full property-ownership rights; and 
laws which do not grant them equal rights regarding the care and 
custody of children, whether in marriage or following divorce. Secondly, 
States must take steps actively to ensure that women are able to 
exercise the same rights as men, including the right freely to enter into 
marriage and to choose a spouse. In keeping with the freedom of a 
woman to choose when and whom she should marry, a minimum age 
for marriage should be guaranteed by law. 
1. For the purpose of considering the progress made in the implementation of the 
present Convention, there shall be established a Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter referred to as the 
Committee) consisting, at the time of entry into force of the Convention, of 
eighteen and, after ratification of or accession to the Convention by the thirty-
fifth State Party of twenty-three experts of high moral standing and 
competence in the field covered by the Convention. The experts shall be 
elected by States from among their nationals and shall serve in their personal 
capacity, considerafion being given to equitable geographical distribution 
and to the representation of the different forms of civilization as well as the 
principle legal systems. 
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list 
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of persons nominated by States. 
3. The initial election shall be held six months after the date of the entry 
into force of the present Convention. At least three months before the 
date of each election the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
address a letter to the States inviting them to submit their 
nominations within two months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a 
list in alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating 
the States which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the 
States. 
4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a meeting of 
State convened by the Secretary-General at United Nations 
Headquarters. At that meeting, for which two thirds of the States 
shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be 
those nominees who obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute 
majority of the votes of the representatives of States present and 
voting. 
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. 
However, the terms of nine of the members elected at the fu"st election 
shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first election the 
names of these nine members shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the 
Committee. 
6. The election of the five additional members of the Committee shall 
be held in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of this 
Article, following the thirty-fifth ratification or accession. The terms of 
two of the additional members elected on this occasion shall expire at 
the end of two years, the names of these two members having been 
chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Committee. 
7. For the filling of casual vacancies, the State whose expert has ceased 
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to function as a member of the Committee shall appoint another expert 
from among its nationals, subject to the approval of the Committee. 
8. The members of the Committee shall, with the approval of the General 
Assembly, receive emoluments from United Nations resources on such 
terms and conditions as the Assembly may decide, having regard to the 
importance of the Committee's responsibilities. 
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary 
staff and facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the 
Committee under the present Convention. Addresses the problem of 
discrimination against women in the private sphere, including 
discrimination in the area of family law. Much discrimination against 
women takes place in their own homes by their husbands, their 
families and their communities. In some societies, young women or 
girls are forced into arranged marriages. It many areas of the world, 
married women are not permitted to participate equally in deciding 
how many children they will bear, how these children will be 
brought up, and when and whether or not they themselves should 
work. Even in countries where women enjoy a greater say in their 
family life, deeply ingrained stereotypes regarding the proper role 
of women as being that of housewife and homemaker may prevent 
them from pursuing outside careers or taking part in important 
decision-making with their husbands. This area of discrimination is 
usually based on long-standing cultural or religious practices; it is thus 
one of the most difficult areas to penetrate and one of the most 
resistant to change. Yet the drafters of the Convention realized that 
change in this area is essenitial in order for women to attain full 
equality. To bring about this change. States must first take all 
appropriate measures to eliminate or amend existing laws or 
instruments relating to marriage and the family which discriminate 
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against women. Such laws would include, for example, those which 
do not give women the same legal rights to divorce and remarriage as 
men; laws which do not allow women full property-ownership 
rights, and laws which do not grant them equal rights regarding 
the care and custody of children, whether in marriage or following 
divorce. Secondly, States must take steps actively to ensure that 
women are able to exercise the same rights as men, including the 
right freely to enter into marriage and to choose a spouse. In keeping 
with the freedom of a woman to choose when and whom she should 
marry, a minimum age for marriage should be guaranteed by law. 
Consisting of a preamble and 30 articles, CEDAW defines what 
constituted discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for national 
action to end such discrimination. 
The preamble to the convention stated the despite the affirmation of 
equal right of men and women in the UN charter, the UDHR and the 
intemational covenants, extensive discrimination against women continues 
to exist. Critics have highlighted that it is ironical that the intemational 
community decided that the solution to the problem of violations of women's 
rights protected by human rights lay in creating another international 
instrument. However despite these criticisms, CEDAW was definitely a step 
forward in protection of women's right. 
The convention is divided in 6 parts first part Article 1 -6 defines 
discrimination and broadly outlines the nature of state obligation in terms of 
law, policy and programmes that the states need to undertake in order to 
eliminate discrimination Article 1 defines discrimination as any distinction, 
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of equality of men 
and women, of human right and fundamental freedoms in the political. 
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economic, social cultural, civil, or any other fields. 
The convention provides fundamental basis for eliminating 
discrimination provides state to the convention also commit themselves to 
adopting temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality 
between men and women.Provides that State should modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving 
the elimination of practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and 
women. CEDAW is based on the principles of State obligation. It recognizes 
that despite legal right being granted to women in many countries, 
discrimination persist, and women's access to legal right are curtailed by 
denial of women, right to economic and social development. 
Part II of the convention deals with right of women in the political 
and public arena. It also grants to women equal right to their nationality and 
the nationality of their children Article 9(1) (2). 
Part III of the convention contain the right to education Article 10, 
employment Articlel 1, health care and family planning Article 12, economic 
and social benefits Article 13, it also focuses on the problems faced by rural 
women and calls on state to eliminate discrimination against women in rural 
areas Article 14. 
Part IV of the convention deals with legal and civil regrets. Article 15, 
grants women equality before law. Article 16 (1) calls upon State to 
eliminate discrimination against women in all matter's relating to marriage 
and family relations. Article 16 (2) prohibits child marriage. 
Part V of the convention establishes a committee on the elimination of 
discrimination against women (CEDAW) to monitor progress made in the 
implementation of the Convention. Article 17-22 details the establishment 
and function of the CEDAW committee. 
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Part VI Article23-30 deals largely with administrative and other 
Procedural aspects of the connection." 
CEDAW is a comprehensive bill of rights of women it has 
integrated various concerns hitherto expressed in an ad hoc manner.It 
provides a legal frame work for women's right but it does not 
automatically confers these right. 
However it legitimizes their straggle to realize their right by providing 
a set of intemationality validated standards. In order to truly exploit the 
potential of the convention, women's group needs to build awareness 
about the provisions and the convention among national audiences and 
play an effective role in reporting and monitoring process. 
Convention on The Nationality of Married Women, 1958 
That conflicts law in practice with reference to nationality arises as a 
result of provisions concerning the loss or acquisition of nationality by 
women as a result of marriage. 
In Article 15 of UDHR the General Assembly of the United Nations 
has proclaimed that everyone has the right to nationality and that no one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to 
change his nationality. Desiring to co-operate with the United Nations in 
promoting universal respect for, and observance of human right and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to sex. 
Each contracting State agrees that neither the celebration nor the 
dissolution of a marriage between one of its nationals and an alien, and the 
change of nationality by the husband during marriage, shall automatically 
affect the nationality of the wife." 
77./bid 5, p. 11-12. 
78. Article 1 Convention of the Nationality of Married Women, 1958, 
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Each Contracting State agrees that neither the voluntary acquisition 
of the nationality of another State nor the renunciation of its nationality by 
one of its nationals shall prevent the retention of its nationality by the wife 
of such national. '^ 
a Each Contracting State agrees that the alien wife of one of its nationals 
may, at her request, acquire the nationality of her husband through 
specially privileged naturalization procedures; the grant of such 
nationality may be subject to such limitations as may be imposed in the 
interests of national security or public policy. 
b. Each Contracting State agrees that the present Convention shall not be 
construed as affecting any legislation or judicial practice by which the 
alien wife of one of its nationals may, at her request, acquire her 
husband's nationality as a matter of right. 80 
4. The present Convention shall be open for signature and ratification on 
behalf of any State member of the United Nations and also on behalf of 
the United Nations and also on behalf of any other State which is or 
hereafter becomes a member of any specialized agency of he United 
Nations, becomes a party to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, or any other State to which an invitation has been addressed by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations." 
Forth World Conference on Women, Beijing,1995 
Republic of China, which, has hosted one of the largest global 
conference over held, with June 17000 participants, including 6,000 delegates 
from 189 countries, over 4000 representative of accredited non 
governmental organization, a host of international civil servants and about 
4,000 media representative more than 30,000 people participated in the non 
79. Ibid, Article 2. 
80. Ibid, Article 3. 
81./6/</., Article 4. 
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governmental organization. 
The massage of this conference is that women's issues are global and 
universal. Deeply entrenched attitudes and practices perpetuate inequality 
and discrimination against women, in public and private life, on a daily 
basis, in all parts of the world. At the same line, there has emerged a 
consensus that equality of opportunity for all people a essential to the 
construction of just and democratic society for the twenty first century. The 
fundamental linkage between the three objective of the conference equality, 
development and peace are now recognized by the fourth world conference 
on women held in Beijing in 1995 is notable. In that it finally put the U.N 
stamp on the concept that Women's right are human rights and also for the 
fact that it initiated gender mainstreaming which denoted the acceptance of 
gender as a holistic approach to humanity which includes both man and 
women.The Beijing Declaration and Platform for action identified 12 critical 
areas of concern which require urgent action to achieve the goal of gender 
equality. 
Out of these 12 critical areas are women's human right. Violence 
against women constitutes one of the critical areas of concern, as does 
women and armed conflict.'^ 
It was held in the Beijing declaration that the human rights of women 
and of the girl child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of 
Universal Human Right. The full and equal participation of women in 
political, civil and economic, social and cultural life, at the national, regional 
and international Levels, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination 
on ground of sex are priority objective of the international community. 
Human rights and fundamental freedom are the birthright of all human 
beings, their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of 
82. V.P. Srivastava, Handbook on Crime against Women, p.23 (2005). 
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Governments. 
The world conference on Human rights reaffirmed the solem 
commitment of all states to fulfill their obligation to promote universal 
respect for, and observance and protection of, all human right and 
fundamental freedoms for all, in accordance with the charter of the united 
nations other instruments relating to human rights and international law." 
Equal right of men and women are explicitly mentioned in the preamble to 
the charter of the United Nations are major international human right 
instrument include sex as one of the ground upon which states may not 
discriminate. 
Governments must not only refrain fi-om violating the human rights of 
all women, but must work actively to promote and protect these rights. 
Recognition of the importance of the human rights of women is reflected in 
the fact that three quarters of the state members of the United Nations have 
become parties to the CEDAW. 
Objectives of Beijing Declaration 1995 
Promote and protect the human right of women, through the 
full implementation of all human rights instruments, especially the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 
action to be taken by Governments. 
- Work actively towards ratification of or accession to and implement. 
- Limit the extent of any reservation to the convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women. 
- Consider drawing up national action plan identifying steps to improve the 
promotion and protection of human rights, inducting the human rights 
83. Ibid, 
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of women, as recommended by the world conference on Human Rights. 
- Create or strengthen independent national institutional for the 
protection and promotion of these right, including the human rights of 
women, as recommended by the world conference on Human Right 
Develop a comprehensive human right education programme to raise 
awareness among women of their human rights and raise awareness among 
others of the human rights of women. 
- Include gender aspects in reporting under all other human right 
conventions and instruments including ILO Conventions, to insure 
analysis and review of the human rights of women. 
- Give full, equal and sustained attention to the human rights of women in 
the exercise of their respective mandates to promote universal respect 
for and protection of all human rights-civil, cultural, economic, 
political and social rights including the right to development 
- Provide training in the human rights of women for all United Nations 
personal and officials, especially those in human rights and 
humanitarian relief activities, and promote their understanding of the 
human rights of women so that they recognize and deal with violation of 
the human rights of the women and can fully take into account the gender 
aspect of their as. 
Declaration on The Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 1967 
Considering that the people of the United Nations have in the charter, 
reaffirmed their faith, in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person and in the equal right of men and women. Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights asserts the principle of non-discrimination and 
proclaim that all human beings are born free and equal indignity and rights 
and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth their in 
without distinction of any kind, including any distinction as to sex, 
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Taking into account the resolution, declaration convention and 
recommendations of the United Nations and the specialized agencies 
designed to eliminate all forms of discrimination and to promote equal rights 
for men and women. Despite the charter of the United Nations the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights, the international covenants on Human Rights 
and other instruments of the United Nations and the specialized agencies and 
despite the progress made in the matter of equality of rights, their countries to 
exist considerable discrimination against women. 
The discrimination against women is incompatible with human 
dignity and the welfare of the family and of society presents their 
participation on equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic and 
cultural life of their countries and is an obstacle to the full development of 
the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of humanity. 
Bearing in mind the great contribution made by women to social, 
political, economic and cultural life and the part they play in the family and 
particularly in the rearing of children. Convinced that the full and complete 
development of a country, the welfare of the world and the cause of peace 
require the maximum participation of women as well as men in all fields. 
Considering that it is necessary to ensure the Universal recognition in law and in 
fact of the principles of equality of man and women solemnly affirms this 
declaration.*'' 
Human being constitute the basic element of all organized societies with 
in the state and the international community in the present organization of the 
society state has the fundamental task to create conditions of life 
affording adequate protection of the individual and permitting reasonable 
opportunities for the full development of the individual's personality. In 
olher words, the realization of human rights is and will remain the first and final 
goal and purpose of the state for all times to come. 
84. V.P Srivastav, Hand Book on Crime against Women, p.480,(2005). 
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Both nationality and internationally and almost all over the world, 
human rights have now become a live issue. The foundational norm 
governing the concept of human rights is that of the respect for human 
personality and its absolute worth, regardless of colour, race, sex and 
religion or other consideration. Human rights are widely considered to be 
those fundamental moral rights of the person that are necessary for a life 
with human dignity." 
The Commissioii on The Status of Women, 1996 
The commission on the status of women recommends to the 
Economic and Social Council for the adoption of the following draft 
resolution. Recalling that the General Assembly in resolution 50/203 decided 
that the General Assembly, the economic and social council and the 
conynission for the status of women, in accordance with their respective 
mandates and in accordance with Assembly resolution 48/162 of December 
1993 and other relevant resolutions, should constitute a three-tiered 
intergovernmental mechanism that would play the primary role in the 
overall policy making and follow up, and in coordinating and implementing 
and monitoring of the platform for action, reaffirming the need for a 
coordinated follow up to and implementation of the results of major 
international conferences in the economic social and related fields. 
That the follow-up to the fourth world conference on women should be 
under taken on the basis of an integrated approach to the advancement of 
women within the frame work of a coordinated follow up to and 
implementation of the results of major international conferences in the 
economic, social and related fields, as well as the overall responsibilities of 
the General Assembly and the economic and social council. The conference 
affirms: 
85. Tapan Biswal, Human Rights Gender and Environment, p.43, (2006). 
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That the commission on the status of women shall have a catalytic 
role in mainstreaming a gender perspective in policies and 
programmes. 
That the inter agency committee on the follow up to the fourth world 
conference on women, once established by the administrative committee 
on coordination, shall inform the commission and the economic council 
and social council of the progress of its work, for the purpose of system-
wide coordination and that a gender perspective shall also be fully 
integrated in the work of all thematic task forces established by the 
Administrative Committee on coordination.'* 
That the platform for action should be implemental through the work of 
all the bodies and organization of the united Nations system during the 
period 1995-2000, and notes that institution of the united Nations 
especially devoted to the advancement of women, including the 
international research and training institute for the advancement of 
women and the United Nations. Development fund for women, are in 
the process of reviewing their programmes of work in the light of the 
platform and its implementation process related to the conference to the 
maximum extent possible and request the secretary-General to make 
appropriate arrangement to assure full utilization of existing channels 
of communication with nongovernmental organization in order to 
facilitate board participation and dissemination of information. 
Some specific comments on Human Rights of women by the Commission, 
1. It should be emphasized that women's rights are human rights. 
2. It should also be emphasized that the human rights of women and of 
the girl child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of all 
human rights and fundamental freedom, 
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3. It should be stressed that this is one of the priority objective of the 
United Nations, 
4. The United Nations should develop a comprehensive policy 
programme for mainstreaming the human rights of women throughout 
the united Nation system, 
Emphasizing the strengthening of the cooperation and coordination 
between different entities of the United Nations in the promotion and 
protection of the Human rights of women. 
5. The centre for Human rights should take into account the programme 
of action of the international conference on population and 
development and the platform of Action of the fourth world 
conference in all aspects of the human rights of women. 
6. Integration of the human right of women in all activities of the United 
Nation should be emphasized.^ ^ 
Commission on the Status of Women is one of the first bodies 
established by the UN Economic and Social Council. Set up in 1946 it 
monitors the situation of women and promotes their rights in all societies 
around the world. It prepares recommendations and report for the UN on 
any issue affecting women. In case of urgent problem, the commission can 
run for immediate international action to prevent all alleviate violations of 
women's right. 
The commission on intergovernmental body has 45 members, each 
elected for four years. Membership reflects following geographical 
composition, 13 States from Africa, 11 from Asia, 4 from Eastern Europe, 
from Latin American and the Caribbean and 8 from Western Europe and after 
86. D.B. Rao, Mrs. V.V. Laxmi, Mr. V.V. Rao, Mr. V.V. Kishna, Status and Advancement of Women, 
p.437 (2000). 
87. Ibid., p. 474. 
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state. The commission meets annually for a period of at least 8 days. 
Second World Conference on Human Rights Held In Vienna, (Austria) 
1993 
It declared that the human right of women and the girl child are 
an inalienable integral and indivisible part of universal human right and that 
the women's human rights should form an integral part of the United 
Nation human rights activities. Traditional human rights group that had long 
concentrated on human rights abrogation by government against their citizens 
begin to accept the fact that violations of rights by citizens against each other 
over equality valid human rights abrogation. The private and public sphere 
began to merge in human right theory and practice. Issue regarding women's 
human rights was the most dramatic agenda item at the 1993 world conference on 
human rights held in Vienna. (Austria). Virtually every garment at the 
conference felt compelled to give at least lip service to the violence issue and to 
women's woman rights. As a result, the Vienna Declaration and programme 
of Actions contained an extensive section on women human right with 
additional references throughout the document." 
The declaration was adopted by the General Assembly in 1993. The 
Declaration defines violence against women as any act of gender based 
violence that results in or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or 
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, 
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of Liberty, whether accruing in public or 
private life. It outlines the steps stars and united Nations, its agencies and 
programme, should lake to address gender based council against women, 
and makes clear the states should not invoke any custom, tradition, or 
religious consideration to avoid their obligation with respect to its 
implementation, and should exercise due diligence to present, investigate 
and in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against 
88. Mohini Chatterjee, Women's Human Rights, p.55 (2005). 
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n 
women, weather those acts are perpetrated by the state or by private 
89 persons. 
The National Commission for Women, 1990 
Though there is no statute as yet in India that addresses itself directly to 
sexual harassment, two statutes may be of particular help to victims of sexual 
harassment. These are the National Commission for Women Act, 1990, and the 
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. 
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the National Commission for 
Women Act, 1990 states: 
Successive Commissions on women had noted in their Reports the unequal 
status of women obtaining in every sphere of life and had suggested the setting 
up of an agency to fulfill the surveillance functions as well as to facilitate 
redressed of their grievances. Several women activists and voluntary action 
groups had also been making persistent demands for setting up of a 
Commission for women. The country cannot progress as long as the inequality 
persists with reference to half of its population. Having realized the importance 
of the issue, the Government decided to set up a Commission for women to be 
called the National Commission for Women, consisting of a Chairperson, five 
Members and a Member Secretary. 
The main task of the Commission shall be to study and monitor all 
matters relating to the constitutional and legal safeguards provided for women, 
to review the existing legislations and suggest amendments wherever 
necessary. It will also look into the complaints and take suo moto notice of the 
cases involving deprivation of the rights of women in order to provide support, 
legal or otherwise, to helpless women. The Commission shall monitor the 
proper implementation of all the legislations made to protect the rights of 
women so as to enable them to achieve equality in all spheres of life and equal 
89. V.P. Srivastava, Hand Book on Crime against Women, p. 23(2005). 
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participation in the development of the nation. 
The Preamble to the National Commission for Women Act, 1990 states that it 
is an Act to constitute a National Commission for Women and to provide for 
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 
National Commission for Women 
Section 3(1) of the National Commission for Women Act, 1990 requires 
the Central Government to constitute a body to be known as the National 
Commission for women to exercise the powers conferred on, and to perform 
the functions assigned to, it under this Act. Section 3(2) of the Act provides for 
* 
the composition of the Commission. It states that the Commission shall consist 
of a Chairperson, five Members and a Member Secretary. All of them have to 
be nominated by the Central Government. The Chairperson has to be a person 
committed to the cause of women. The five Members should be persons of 
ability, integrity and standing who have had experience in law or legislation, 
trade unionism, management of an industry or organization committed to 
increasing the employment potential of women, women's voluntary 
organizations (including women activists), administration, economic 
development, health, education or social welfare. At least one member each has 
to be from amongst persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes, respectively. The Member Secretary should be an expert in the field of 
management, organizational structure or sociological movement, or an officer 
who is a member of a civil service of the Union or of an all-India service or 
holds a civil post under the Union with appropriate experience. 
Functions of the Commission 
Section 10 of the Act lays down the functions of the Commission. It 
states: 
(1) The Commission shall perform all or any of the following functions, 
namely. 
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(a) Investigate and examine all matters relating to the safeguards provided 
for women under the Constitution and other laws. 
(b) Present to the Central Government, annually and at such other times as 
the Commission may deem fit, reports upon the working of those 
safeguards. 
(c) Make in such reports recommendations for the effective implementation 
of those safeguards for improving the conditions of women by the 
Union or any State. 
(d) Review, from time to time, the existing provisions of the Constitution 
and other laws affecting women and recommend amendments thereto so 
as to suggest remedial legislative measures to meet any lacunae, 
inadequacies or shortcomings in such legislations. 
(e) Take up the cases of violation of the provisions of the Constitution and 
of other laws relating to women with the appropriate authorities. 
(f) Look into complaints and take suo moto notice of matters relating to -
(i) Deprivation of women's rights. 
(ii) Non-implementation of laws enacted to provide protection to women 
and also to achieve the objective of equality and development. 
(iii) Non-compliance of policy decisions, guidelines or instructions 
aimed at mitigating hardships and ensuring welfare and providing relief 
to women, and take up the issues arising out of such matters with 
appropriate authorities. 
(g) Call for special studies or investigations into specific problems or 
situations arising out of discrimination and atrocities against women and 
identify the constraints so as to recommend strategies for their removal. 
(h) undertake promotional and educational research so as to suggest ways of 
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ensuring due representation of women in aH-%fiKfi?«nd identify factors 
responsible for impeding their advancement, such as lack of access to 
housing and basic services, inadequate support services and technologies 
for reducing drudgery and occupational health hazards and for 
increasing their productivity. 
(i) Participate and advise on the planning process of socio-economic 
development of women. 
(j) Evaluate the progress of the development of women under the Union 
and any State. 
(k) Inspect or cause to be inspected a jail, remand home, women's 
institution or other place of custody where women are kept as prisoners 
or otherwise, and take up with the concerned authorities for remedial 
action, if found necessary. 
(1) Fund litigation involving issues affecting a large body of women. 
(m) Make periodical reports to the Government on any matter pertaining to 
women and in particular various difficulties under which women toil. 
(n) Any other matter which may be referred to it by the Central 
Government. 
(2) The Central Government shall cause all the reports referred to in clause 
(b) of sub-section (1) to be laid before each House of Parliament along 
with a memorandum explaining the action taken or proposed to be taken 
on the recommendations relating to the Union and the reasons for the 
non-acceptance, if any, of any of such recommendations. 
(3) Where any such report or any part thereof relates to any matter with 
which any State Government is concerned, the Commission shall 
forward a copy of such report or part to such State Government who 
shall cause it to be laid before the Legislature of the State along with a 
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memorandum explaining the action taken or proposed to be taken on the 
recommendations relating to the State and the reasons for the non-
acceptance, if any, of any of such recommendations. 
(4) The Commission shall, while investigating any matter referred to in 
clause (a) or sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1), have all the powers of a 
civil court trying a suit and, in particular, in respect of the following 
matters, namely— 
(a) Summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from any part of 
India and examining him on oath. 
(b) Requiring the discovery and production of any document. 
(c) Receiving evidence on affidavits. 
(d) Requisitioning any pubic record or copy thereof from any court or office. 
(e) Issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and documents, and 
(f) Any other matter which may be prescribed. 
Section 16 of the Act requires the Central Government to consult the 
Commission on all major policy matters affecting women. 
The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 
The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 was enacted to provide for 
better protection of human rights and for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto. The statement of objects and reasons notes that the human 
rights embodied in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16"^  December, 1966, stand 
substantially protected by the Constitution of India. However, there has been 
growing concern in the country and abroad about issues relating to human 
rights. Having regard to this, changing social realities and emerging trends in 
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the nature of crime and violence, the Government has been reviewing the 
existing laws, procedures and system of administration of justice, with a view 
to bringing about greater accountability and transparency in them, and devising 
efficient and effective methods of dealing with the situation. Taking into 
account the views of all concerned, the Act was enacted.'" 
The Preamble to the Protection of Human Rights Act states that it is an 
Act to provide for the Constitution of a National Human Rights Commission, 
State Human Rights Commissions in States and Human Rights Courts for 
better protection of human rights and for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto. 
The term Human Rights as used in this Act means the rights relating to 
life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the 
Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants enforceable by courts 
in India,"" International Covenants means the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on economic. Social and 
Cultural right adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 
16"^  December, 1966.'"^ The definition of human rights is wide enough to 
encompass the principles embodied in the Vienna Declaration on the 
elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW).'^ 
As observed by the Supreme Court, Human rights are derived from the 
dignity and worth inherent in the human person. Human rights and fundamental 
freedoms have been reiterated by the universal declaration of Human Right. 
Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human 
rights. The full development of personality and fundamental freedoms and 
equal participation by women in political social economic and cultural life are 
90. People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2005) 2 SCC 436, per Y.K. Sabarwal J. 
91. Section 2 (l)(d). 
92. Section 2(1) (f). 
93. C. Masilamani mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminath aswami Swaminathasrwami Thirukal (1996), 8 
SCC 525: AIR 1996 SC 1697 at p. 1702 para 19. 
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concomitants for national development social and family stability and growth, 
culturally socially and economically. All forms of discrimination on grounds of 
gender are violative of fundamental freedoms and human rights.'"" 
National Human Rights Commission 
Chapter II of the Act provides for the National Human Rights 
Commission. Section 3 (1) deals with the constitution of such Commission by 
the Central government to exercise the powers conferred upon, and to perform 
the fiinction assigned to it under this Act. Section 3(2) deals with the 
composition of the Commission. It provides that the Commission shall consist 
of a Chairperson who has been the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; one 
member who is, or has been, a Judge of the Supreme Court, one Member who 
is, or has been, the Chief Justice of a High Court, and two members to be 
appointed from amongst persons having knowledge of, or practical experience 
in, matters relating to human rights. Section 3(3) provides that the Chairpersons 
of the National Commission for Minorities, the National Commission for the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the National Commission for 
Women shall be deemed to be Members of the Commission for the discharge 
of functions specified in clauses (b) to (/) of Section 12. Sub-section (4) of 
Section 3 provides for a Secretary-General "who shall be the Chief Executive 
Officer of the Commission and shall exercise such powers and discharge such 
functions of the Commission as it may delegate to him". 
Functions and Powers of the Commission 
Chapter III of the Act deals with the functions and powers of the 
Commission. Section 12 deals specifically with the functions of the 
Commission and thus provides'':-
(a) Inquire, suo moto or on a petition presented to it by a victim or any person 
on his behalf, into complaint of :-
94. Ibid, at p. 1701 para 17. 
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(i) Violation of human rights or abetment thereof; or 
(ii) Negligence in the prevention of such violation, by a public servant; 
(b) Intervene in any proceeding involving any allegation of violation of human 
rights pending before a court with the approval of such court. 
Powers relating to inquiries.—(1) The Commission shall, while 
inquiring into complaints under this Act, have all the powers of a civil court 
trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in particular in 
respect of the following matters, namely:' .96 
(a) Summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and 
examining them on oath. 
(b) Discovery and production of any document. 
(c) Receiving evidence on affidavits. 
(d) Requisitioning any public record or copy thereof fi-om any court or 
Office. 
(e) Issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents. 
(f) Any other matter which may be prescribed. 
(2) The Commission shall have power to require any person, subject to any 
privilege which may be claimed by that person under anyTaw for the 
time being in force, to furnish information on such points or matters as, 
in the opinion of the Commission, may be usefiil for, or relevant to, the 
subject-matter of the inquiry and any person so required shall be deemed 
to be legally bound to furnish such information within the meaning of 
Sections 176 and Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code. 
(3) The Commission or any other officer, not below the rank of a Gazetted 
95. Section 12. 
96. Section 13. 
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Officer, specially authorized in this behalf by the Commission may enter 
any building or place where the Commission has reason to believe that 
any document relating to the subject-matter of the inquiry may be found, 
and may seize any such document or take extracts or copies there from 
subject to the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973, in so far as it may be applicable. 
(4) The Commission shall be deemed to be a civil court and when any 
offence as is described in Section 175, Section 178, Section 179, Section 
3 80 or Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code is committed in the view 
or presence of the Commission, the Commission may, after recording 
the facts constituting the offence and the statement of .the accused as 
provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, forward the case 
to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same and the Magistrate to 
whom any such case is forwarded shall proceed to hear the complaint 
against the accused as if the case has been forwarded to him under 
Section 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
(5) Every proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be a 
judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for 
the purposes of Section 196, of the Indian Penal Code, and the 
Commission shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of 
Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973. 
The power to conduct any investigation pertaining to the inquiry has 
been provided for in Section 14 of the Act. It provides; 
Investigation 
(1) The Commission may, for the purpose of conducting any investigation 
pertaining to the inquiry, utilize the services of any officer or 
investigation agency of the Central Government or any State 
82 
Cfiapter-I 
Government with the concurrence of the Central Government or the 
State Government, as the case may be." 
(2) For the purpose of investigating into any matter pertaining to the 
inquiry, any officer or agency whose services are utiHzed under sub-
section (1) May, subject to the direction and control of the 
Commission,— 
(a) Summon and enforce the attendance of any person and examine him. 
(b) Require the discovery and production of any document, and 
(c) Requisition any public record or copy thereof from any office. 
(3) The provisions of Section 15 shall apply in relation to any statement 
made by a person before any officer or agency whose services are 
utilized under sub-section (1) as they apply in relation to any statement 
made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the 
Commission. 
(4) The officer or agency whose services are utilized under sub-section (1) 
shall investigate into any matter pertaining to the inquiry and submit a 
report thereon to the Commission within such period as may be 
specified by the Commission in this behalf 
(5) The Commission shall satisfy itself about the correctness of the facts 
stated and the conclusion, if any, arrived at in the report submitted to it 
under sub-section (4) and for this purpose the Commission may make 
such inquiry (including the examination of the person or persons who 
conducted or assisted in the investigation) as it thinks fit. 
Section 15 of the Act provides as under: 
Statement made by persons to the Commission.—^No statement made 
97. Section 14. 
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by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall 
subject him to, or be used against him in, any civil or criminal proceeding 
except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement. Provided that 
the statement.'* 
(a) Is made in reply to the question which he is required by the Commission 
to answer or 
(b) Is relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. Section 16 of the Act 
may also be noted. It provides: 
Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard.—If, at any 
Stage of the inquiry, the Commission.'" 
(a) Considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person; or 
(b) Is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be 
prejudicially affected by the inquiry, 
it shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the 
inquiry and to produce evidence in his defense. 
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of a 
witness is being impeached. 
Inquiry into complaints.—The Commission while, inquiring into the 
complaints of violation of human rights may. 100 
(i) Call for information or report from the Central Government or any State 
Government or any other authority or organization subordinate thereto 
within such time as may be specified by it provided that— 
(a) If the information or report is not received within the time stipulated by 
the Commission, it may proceed to inquire into the complaint on its 
98. Section 15. 
99. Section 16. 
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own. 
(b) If on receipt of information or report, the Commission is satisfied either 
that no further inquiry is required or that the required action has been 
initiated or taken by the concerned Government or authority, it may not 
proceed with the complaint and inform the complainant accordingly. 
(ii) Without prejudice to anything contained in clause (i) if it considers 
necessary, having regard to the nature of the complaint, initiate an 
inquiry. 
Steps after inquiry.—The Commission may take any of the following 
steps upon the completion of an inquiry held under this Act, namely."" 
(1) where the inquiry discloses, the commission of violation of human rights 
or negligence in the prevention of violation of human rights by a public 
servant, it may recommend to the concerned Government or authority the 
initiation of proceedings for prosecution or such other action as the 
Commission may deem fit against the concerned person or persons. 
(2) Approach the Supreme Court or the High Court concerned for such 
directions, orders or writs as that Court may deem necessary. 
(3) Recommend to concerned Government or authority for the grant of such 
immediate interim relief to the victim or the members of his family as the 
Commission may consider necessary. 
(4) Subject to the provisions of clause (5) provide a copy of the inquiry 
report to the petitioner or his representative. 
(5) the Commission shall send a copy of its inquiry report together with its 
recommendations to the concerned Government or authority and the 
concerned Government or authority shall within a period of one months 
100. Section 17. 
101. Section 18. 
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or such further time as the Commission may allow, forward its comments 
on the report, including the action taken or proposed to be taken thereon, 
to the Commission. 
(6) The Commission shall publish its inquiry report together with the 
comments- of the concerned Government or authority, if any, and the 
action taken or proposed to be taken by the concerned Government or 
authority on the recommendations of the Commission. 
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HISTORICAL POSITION OF WOMEN UNDER 
DIFFERENT PERIOD 
VEDIC PERIOD 
One way to judge the status of a nation is to study the status of its 
women. In reaUty the status of women represents the standard of culture of any 
age. The social status of the women of a country symbolizes the social spirit of 
the age.' However to draw a conclusion about the position of women is a 
difficuh and complicated problem it is therefore necessary to trace his position 
in the historical perspective in the course of Indian history form prehistoric to 
modem times there were distinct stages of the rise and fall in the status and role 
of women. 
The recorded evidence found in the same period and in to same province 
have expressed opposite views about the worth, nature and importance of 
women. According to one school a woman is the best gift of God to man. She 
brings prosperity when she is properly treated and respected and is called 
Laxmi, the goddess of wealth and prosperity. The second School of thoughts 
hold the view that the best way to reach God is to avoid women. Where the 
women are held in reverence, there do the Gods reside, is an old Sanskrit 
adage. A society grows if the woman grows, if they partake of the spirits. Of 
progress for they are the proverbial domestic legislators they are the matrix of 
social life.^ 
A proper assessment of Indian women necessarily involves a brief 
resume of the cultural background of Indian women through the ages. Unlike 
her western counter part, the Indian Women is part of a culture which goes 
back into the part. If she has a particular conviction or acts in a specific manner 
1. K. Gill, Hindu women Right to property in India, p. 17 (1986). 
2.lbid?.\l 
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it is due to the pattern that has been ingrained in her by the fairly stable social 
structure of a thousand years. 
The highest place has been accorded to women in India religious and 
philosophical thought. The primordial one is conceived as a harmony of 
Purusha (male). The concept of'Ardhanarishwara'' describes God head as half 
female and half male. The Shakti cult is centered on the superiority and 
destructive strength of the females. Rivers and streams, down and twilight, 
flowers and seasons knowledge and music are conceived of as feminine. 
The position of power, status and disabilities of the daughter, the wife, 
and the widow went on changing in course of time. Women enjoyed 
considerable freedom and privileges in the spheres of family religion and pubic 
life, but as centuries rolled on the situation went on changing adversely There 
are recorded evidence to show that women was not always rights nor was the 
constantly in subjection. There is however grater evidence to show that 
contrary was equally true, for many centuries her position continued to be one 
in which she did not have either legal or social rights to make her independent 
of the family into which she was bom or married.^ 
Vedic period 
The women in the Vedic period it is observed enjoyed equal status with 
men and independence in action. Not only they had the place of honour, but 
were entitled to participate freely in social activities. They were allowed to 
pursue the academic alignments and share the family life with fiill vigor. They 
were free to select their conjugal partners and exceeded free will in entering 
into the matrimonial bondage. 
Women were not only highly educated. Cultured they proved to be good 
teachers in the upbringing of their children in all spheres of life."* 
3. R. Mehta, The Western Educated Hindu Women, p. 16 and 113(1970). 
4. Anjani Kant, Women and the Law, p.22(2003). 
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The Vedic India was inhabited by the highly cuhured and civiHzed 
people of the Aryan race. Those great Aryans were not the original residents of 
India, but crossover India and settled herein. The Aryans were the authors of 
the Vedic literature and were the first among the many races inhabiting India. 
They accepted the authority of Vedas and followed the Vedic rules. These rules 
consisted of moral clinical and religious injunctions. To the Aryans whatever 
was contained in the Vedic text was "Dharma" and the ''Dharma" is the 
simplest sense meant law to them. The elevation of the feminine principles 
pervades Vedic thought. The social structure in the Vedic period admitted the 
equality of women. Hymn XXI of the Rig Veda extols the virtues of women as 
each greater than those of men. 
Through out the Vedic period women was given a status equal to man's 
to participate in sacrifice sites, to undergo the investiture ceremony, and to be 
man's equal in upholding 'Dharma\ She could fight wars join in festivals take 
part in philosophical discussion like Gargi and Maitreye or even remain 
unnamed to if she so desire.^ In the Vedic period women participated in all the 
fields like men and took part in every sphere of human life. During that period, 
women enjoyed a fair amount of freedom and equally with men. Women 
studied in Gurukul and enjoyed equally in learning Vedas. For a long time, 
girls in higher societies were allowed to undergo Upnayanna rite. The great 
women like Ghosa, Apala, lopamudra, Visvara, Gargi, Atcyi, Indrani, Yamig 
and others had distinct equalities of art, music, dance and even fighting in the 
battle. Purdah was not in the Vedic period. In the matter of selecting the life 
partner in marriage, women had equal rights. The example of polygamy was 
rare and mainly confined to ruling class. Dowry system was prevalent in rich 
and royal families only in the form of movable gifts. A widow could marry 
again or could undertake the recourse of leverage (Niyoga). The Indus valley 
civilizafion recorded the beginning of the cuh of worshipping earth or Goddess. 
5. Khanna, Girja and Verghees, Mariamma, A. Indian Women Todcry,p.54 (1978). 
e.fbidpA 
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But there still wee certain restrictions on women's right. In Vedic times there 
was no determination between boy and girls. There were two classics of girls 
(i) the Brahm-Vadini student, who donned the sacred thread, constant reminder 
of the holy vows, tend the fire, do the begging for aims with in there own 
parental homes, and (ii) the Sadyo Vadhey who are given only symbolically 
and formally immediately before marriage. Men used to regard women as 
partners in managing the affairs during the Grihasta, Vanaprastha, and Sanyasa 
ashram in life and consequently women enjoyed a quality of life comparable to 
that of the men.'^  
Every Hindu believes in the authority of the Vedas and in the cycle of 
birth and rebirth, which is an interminable cycle. This kind of faith is imbibed 
in the character of Hindu, consciously or unconsciously and it is reflected in 
him in various form and practice. For a Hindu the authority of Vedas is 
unimpeachable paramount, final and irrevocable. It is correct to say that not a 
single case of literary adultery has been reported in the contents of the Vedas 
until now. The four Vedas are neither mutable corrigible. Because of great 
authority of Vedas as a screed Hindu text it is claimed to be the first source of 
orthodox Hindu law even today and all the since smites and digests and 
commentaries on the smirits owe either their origin or development to it. 
Actually the Vedic literature serves as a path finder to a Hindu to seek his joy 
of life. Now it is judicially acknowledge view that who believes in the authority 
of life is aHindu.^ 
Position of The Daughter 
The position of women in Vedic period can be judged by the way in 
which the birth of a girl was received. None of the hymns of Rig-Veda 
considered the birth of daughter as inauspicious. But we find prayers for the 
7. V.K.Dewan , Law Relating to Offence against Women, p.32( 1996). 
8. U.C sarkar's ,An introduction to Hindu Law, p.l 
9. Yagnapurushadas Ji v. Muldas and other AIR (1966) SC i 19 
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birth of a son in Atharva Veda witch says the birth of a girl grant it else where; 
hare grant a boy.'° We do find a frequent longing for a male child in the Rig-
Veda, while during the Vedic Age there were some parents who would perform 
kanyasraddhas on the second day of the moon for the blessings of getting 
learned and capable daughter. Beside it was recommended that Matrika-Puja 
should take place first, the Kumar-Puja was to be performed at the end of all 
Vedic rituals." 
Initiation of girls was common girls were educated like boys. Like their 
brothers, the girls wore the screed thread and use to pass through a period of 
Brahmacharya. After his Upavita Ceremony the Vedic women carried on the 
study of the Vedas, recited Vedic mantras, performed Vedic rites and naturals; 
under took Vedic-Vows and did what ever was necessary for the proper 
performance of Yagayajna just like a son. According to Sarvannkramanika 
there were as many as twenty women who were credited with having composed 
hymns of the Rig-Veda. Many of them become distinguished poetesses and 
were honored by having their poem included in Vedic literature. Some of the 
high class women were highly educated and they actively participated in 
intellectual and philosophical discussion. 
Marriages of girls used to take place at the age of under standing 
between 14 to 17 years and that too with their consent. The educated girls had 
naturally an effective voice in the selection of their life partners. Pre-puberty 
marriages were unknown as there were Swayamvara marriages where women 
were given the chance of selecting their partners. There were also many 
instances of love marriages. It can be concluded that both men and women had 
10. AthavvaVedaVI2-3 
11. B.S LTpadhyaya, Women in Rig-Veda, p.43 (1974). 
12. Ibid pA5-46 
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considerable freedom in selecting their partners though parents often arranged a 
suitable match. ^ ^ 
If for any reason a daughter remained unmarried she was expected to 
live under the protection of her father, and after her father's death under the 
control and protection of her brother. Other wise she was on her own. Perpetual 
tutelage of women is of a later origin.''* The position of a daughter during the 
Vedic period did not suffer much from authoritative interference. She was 
socialized with a high degree of modesty.'^  She was expected to have 
tolerance, patience, submission to and an identification of her personality with 
her husband's. She in turn received affection consideration and regard. Though 
marriage was of great social and religious significance it was not mandatory as 
there were some reference to girls who remained unmarried.'^  
Position of Wife 
The Vedic society also was patriarchal and male dominated. The 
household was ruled by house lord, who wielded almost absolute control over 
all other member of the family and to him his wife or wife's were bound by 
strict tie of life long duty and obedience. 
Marriage in fact was a religious necessity for both men and women, but 
neither could reach women without being accompanied by his or her duly 
married spouse. The Vedic women being Sahadharmini or Patni had the ftillest 
right to participate in all the religious ceremonies with her husband she could 
also perform sacrifices independently and was not regarded as an impediment 
in religion pursuits. Her position was an honored one in the family. She was 
joint owner of the household wither husband though in actual practice she was 
13. A .S Altekar., The position of women in Hindu Civilization, p.338( 1983). 
14. Radha Binod pal, The History of Hindu Law, Calcutta, University of Calcutta 1958 p.302. 
15. M.N. Banerjee," Hindu Family and Freudian Theory" Indian Journal of social work 1944-45 pp-
180-186 
16. Shakuntala Rao Shastt-i, Women in the Vedic Age (3m etd ) Bombay; Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan 1960 
p,4-5 
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the subordinate partner. This was because of the prevalence of a patriarchal 
family system as it is today. Her social status was not only of a loving wife but 
also of a loving mother. She was desired by the Vedic sages as an ornament of 
the home. Her social status was of an absolute equality with man in the eyes of 
religion.'^ 
The Dharmashastra has raised a chaste wife to the rank of a Goddess. 
Out of love and veneration she has been placed above the father and teacher. 
The Panchantantra mention that the maintenance of a home is known by the 
culture of the wife without her a home is like a dreary forest. Rig-Veda accords 
a high position to women. As a mother the Vedic women held a far more 
venerable position than a man as the father. 
During this period asceticism was not of great prominence women had 
the right of free movement. Polygamy prevailed to some extent among the rich 
and royal families but ordinarily monogamy was the rule. The main 
disadvantage from which the wife suffered in the Vedic age was that she could 
neither hold nor inherit property rights in some kind of properties which 
women slowly acquired were assimilated with their rights in their position of 
bride price probably as being the only existing type of women's property.'^ 
In the post Vedic period women were known to take up teaching career. 
She was accepted as an Acharya. Some of the lady teachers were specialists in 
theology and philosophy, the most obstruce and difficult subjects. Women had 
privilege of adoption e.g-Vadharimati adopting Haranyanhasta and Loppada 
adopting Santha, the daughter of Dasaratha.'^ The position of women during 
the Vedic age is clearly manifest from Suktas of revered Nari Risi or women 
seers in the Rigveda. Women as daughter's sisters wife and mother had equally 
honoured places in the family society and the state alike. Thus in all aspects 
17. Supra Note 14, p-338-39 
18.5w/7raNota l,p-23 
19. Venkatarayappa, Feminine Roles, p.36-37(1966). 
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they had equal rights with men and were their equal partners, friends and 
helpers all through. 
Position of Widow 
Thought the Hindus of the Vedic period had a patriarchal society, the 
women in general did not suffer from disabilities which are characteristic of 
later period. This is particularly true of widows. Widows of this age were 
permitted to remarry the practice seams to have been accepted as normal from 
the Vedic period onwards. A number of references are found in the Vedas to 
show that widow remarriages was common, though the re-married widow 
could not aspire for the status of 'Grihini' wife where she could become the 
mistress of the house. The use of the word 'Parapurva' a woman, who has had 
a second husband, proves that widows were remarried. The word 'Didhishd' 
used in the Rig -Veda means the second husband of a woman. This shows that 
marriage of widows was not opposed the custom of a widow marrying the 
brother of her deceased husband seems to be common, Hence the word 
'Devara' which means the woman's brother-in-Law, literally means the second 
husband. 
The institution of Niyoga (Levirate) came into Aryan society form some 
non-Aryan source. Under the system of Niyoga, a widow or a woman whose 
husband was not virile was allowed to have conjugal relations with her brother-
in-Law, or some other near relation, till she gave birth to an offspring. A 
widow was allowed to have two sons through Niyoga. A son by levirate was 
always preformed to a son by adoption.^" 
We do not find any reference to sati or burning of widows in Rig-Veda. 
On the other hand Vedic hymns refer to remarriage of widows rather than their 
self-immolation. The burning of the widow on the fiineral pyre of her husband 
might have been practiced by the early Aryans. But in reality in the Rigvedic 
20. Supra note 18 p. 144-145 
94 
CHapter-II 
period the widow was made to lie by the side of her dead husband. She was 
however, asked to come down and a prayer was offered that she be granted a 
prosperous Ufe enjoying the bHss of children and wealth. 
Attachment of importance to the birth of a male child becomes 
responsible for the gradual decline in the status of women. The widow was 
given an inferior position as she was unfortunate enough to lose the all-
powerful protecting male partner. 
The custom of widow remarriage as we understand the term today did 
not exist. But even then we have some references to widow remarriage with the 
younger brother or with the net kinsman of her deceased husband. It can only 
be said that her life was not bound by so many restrictions and austerities as it 
was in the late days. She had not to ascend her husband's funeral pyre. ^^  
In other words, sati system was not in practice. The right of Niyoga 
shows how a widow was very liberally treated in those days. The legal status of 
the widow was the same as that of the wife. The widow however, did not have 
the right to hold property. But then, even a married wife did not possess that 
right. 
Position of Women Before The Advent of Isiam 
In the 6"^  century the greatest event of the history of mankind which 
shook the very basic ideals and concepts of man and brought about a complete 
revolution in his thoughts and views and a total change in his character, was the 
high spirited and high hearted proclamation of the Prophet hood of Hazrat 
Mohammad (Peace be upon him), the result of this revolution was that it not 
only took different turn in man's thought, but also gave a new direction to his 
life. One significant aspect of this new trend of thinking was the concept of 
21.5M/>ra Note 18 p. 118. 
22. Supra Note 17 p. 23-24. 
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women which under went a complete change and thereby estabHshed the 
relationship between man and woman on entirely new grounds. 
Before the advert of Islam, the world has degraded the woman and had 
almost outcaste her. She was thrown in such deep abyss that there seemed no 
hope of her redemption. Islam boldly remonstrated against this injustice and 
emphasized that life needed both man and woman. Woman is not created to be 
derided and cast a side. Like man, woman also has her purpose and rights to 
exist. The arrival of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) and his 
proclamation of Prophethood, the history of woman was no doubt the history of 
subjugation and oppression she was under estimated and condemned as a low 
and mean creature and was regarded as the root cause of all evils and disasters. 
Instructions were given to be careful about her and to avoid her like 
snake and scorpions. She was bought and sold like animals. She did not enjoy 
any absolute or independent position in the society and was made subservient 
to man. She was denied all rights and had to live on the pity and mercy of man. 
In such a dark period of the history of woman, Islam raised its voice so 
vehemently that the whole world reverberated with it. It was the announcement 
that the discrimination which the world has made between one man and the 
other is false, absurd and baseless. The whole mankind is the offspring of the 
single human soul. Originally all have the same descent. No one is noble or 
mean, or low or high by birth. All are equal and enjoy equal position. Any kind 
of distinction between them on the grounds of family status, race, colour, tribe, 
region, language, occupation or nationality is null and void. 
The teachings of Islam revolutionized the thinking of those men who 
buried their daughters alive and felt no shame in doing so. They begun to love 
and nourish their daughters, those who refused to shelter their own daughters, 
became the guardians of others, daughters. Those who were devoid of love and 
affection for women, now loved and cared for their. 
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The most important thing in Islam has assigned woman a prominent 
position at social level. Hence she can lead an honoured and dignified life 
without becoming a victim of any inferiority complex. She can, in fact, offer 
her fullest cooperation to man in building up a chaste and virtuous society 
while contributing her potentialities. Islam does not make any distraction 
between man and women but both are equal before law. 
Women Human Rights In Islam 
Man and woman are ?qual parts of humanity having equaljiignity and 
social and religious status. Before the advent of Islam women were not treated as 
a human being with an independent identity of their own. They were deprived 
of almost all kinds of rights. Islam brought a complete change in the status of 
women and stopped discrimination against them. According to Islamic teachings 
the women should not be treated as entirely dependent on men, rather both have 
their own independent identity.^ ^ The Holy Quran states: 
"The one who does good deeds, whether man or woman, provided that the 
one is a believer, will enter the paradise and they will not be wronged in the 
least of their rightful reward. " 
The second caliph Umar Farooque® described the position of 
Women before and after advent of Islam. He says: 
"By God, in pre- Islamic period women had no position in our society 
and could claim no rights until Allah specified all her rights in the Holy 
Quran. "^^ 
23. M Saud Alam Qasmi, Human Rights in Islam, Publication Division,Aligarh Muslim 
University,Aligarh,p.37,(2005). 
24. The Holy Quran, Al-Nisa, 124 
25. Muslim, Kitabul Nikah. 
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Upliftment of the status of women and granting them the right to lead a 
dignified life in the society can rightly be counted among the greatest 
contributions of Islam in the area of social reform. 
Right to Live 
Before the advent of Islam the Arabs held the women in abject contempt 
and considered them nothing more than chattel. The birth of a daughter was 
considered as a matter of disgrace and social stigma. In some cases even they 
went to the extent of burying them alive. The Holy Quran condemned this evil 
practice in the strongest terms. It says: 
"When any one of them is given the good news of a daughter, his face 
grows dark after this news and he chocks with inward gloom. He hides himself 
from people because of this disgrace, asking himself whether he should suffer 
his daughter with disgrace or bury her alive, what an evil judgment they 
have".^^ 
Female children were deprived of their very basic right to live. 
Unfortunately this cruel practice was not confined to the dark ages of pre-
Islamic Arabia, it is still being followed in the enlightened modern times. 
Using the advanced technology the gender of the foetus is determined and the 
foetus of the female child is killed in the mother's womb and the parents are not 
even charged for taking life of their daughters. In no way it could be said to be 
less heinous than the female infanticide prevalent in pre-Islamic Arabia. Islam has 
no patience with this kind of crime against humanity and condemns it in the 
strongest terms. The Holy Quran says: 
"When the female infant buried alive is asked, for what crime she was 
killed"?^'' 
26. The Holy Quran, Al-Nahal, 58-59. 
27. The Holy Quran-Al-Shams, 8-9 
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Islam stopped this inhuman practice completely and put the women at the 
same footing as the men in the matters of human rights. Muslims were directed to 
take special interest in bringing up their female children and were assured great 
recompense for doing so. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) promised paradise as a 
reward for bringing up female child and said: 
"Whoever takes care of his two girls till they attain maturity, he and I will 
come on the Day of Judgment like this. Saying he joined his fingers " . 
A Muslim cannot aspire for a greater honour and reward. 
Right to Education 
Islam lays great emphasis on the acquisition of knowledge and makes 
it necessary for every Muslim, man and woman, to seek knowledge. But in spite 
of this, education of Muslim women in particular is badly neglected today. 
Needless to say that women's education is essential to improve the living 
conditions of women and also for the revival of Muslim Ummah. Education is 
not only a fundamental right of girls but also the pressing need of Muslim 
society today^ .^ Giving due importance to education of girls the Holy Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) said: 
"Whosoever brings up three daughters, impart them good education, 
arrange their marriage and behave with them nicely, he shall be re-warded the 
paradise." 
This does not mean that the Prophet was not giving due importance to the 
education of male children. The reason behind this statement is quite simple. 
Educating a boy means education of only one person. While educating a female 
is in reality education of entire family, as children are nursed and brought up in the 
28. Muslim, Abwabul Birr. 
29. Supra Note 23 p.45 
30. Tirmizi, Abwabul Birre Walsilah. 
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lap of women. An educated woman therefore, is the best security of the education 
of future generation. 
Right of Equality 
Islamic Shariah considers both the spouses complementary to each 
other. Mutual respect, love and .affection and concern for the comfort of each 
other are the sure guarantees of a pleasant life. The Holy Quran says: 
"They are like garment to you and you are like garment to them ". 31 
This is an extraordinarily portraiture to express the intimacy that exists 
between the husband and wife and their suitability for each as the garment fits the 
body and no room is left in between. The husband is the best protector of wife and 
wife is the best safeguard for the husband against the sin. Islam has assigned 
equal right and responsibility upon the spouse. The Holy Quran says: 
"Wives have the same rights as the husbands have on them in 
accordance -with the generally known principles. " 
The Holy Prophet Said 
"A man is guardian of his family and responsible for them, a wife is 
a guardian of her husband's house and she is responsible for it". ^ 
A companion of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) requested him as to what is 
the right of one's wife on her husband? The Prophet replied: 
"Feed her as and when you feed yourself cloth her as and when you 
clothe yourself do not beat on her face, do not abuse (or curse) her and do not 
separate yourself from her except inside the house ". 
31. The Holy Quran Al-Baqarah, 187. 
32. Ibid, 228. 
33. Bukhari, Kitabul Ahkam. 
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Similarly the husband should not hate his wives neither insult her nor cast 
any doubt on her chastity on false and flimsy grounds. The Holy Prophet 
commanded: 
"Fear Allah with regard to women, because you have taken them in the 
trust of Allah and made their private parts lawful with the word of Allah ".^^ 
Right to Property 
According to Islamic Shariah the property of spouses is separate and like 
husband the wife has also right to manage her property independently. Though 
the husband is responsible to bear the cost of his wife's subsistence, but he is 
not supposed to merge her property with his own. The Holy Quran says: 
"The men shall have their due share according to what they have 
earned and the women shall have their share according to what they have 
earned " ^^ 
Islam fully acknowledges the right of independent ownership of a 
woman. She has fiill right to buy and sell the property or give it on contract. 
The right of independent ownership of wife was not accepted even in 
English law till the late nineteenth century. According to the English common 
law: 
"All real property which a wife held at the time of a marriage 
became a possession of her husband. He was entitled to the rent from the land 
and to any profit, which might be made from operating the estate during the 
joint life of the spouses. As time passed, the English courts devised means to 
forbid a husband's transferring real property without the consent of his wife, but 
he still retained the right to manage it and to receive the money which it 
34. Abu Daood, Kitabul Nikah. 
35. Muslim, Kitabul, Nikah. 
36. The Holy Quran, Al-Nisa, 31. 
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produced. As to a wife's personal property, the husband's power was 
complete. He had the right to spend it as saw fit".^^ 
Islam does not forbid the women from taking up employment, but it 
certainly considers her role as the householder to be much more important. 
However, if a family finds it hard to live on the husband's income alone and the 
wife is in need of employment, she may take a suitable job after consultation. 
(B) MEDEVIAL PERIOD 
From about 1500 B.C there were perceptible changes in the women's 
status due to various reasons, among which the most important was the denial 
of education. The down of paranoiac period witnessed a significant change in 
the role of Hindu women and a concept begun to get strength that the role and 
activity of the women had to be limited and restrained to the basic cuds of 
Hindu existence. The current was flowing then in different directions. The men 
wanted their dominance and making the Hindu women subservient to them. 
Neither they were left with freedom of choice they become only the means for 
Hindu men to attain their end. The women lost their past status and glory. They 
made them to feel subjugated at men's whims. The concept of dual existence 
and rythm of cycle of birth, and death and rebirth, the theory of pind-dan threw 
the Hindu women to a place of subservience. What ever they received in the 
Vedic period the begun to lose it here. The women become dependent on men. 
The marriage also lost its independent value. It failed to secure a firm grip in 
the changing events of Hindu life. The role of Hindu women in conjugal right 
begun to be confined to the kitchen and producing of son. The daughter 
become un welcome to the then society. 
With the lapse of time the position of the daughter also changed. During 
this period there was a gradual decline in women's education. Girls were not 
37. Encyclopedia Americana International, Vol. 29, p. 108, Cited in Human Rights in Islam by Dr. M. 
Saud Alam Qasmi, Publication Division, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. (2005). 
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allowed to go to the houses of the preceptor or centers of education but were 
taught only by near relative like father, brother, or the uncle. Therefore only the 
girls of rich and cultured families received religion and other training. As a 
result there appeared a tendency to curtail the religious right and privileges of 
women in general. 
The desire to get a son to provide for the future became quite intense 
and daughter came to be looked upon as encumbrance and the marriage age of 
the girls continued to be around 16. They had some voice in the selection of 
their life partners. Love marriage was also common. Among the Kshatriyas, 
Swayamvara was fairly common in practice. The social and family status of the 
daughter deteriorated in the post- Vedic period. Her proprietary right was also 
the same as it was in the Vedic age. Even so far as her right in the separate 
• 5 0 
property of the father was concerned, she was not altogether ignored. 
The following line aptly depicts the position of the daughter; "A wife as 
a comrade, a daughter is a misery and a son a light in the highest haven." 
According to the Gautama Samhita, a girl should be given in marriage 
before she attains puberty. He who neglects it commits sin. Some declare that a 
girl should be given in marriage before she wears clothes. Vasistha samhita 
also says the same things. 
Position of Wife 
There were gradual changes in the position of women in this period. 
Women were not allowed to participate in the performance of sacrificial 
ceremonies. The eventually began to lose touch with the Vedas and were 
pushed back to domestic duties. The study of Vedas became the monopoly of 
men. Women were ceased to attend public meetings having lost their 
38. Si/pro Note 18p.340 
39. Supra'Note 0\ p. 26 
40. Vasistta Samhita, XVII- 70-71 quoted by K. Gill, Hindu Women Right to Property, in India p.24-25 
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importance as comrades of men in public activities, they came to be honored 
merely as mothers. 
The reason for the deterioration of their status was the inter-marriage 
between the Aryans and the Dravidians. The non Aryan wife, with her 
ignorance of the Sanskrit language and Hindu religion, obviously as the Aryan 
consort.'*' The black non Aryan wife could be her husband's associate in 
pleasure but not in religious rituals, say several authorities. The discontinuance 
of Upanayana, the neglect of education and lowering of the marriage age 
produced disastrous consequence regarding the position and status of women. 
Early marriage became a hindrance in the education of girls. Women came to 
be regarded as being of the same status the Sudra. During this period on the one 
hand women was being idealized and on the other she was given a very 
degraded status.'*^ 
Over the property of her husband it was generally considered that 
women had no right during his lifetime beyond the right of maintenance and 
residence. According to the mitakshara law, in the matter of partition, a wife 
was allowed to get an equal share with her own son or sons where the division 
took place in the lifetime of her husband. But she could not herself demand a 
partition. She could get a share only if the husband himself separated from his 
sons during his lifetime or if the sons claimed partition during the father life 
time."*^  Though a woman had her own property called Stridhana, she was given 
only limited ownership. It seems the spirit of Hindu law was not to allow 
women independence as regard the disposing of property, but had the right of 
possession and right of enjoyment."'' It can be not said that the social status of 
the wife was not satisfactory. However her status was improved in the sphere 
of proprietary right. 
41. Swpra Note 14-p.345 
42. IbidpMS 
43. Ibid. 
44. Supra Note 26 p. 29-30. 
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Position of Widow 
The widowhood was the greatest calamity that could befall a woman. 
Death of husband however, did not mean an end to the widow's life too. The 
custom of sati, or self immolation by the widow on the husband's pyre, has 
little sanctions in the Ramayana. None of the wives of Dasaratha or Ravana are 
represented as joining their husband on the pyre. Widow was considered both 
undesirable as well as inauspicious. The position of widows become more 
pitiable because the sutras ordered a widow to avoid for the duration of a year, 
the use of honey, meat spirits and liquor as well as salt and to sleep on the 
ground. At the expiry of six months, she could with the permission of her Guru, 
bear a son by her brother-in-law in case she had no son. The custom of Niyoga 
came into existence during this period. Remarriage are not found among the 
Aryans widow but there are instances of non-Aryan widow marrying Aryans. 
The Mahabharata says a child widow can remarry and her sons by the second 
marriage can offer obligations to the manes. The children by the second 
marriage of a widow were given social as well as religions status. Child 
widows, there-fore married without fear of social ostocism. During this period 
Niyoga was preferred to widow re-marriage. 
The rise of Brahmanism during the smriti period became detrimental to 
the status of women. The Hindu lawgivers of this period imposed certain duties 
on widow, who did not ascend the funeral pyre and chose instead to survive the 
husband. All the sages prescribed a life of strict discipline and penance on such 
widows or their whole life. 
The custom of Niyoga was condemned by smriti writers when chastity 
became the main qualification of marriage. Manu disapproved the custom of 
'Niyoga' and declare. That it was fit for cattle only. Although it is still preached 
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in some communities in India, the custom appears very strange and 
unacceptable to the modem mind 45 
Widow marriage was prohibited. The practice of 'sati' was 
recommended by many of the later authorities and was well established by the 
end of the 6^ century A.D. the practice prevailed as early as. Alexander's 
invasion about 325 B.C. Trvellers like Strabo, Megasthenes, and Diodarus who 
accompanied Alexander, allude to this practice. The law givers forced the 
widow to lead the life of austerities fasting and abstinence from pleasure. Manu 
the Hindu law giver say. 
1. Until her death, let her patient of hardship, self controlled and chaste and 
strive to fulfill the most excellent duty which is prescribed for wives who 
have one husband only. 
2. At her pleasure let her emaciate her body by living on pure flowerer roots 
and fruits but she must never mention the name of another man after the 
husband has died. 
3. A virtuous wife, Manu says "again is one who after death of her husband 
contently remains chaste, reaches heaven though she has no son, just like 
those chaste men".'*^  
Later on the role of women in Mauryan society is of some significance. 
It was taken for granted that their position was subordinate to that of the men. 
This is particularly the case in the type of society envisaged by the Arthaastra 
Brahmanical treaties were usually severe with women who in later works 
regarded without equivocation as an inventor species.'*^ The Buddhists were 
much more human in their attitude. Because the women were not independent, 
therefore it was observed that. "The decision to allow nuns in the Buddhists 
order was one of tremendous importance where as there Brahman cal counter 
45. A.S. Altaker, op cit,p. 146-149 
46. Manu V. 157. 158, 160 quoted by R.M. pal, Women in Manu and His Seven Commentators, p. 
221-227(1962). 
47. Rohila thapar; Ashoka and the Decline of the Mauryas" Ilnd ed. 11th impression, p. 87(1990). 
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parts would not even admit of education for women. It has been suggested and 
with some justification that for a women Hfe in Buddhist society was not as 
prying as life in brahmanical society, since she was not regarded primarily as 
child bearer. The birth of a son was not necessary to Buddhists rituals as it was 
a Hindu ritual since Buddhist society accepted unmarried women, the women 
tended to be less concerned with findings husbands and consequently less 
subservient. All the same marriage was still regarded as the most suitable 
occupation for a woman. Working women were restricted is their work. The 
only possibilities seem to have been those of performing in circuses and plays, 
working as domestic slaves either in private homes or in royal places, and as a 
last resort setting them selves up as prostitutes and courtesans. At a later state 
when Hindus ideas on this matter began to infiltrate into Buddhism the 
women's importance even within the home, declined and the older 
Brahmanical attitudes were revived.''^  
Women of India rose in the heights of knowledge and realization, 
worked with men in all spheres of life to the fiillest freedom as well as to 
untrammeled self dependence and self determination. Such bold and blessed, 
self-confident and independent women found than selves suddenly confined 
within four walls of dark and dreary homes, with their minds desolate and 
depressing with almost all their fundamental birth rights totally or almost cult 
off. They were deprived of any rights to justice, freedom education, equality 
and were degraded domestically, socially legally economically politically and 
in every other way they came to be called Abala (The powerless) or 
GrihapinJarakokila (cuckoo of the cage of the house) and subject to the most 
derogatory maxim. 'Putrartha Kriyate Bharya' (women have to be taken in 
marriage for procreation only). 
48. Ibid 
49. R. Chaudary; Status and Role of women Great Indian women through the Ages, in role and status 
of women in India society Calcutta, firma KLM private Ltd 1978 p.31 
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There are contradictory views regarding the position and status of 
women. While some of the earlier authorities have described women as abodes 
of more evil than good, the progressive and liberal thinkers are in favour of 
women. They have gone to the length of worshipping her as a living image of 
the Divine Mother: in menu smriti we find two contradictory statements; 
1. Where women are honored, there gods dwell 
2. A women is to be protected and sheltered all through her life by her male 
relatives by the father during her childhood, the husband when a house wife 
and the son during her widowhood. 
The position of women in all other sphere, except the proprietary rights 
continued to be deteriorating in this period. Most of the causes responsible for 
the degradation of women during the last period continued to operate in this 
age also. 
The age of marriage was fixed at eight. The Upanayana ceremony of 
girls was completely discontinued. The commentators were of the opinion that 
the parents would be committing sin, if the girl's age exceeded eight years. 
Only in kshatriya families girls were married at the age of 14 or 15. Girls of 
rich families, however still received education and a few of them extinguished 
themselves as poetess and critics the ignorance of most giris created a tendency 
among men to treat them lightly and pass cynical remarks about their weakness 
and worthlessness.^° 
In Mughal period the position of women in general was subordinate to 
men. "The functions and position of women were distinctly subordinate and in 
the long run came to be understood as the service of the male and dependence 
upon him in every stage of life. As a daughter, a woman lived under the 
worship of her father, as a wife under the tutelage of her husband and as widow 
(that is if she was permitted to survive her husband) under the care of her eldest 
50. Chandrakda, Hate, Changing Status oftVomen,p.]73 (1969). 
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son. In a word her life was state of perpetual worship and the social laws and 
customs stamped her with a sort of mental deficiency. '^ The girls were 
considered a liability right from the time of their birth. A mother giving birth to 
a number of girls in succession was despised. Amongst some of the Rajputs 
cast the girls were killed at the time of their birth. 
POSITION OF WOMEN UNDER MUGHAL PERIOD 
With the advent of the Mughals in India, the position of women 
underwent many moderate changes, as they brought with them many Islamic 
ideas and practices in favour of women. The Muslim gave their ladies a more 
respectable position by enforcing the system of purdah, and thus safeguard the 
honour of their ladies buy regularizing the customary dower and property 
rights, the economic position of Muslim ladies was tried to be leveled by 
recommending the marriage of widows and raising their position, the Muslim 
rulers had contributed for the upleftment of women. 
Dower or Mehar 
Dower or Mehar has been regarded as an essential ingredient of a 
Muslim marriage without which no marriage is considered lawfully in Islam. 
By dower is meant a certain sum of money paid by the bride groom to the bride 
immediately after 'Nikah; the system of giving Mehar (dower) is an ancient 
custom traced back to the pre Islamic day in Arabia, where a price for a bride 
was paid at the time of marriage. During Mughal age, like today the amount of 
dower was fixed by mutual agreement of the couple concerned, but in practice 
the guardian considered it their duty to settle the amount and the couple were 
informed of it for getting their final consent, and it was communicated to the 
religions heads (Qazi) prior to reciting Nikah. 
51. K.M. Ashraf, Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan. 2nd ed 1970.New Delhi, p. 192 
52. Mishkat, Vol. Ill, 142, p-38-39, The Holy Quran Says "if the intention of a husband is not to pay 
the dower, the marriage is void," Text IV, Surah IV, Verse IV. 
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So far as the fixation of amount of dower is concerned Islam has not 
specified any limit on this account and the only object is to make the wife 
economically and financially sound so that she may not find herself helpless as 
against her husband, and feel confident enough to defend her right. However 
Islam enjoins that the amount of dower should be in conformity with the 
financial position of the bride groom/"' It is important to mention that though 
high dower were preferred, people in general, were incapable of paying the 
large sum of money fixed, either at the time oiNikah or after wards. It has been 
a general practice to leave the dower unpaid, and so like an on-demand 
obligation it remained due at all times the wife's right to the same not being 
extinguished by lapse of time.^ '' Among poor Muslims, due to the weak 
financial position, high dowers could not be fixed and so they generally settled 
doers reasonably that suited the resources of the bridegroom. In regard to low 
dower Islam does not provides a measuring yard, and hence there is permission 
to accept even lower dower, but its minimum is never less than ten dhirmas^^ 
Divorce 
The system of divorce was prevalent in Muslim Society, but was looked 
upon with extreme disapproval by wise and honourable persons. No doubt, 
divorce is lawftil in Islam but disliked by God and allowed only under stringent 
conditions as a last resort. In case of differences between husband and wife, 
Islam strictly laid stress that every effort should be made by both the parties to 
smooth out differences and at reconciliation and the conjugal disputes must be 
settled by means of arbiters. The Quran Says, "And if ye fear even a breach 
between them (husband and wife), then send ye a judge chosen from his 
family, and a judge chosen from her family, that peace be maintained,^ ^ but if 
53. Al-Nikah (Risala) Arabic MS. O.P.L Patna, P-213. 
54. Hugh's Dictionary of Islam p-91. 
55. Ibid.. 
56. The Holy Quran, Chapter 5 Suran 4, Vesse 35. 
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differences becomes acute and should all attempts at reconciliation prove 
unsuccessful then the final separation is permitted by divorce. 
Divorce is lawful in Islam because marriage is regarded as civil contract, 
rather than a sacrament of divine origin, and so the nuptial tie may be severed. 
In connection with divorce it is worth mentioning that the wife was also 
entitled to demand a separation on the grounds of ill usage, than with holding 
of due and proper means of maintenance and certain other causes. In such cases 
an agreement entered into for the purpose of dissolving marriage was known as 
""Khuld" as was prevalent during the wife had to give back her dower/Mahar or 
any other additional sum proposed by the husband. But this type of divorce was 
also subject to willingness of the husband to grant her a divorce." 
Purdah System 
Women according to the Holy Quran should not ordinarily go out of 
their homes, and it forced to do so they should strictly absorb Purdah, and 
dress and conduct them selves in a way so as not to attract the male passers by. 
In India among the Hindu the Purdah system existed long before the 
advent of the Muslim Seclusion of women could be traced back to all ancient 
communities and it was particularly so among the aristocracy during the palmx 
days to Hindu civilization. 
In Mughal period Purdah was mainly observed by all classes of 
Muslims ladies with slight differences. Hamilton writes the Mohammedan 
CO 
women always go veiled when they appeared abroad. Ladies of the upper 
class society strictly observed purdah and none could see the toes of their feet. 
In fact purdah came to be considered as a measure of respectability among 
higher classes. 
57. Zinat Kausar, Muslim Women in Medieval India, Janaki Prakashan, p-291,(1998). 
58. Hamitton, vol. 1 p-163. 
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But like Razia Sultan, Empress Nurjahan also broke the purdah 
convention, and showed her extraordinary personality in the public. On state 
occasions, she appeared in public and she always insisted on seeing with her 
own eyes the things and the people whose conditions and whose affairs she was 
called upon to regulated and rule. However care was taken to veil the face upon 
the lips. 
When ever the respectable ladies of the higher section moved about they 
were carried in 'Dolis' with men in attendance. The women of middle class 
also strictly observed purdah and always appeared abroad in 'Chadaf and 
Burquas or long garments which covered their heads and bodies down to their 
ankles.^ ^ 
Widows Position 
Muslim widows enjoyed a respectable position in society throughout 
Mughal period. Unlike Hindus, a Muslim widow was allowed to attend and 
enjoy the festivals of betrothal, Nikah and birth ceremonies, as Islam takes a 
more generous and liberal view about them and gives them permission to enjoy 
the fruits of life. The only ban on her, after the husband's death, was to observe 
strictly the period of'Iddaf which was of four months and ten days. 
She had to be secluded in the house and was not permitted to move 
about except under unavoidable circumstances, that too during the day and 
covering herself with a veil. 
In case of pregnancy, she had to follow the Islamic rules of Iddat up to 
the birth of the child. '^ 
59. Zinat Kausar, Muslim Women in Medieval India, p.294 (1998). 
60. Behishti Zewar (Urdu) Vol, IV p-34. 
61. The Holy Quran, Surah IXV 4, 11,234. 
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It was an important feature of Muslim society that educated widows 
enjoyed an honorable position in the Mughal age. They imparted education to 
the immates of the royal harem and the nobles families. The well-to-do class 
paid them respect and appointed them as tutors of the daughters and sisters. A 
widow in her family was treated with more respect than before by her children 
who believed that the paradise lay under a mother's feet and always obeyed her 
and took care of her. 
As a wife also woman had to follow the commands of the mother-in-law 
and win other member of husband family through dedicated service however, 
generally in course of time the woman acquired freedom to manage the 
household. Even the Muslim wives were expected to pull on properly with the 
mother-in-law failing to do so could lead to divorce. The women on family way 
were treated with great respect by relations as well as neighbours, however 
when they actually delivered the child they were not touched by anyone except 
the mid wife. In relation to her husband also the women enjoyed a subordinate 
position. The final work in most of the matters rested with the husband even 
though he often consulted his wife and gave due weightage to her counsel. No 
social function amongst the Hindus could be preformed without wife, which 
was described as the better half of man. In short even though the wives were 
accorded a subordinate position to husband they were treated with respect and 
importance.^^ 
The position of Hindu women who were treated at par with men and 
given position of pride considerably declined during the medieval period. One 
of the immediate impacts of the coming of Muslims in India was the 
introduction of pardah system. Pardah or veiling of women, was a common 
practice among the Muslims and was adopted by the Hindu women under the 
stress of circumstances the Hindus adopted pardah as a protective measure to 
say the honour of their women folk and to maintain the purity of their social 
62. Abul fazal: "Akbamama Vol III, Translated by Henry Beveridge, p.372( 1904). 
113 
CRapter-II 
order. Probably the tendency to imitate the ruling class was also contributing 
factor for the adoption of pardan by the Hindus families 63 
It may be noted that the system of purdah was followed mainly by the 
members of high class families amongst the two communities. The women of 
high castes rarely went out. When ever they had to go out they went in covered 
palanquins. Even the middle class Muslim women observed purdah. On the 
other hand the Hindu women belonging to middle and lower classes did not 
observed purdah and moved out without restrictions. However, they use 
dopatta to cover their then head they went out the women of poor families who 
had to help their men folk in the fields and other pursuits also did not observe 
purdah,^ " 
The Hindus by and large practiced monogamy however a small section 
of Hindu population consisting of princes and wealthy persons married more 
than once the Hindus of middle class married second time only if there wife 
proved to be barren or died. This was also done with consent of the Brahmans. 
On the other the Muslims who were permitted by Quran to have four wives at a 
time also generally practiced monogamy. Only rich Muslims took to polygamy 
and maintained three or four wives a time.^ ^ Widow re-marriage was 
prohibited in general. Altacker say that the prohibition of widow re-marriage 
began to be imposed from about 1000 A.D, even on the child widows; it was 
totally prohibited in Hindu society from about 1100 A.D. Initially society upper 
caste widows were prohibited from re-marriage where as lower caste widows 
were allowed to do so.^ ^ Since the last century the lower castes, due to 
sanskritisation and the desire to increase their respectability begun to impose 
upon themselves the prohibition, of widow re-marriage. 
63. Neelam Upadhyay and Rekha Pandey, Women in India, Past and Present, p. 17-18 (1990). 
64. Ibid. PAS 
65. Ibid P. 18 
66. A.S. Altaker op. cit. P. 156 
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The practice of tonsuring of widows was prevalent among may high 
castes until recently it is believed to have come into vague in about the 8* 
century A.D. this system of tonsuring of widows is believed to have been 
adopted by the Brahmins under the influence of Buddhism where the Buddhist 
nuns under went tonsure in imitation of the monks. Henry Maine opines that 
superstitions belief, coupled with the Brahmanical dislikes of the enjoyment of 
property by women, had led to the practice of sati, and was intended to fight 
the ancient rule of civil law, which made her a tenant for life in respect of her 
husband property. It is also believed that the custom came into practice due to 
frequent wars and foreign invasions which left behind widows who preferred to 
commit "Sati" to leading a life of disgrace or dishonour. However though it 
started as a voluntary gestures, as time went on many cases were reported 
where widows were forcibly cast into flames of the pyre much against there 
will.^ ^ 
''Sati" became more frequent among the royal families in northern India 
and quite common in Kashmir during the period 1500-1800 A.D. the practice 
of "Sati" or "Jauhar" was also quite common as well as popular particularly 
among the Rajputs and Marathas of central India. The incentive that were 
dangled before a 'Sati' were as Sankna and Angirasa say, that she who follows 
her husband in death, dwells to heaven for 3.5 corers of years^ ^ 
Several Muslims emperors discouraged 'Sati' and adopted measures to 
prevent it as far as possible but didn't succeed. This era led not only to the 
degeneration of women's physical mortal and social life, but her right in 
educational, social, religions and economic fields were also lowered gradually. 
67. Abbe J.A. Dubois, Hindu Manner Customs and Ceremonies (Translated by H. Beauchanp) O.U.P. 
(Illedn) 1906 P.357-8 
68. A.S. Altaker op. cit P. 130 
69. P.V. Kane, History of Dharamashastra II Poona Bhandaskar Oriental Research Institute, 1955-
p.587 
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The legal position of Hindu women with regard to inheritance right was 
also unsatisfactory under the doctrine of stridhan they were gradually excluded 
from succession to property and this led to their dependence on men.^° 
PRE-INDEPENDENCE 
When the Indians came in vital contact with the Britisher, in the latter 
half of the eighteen century the position of the Indian women had reached the 
maximum degree of deterioration. Ideologically women was considered a 
completely inferior species, inferior to the male, having no significance, no 
personality, socially she was kept in the state of Utter Subjection, denied any 
right suppressed and oppressed. She was further branded as basically lacking 
an ethical fiber. 
The patriarchal joint family, the custom of polygamy and its 
concomitant Koolistan, the Purdah, the property structure, early marriage, self 
immolation of widow or a state of permanent widowhood all these contributed 
to the smothering of the free development of women. 
Thus not only social institutions and customs thwarted the free growth 
of her personality, but the prevailing ideology also assigned the Indian women 
on inferior status. She was denied independent personality. Her life as Manu 
says was to be associated with and subordinated to the father, the husband or 
the son. In fact she had not personality of her own she had no dreams of her 
own. She had no separate status as a member of the family or society. Her 
existence was taken for granted. Her opinion her desires, her likes or dislikes 
were never to be considered. In short the prevailing conception of woman, 
whether Hindu or Muslim, was basically feudal in character. 
It was obvious as Britishers being totally ignorant of their plight in the 
early stage and further felt disinterested in interfering with the personal laws of 
70. Tara Ali Baig, fVomen of India, Delhi Gout, of India publication, p, \2 (195S). 
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the Hindu they not only lacked interest in bringing reforms in the state of 
Hindu law but they otherwise were busy in other important matters. The 
position of woman in the words of Shastri appeared to be as follows. 
"The enforced child-marriages, the exposure of the female children by 
throwing them at the junction of the Gangaes and the sea, the violence used to 
make women the Sati rule and thus end their miserable existence, the shameful 
treatment according to a widow the famous kulinism which make marriage a 
profession rather than a sacrament made woman not only an object of pity but 
many a woman sighed in the secret recess of her heart and wished that she had 
never been bom a woman in the unfortunate country. 
Presenting the position of women in the pre British India, it has been 
observed that: 
"Uneducated considered on a level with the shudras, marriage before 
their characters folly developed, transferred from the loving and sympathetic 
atmosphere of parents house to the house of the parents-in-law where an 
atmosphere of awe prevailed, apprehensive of suppression frequently forced to 
drag on a miserable existence in an interminable widowhood, their character 
suffered from forced repression in some direction and unnatural stimulation in 
others. They had no status in society none in their own estimation.''^ 
According to Altaker 
"Denied the benefits of education brought up in the authoritarian 
atmosphere, having no opportunities to develop their natural capacities, women 
became helpless illiterate narrow minded and peevish. Economically too 
women became dependent on men. 
71. Shakuntala Rao Shastri, Woman in the Sacred Laws, Bombay Vidya Bhavan, (1959), p.l71 
72. S.C. Dube, in Barbara word (e d) Women in New Asia (The Hague, UNESCO, 1963),p. 189 
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"The present woman is an atrophied limb of the social organism and 
especially in civilized society she depends as completely for her support and 
sustenance on the husband as a child does on its mother^^ 
The movement of social reform begun during British rule through with a 
slow pace, when a few educated Indians coming in contact with western ideas 
started taking keen interest in ameliorating the conditions of Hindu women. 
Ishwar Chand Vidhya Sagar, Mahatama Gandhi, Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Tilak 
and other prominent figure laid emphasis on the education of the Hindu female 
abolition of child marriage, lifting oipardah system removal of dowry evil and 
Sati Pratha. The movement started with their effort and there was realization of 
feeling that the legislature should step in and to take some concrete steps by 
giving statutory recognition to their rights and provided some kind of identity 
and recognition to them in society. Though their efforts possessed a limited 
character nevertheless it created a kind of awareness that after all their position 
has to be improved. It was the beginning during the British rule but it took a 
concrete shape during the course of time in the post independent era when 
parliament passed notable legislations for improving upon the states of the 
Hindu women by passing many legislation in that regard. 
Gandhi, 1869 emerged on the Indian political scene in 1948. He 
appreciated qualities of Indian women. "To call women the weaker sex is a 
liable it is man's injustice to woman. If by strength is meant moral power then 
woman is immeasurably man's superior. Has she not greater intuitions. Is she 
not more self-sacrificing has she greater powers of endurance, has she not 
greater courage? Without her man could not be if non violence is the law of our 
being, the ftiture is with women.^ '* 
73. Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in pratima Asthana, Woman's Movement in India, p.9 (1974). 
74. M.K. Gandhi, young India (Feb 9 1926) 
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Gandhi devoted his attention to women's cause. He opposed child 
marriage and deplored the treatment meted out to Hindu widow.'^  He wanted to 
give every widow the right to marry. He condoned the system of pardah and 
appealed to the parents to be broad minded. For him the system of dowry was a 
real drag on society. The reasons that are responsible for the deterioration of 
the status of women in India were 
1. Patriarchal joint family system 
2. Polygamy and the sati system 
3. Enforcement widowhood, denial of the right to divorce and right to 
remarry after widowhood. 
4. Child marriage and the purdah system. 
Because of child marriage too much older men there was an increase in 
the number of widows. Both child marriage and the purdah custom led to low 
literacy rate among women. Their entry to social political and religious 
functions was prohibited. They were depressed to such an extent that they 
could not comprehend their own freedom and independent personality. During 
this period one finds exceptional women like Chand Bibi, Jhansi Laxmi bai, 
Kittur Rani Channamma and Rani Abbakka who made the remarkable impact 
in the field of administration.''^  
The British were the first rulers who unified the country as a whole and 
were liberal in their thinking. They believed that rational thinking has to be the 
basis for all customs and institutions and all customs and institutions not so 
based on reason had to be done away with. Hence during the British rule Indian 
society faced significant modifications. The British Government worked slowly 
and succeeded in providing on alternative way of life for those who wanted 
change by introducing a new type of economy, state, structure, educational 
75. K.M. Gandhi, young India (Feb 4 1926) 
76. K.M. Gandhi, Mahajan (May 23 1936) 
77. Sudha.G, Changing status of women in society in sarojini Shintri (ed/ Women: Her problem and 
Her achievements dharwael, Karjalaka University 1977p.91 
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system and also by passing new social legislations. Taking a broad view of the 
legislative changes effected in the area of Hindu law during the British period 
the first and foremost place may be accorded to that body of legislation which 
sought to improve the social and legal status of Hindu women. The prejudices 
of some of the Dharmashastra writers along with the degenerate customs 
which arose in the Hindu society in course of time under the impact of foreign 
domination were responsible for making the social position of Hindu women 
rather weak and inequitable. They came to occupy an inferior position in the 
eyes of law, this needed to be corrected and there fore, the legislature enacted a 
number of statutes designed to improve the lot of women in the Hindu society. 
The Hindu widow's Remarriage Act, passed in 1856 was the first important 
measure in this series. This act legalized the remarriage of the Hindu widow. It 
was an enabling Act and was passed at the instance of a reformist section of the 
Hindus. There after the Hindu women's Right to property Act was enacted in 
1937. The Act conferred on the Hindu women some limited properly right than 
they had in past possessed. It was the beginning for an important piece of 
legislation which effected revolutionary changes in the domain of Hindus law 
of joint family, coparcenery, partition, inheritance etc. in course of time. The 
last statute in this series was the Hindu Married Women's Right to separate 
Residence and Maintenance Act enacted in 1946, which enabled a Hindu 
married women, without dissolving the marriage to claim separate residence 
and maintenance from her husband under certain circumstances mention in the 
Act. 
A few statutes were enacted to suppress some objectionable social 
practices which have the sanction of law and customs amongst the Hindus. The 
first step in this respect was the abolition of the inhuman practice of sati by 
Lord William Bentick very early in the day. A very conspicuous evil, which 
was sapping the very vital of the society, was the practice of child marriage. To 
discourage this practice the child marriage restraint Act was enacted in 1929. 
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The attitude of non-interference adopted by the British administrators in 
case of the Hindu law was reflected much more tenaciously in case of Muslim 
law. On the whole changes made in the Hindu law were far greater than was 
the case in the domain of the Muslim law. Fewer changes have been effected in 
the Muslim law as administered in India than was the case with respect to 
Hindu law. In fact, some of the statutes were passed in order to restore the 
orthodox doctrine of Muslim law and undo the effect of judicial decisions. This 
can be ascribed to some extent to the lack of enlightened public opinion among 
the Muslim. 
The first legislative change made in the law was in 1913 when the 
legislature enacted the Wakf Act. Therefore the Wakf Act 1913 sought to bring 
the law back to the Muslim shariat law and restored to the Muslims the right to 
make valid Wakfs in favour of the family. In 1937, the Shariat Act was passed 
which abrogated customs and brought all the communities under the Muslim 
law. 
Anther place of legislation was enacted in 1939. The dissolution of the 
Muslim Marriage Act gave to a Muslim wife the right of Judicial separation 
from her husband which had been denied to her earlier, perhaps because the 
courts follow mainly the Hanafi School of interpretation of the Muslim Law. 
POST INDEPENDENCE 
Though at the time of independence before the constitution of India, 
some reforms in the state of law were carried out by the Britishers at the 
instance of Indian social reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Roy, The concept of 
the women being independent rather like dumb animal who on humanitarian 
grounds, must not be mistreated was still holding ground. This is despite some 
great men and women who worked as equal and comrades and considered each 
other so, in the freedom movement itself It is observed that. 
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Since independence all India women's conference became interested in 
constructive work and left its agitational attitude of pre-independence era. It 
activities since independence led to the enactment of some legislations 
concerning women. Some significant ones are, The Suppression of Immoral 
Traffic in Women and Children Act 1954, The Special Marriage Act 1954, and 
Guardianship Act 1956, Intestate Succession Act 1956, The Orphanage and 
Widow Home Act 1960 and the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961. Not with 
standing the multiplication of legislation on various fields, with a view to 
improve the social political and economic condition and status of women even 
the ancient form of victimization child marriage, and premature consummation 
resulting in early and dangerous pregnancies. Sati, female infanticide, illegal 
abortions, dowry deaths, rape eve-teasing and various other forms of 
molestation of women still continues. In fact, since the passing of the dowry 
prohibition act and even after several amendments to the I.P.C, Cr. P.C, and the 
Evidence Act, dowry deaths are on the increase. The Hindu Marriage Act of 
1955 and the Hindu Succession Act 1956, securing for women the right to 
divorce and property have not automatically given women rights. Under the 
Hindu succession Act, parents make will depriving daughters. Though, bigamy 
is an offence the rate of desertion by Hindu husbands and illegal second 
marriage is higher than "Talaq" rate of the Muslims. 
The advancement of reproduction technology has brought in the new 
phenomenon of female feticide. One study revealed that nearly 100 percent of 
the aborted fetuses wore female. Women's health is given consideration only in 
terms of maternity, leaving women beyond the reproductive age, young 
unmarried girls and widows outside health and nutrition schemes. The 
government's family planning programmes have a heavy gender bias. 78 
The condition of elderly women is also not satisfactory especially those 
of widows. She has to earn as also run the house and raise her children. If she 
78. Ghosh, S.K, Indian Women Through Ages, Ashish publishing House New, Delhi, ]989-p.l9 
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does not earn her condition is even worse. If the widow has no issue she has to 
work hard as a maid servant in her husband's joint family or relations who 
might have taken her in and is totally dependent for all her needs on others. She 
has neither economy security nor a say in decisions concerning her and her 
children. Families still believe that once a daughter is given away in marriage 
she can not be given away again to another person. Hence widow remarriage 
though sanctioned by Hindu Widows Remarriage Act of 1850. Seldom takes 
place and is discouraged.^' Large sections of women have suffered a decline of 
economic status. Even after the promulgation of these laws the protection 
enjoyed by the large masses of women from exploitation and injustice is 
negligible. Though women don't numerically constitute a minority, they are 
beginning to acquire the feature of a minority community by the recognized 
dimensions of inequality of class, economic situation status and political 
power. The chasm between the values of a new social order proclaimed by the 
constitution and the realities of contemporary Indian society as far as woman's 
rights are concerned remains as great as at the time of independence. 
19.1bid,^.\6 
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CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS: PROTECTING 
WOMEN HUMAN RIGHTS 
The preamble to the Constitution of India envisages certain objectives to 
be achieved which is as following: 
WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute 
India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC' and to secure to all its citizens. 
JUSTICE, social economic and political; 
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; 
EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; 
and to promote among them all 
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and 
integrity of the nation;^  
IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty sixth day of 
November 1949, do 
HEREBY ADOPT ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS 
CONSTITUTION. 
The preamble contains "the ideals and aspirations of the people of India" 
one of the golden ideals is "the equality of status and of opportunity" this 
objective has been achieved by and large, by providing equality clause in the 
constitution of India. The equality clause expressly prohibits discrimination on 
1. Substituted by the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act 1976, sec-2, for "SOVEREIGN 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC" (w.e.f. 3.1.1977). 
2. Substituted by the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act 1976, sec-2, Ibid, for "unity of the Nation" 
(w.e.f. 3.1.1977). 
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the basis of race, religion, caste, sex and place of birth and guarantees equality 
before the law and equal protection of laws irrespective of race, religion, caste, 
sex etc. Thus the Indian Constitution has assured equal status to all not only 
between men and men, women and women but also between men and women.^  
The Constitution of India guarantees the Right to Equality through 
Article 14. "Equality is one of the most magnificent comer-stone of Indian 
democracy." 
The doctrine of equality before law is a necessary corollary of Rule of 
law which pervades the Indian Constitution."* Article 14 outlaws discrimination 
in a general way and guarantees equality before law to all persons. In view of a 
certain amount of indefmiteness attached to the general principal of equality 
enunciated in Article 14, separate provisions to cover specific discriminatory 
situations have been made by subsequent Articles. In this series Article 14 is 
the most significant, it has been given a highly activist magnitude in recent 
years by the courts and thus it generates a large number of court cases. 
It may be worthwhile to note that Article 17 of Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948, declares that all are equal before law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to equal protection of law, by and large the same 
concept of equality in the Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. 
It may be noted that the right to equality had been declared by the 
Supreme Court as the basic Feature of the Constitution. The Constitution is 
wedded to the concept of equality. The preamble of the Constitution 
emphasizes upon the principles of equality as basic to the Constitution. This 
means that even a Constitutional amendment offending the right to equality 
will be declared invalid. Neither the parliament nor any state legislature can 
transgress the principal of equality. This principle has been recently reiterated 
3. Article 14-16 of the Indian Constitution. 
4. Ashutosh Gupta v. State ofRajastan (2002) 4 SCC 34 AIR 2002 SC 15 33. 
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by the Supreme Court in Badappanavar, Equality is a basic feature of the 
Constitution of India and any treatment of equals unequally or unequal as 
equals will be violation of basic structure of the Constitution of India. 
Article 14 bars discrimination and prohibits discriminatory laws. Article 
14 is now proving as a bulwark against any arbitrary or discriminatory state 
action. The horizons of equality as embodied in Article 14 have been 
expanding as a result of the judicial pronouncements and Article 14 has now 
come to have a highly activist magnitude. 
Article 14 runs as follows, the state shall not deny any person equality 
before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. 
This provision corresponds to the equal protection clause of the 14' 
amendment of the U.S Constitution which declares: No state shall deny to any 
person within its Jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
The first is a negative concept which ensures that there is no special 
privilege in favour of any, that all are equal subjects to the ordinary law of the 
land and that no person whatever be his rank or condition is above the law. 
This is equivalent to the second corollary of the DICEAN concept of the Rule 
of Law in Britain.^ 
However it is not an absolute rule and there are number of exceptions to 
it, e.g.. Foreign diplomats enjoy immunity from the country Judicial process, 
Article 361 extends immunity to the president of India and the state Governor's 
public officer and also judges enjoys some protection and some special groups 
and interests like the trade union have been accorded special privileges by law. 
The second concept, equal protection of laws, is positive in content. It 
does not mean that identically the same law should apply to all persons or that 
every law must have a universal application within the country irrespective of 
5. MG. Badappanavar v. State ofKamataka. AIR 2001 SC 260. 
6. Wade and Phillips, Constitution and Administrative Law 87 (1977). 
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differences of circumstances. Equal protection of the law does not postulate 
equal treatment of all persons without distinction. What it postulates is the 
application of all persons similarly situated, it denotes equality of treatment in 
equal circumstances, and it implies that among equals the law should be equal 
and equally administered that the like should be treated alike without 
distinction of race, religions, wealth social status or political influence.^  The 
principle of equality of law means not that the same law should apply to 
everyone but that a law should deal alike with all in one class; that there should 
be an equality of treatment under equal circumstances. It means that equal 
should not be treated unlike and unlike should not be treated alike. Likes 
should be treated alike.^  
Article 14 prescribes equality before law. But the fact remains that all 
persons are not equal by nature attainment or circumstances and therefore a 
mechanical equality before the law may result in injustice. Thus the guarantee 
against the denial of equal protection of the laws does not mean that identically 
the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons in spite of 
differences in circumstances or conditions.^  The varying needs of different 
classes or sections of people require differential and separate treatment. The 
legislature is required to deal with diverse problems arising out of infinite 
variety of human relations. It must therefore necessarily have the power of 
making laws to attain particular object and for that purpose of designating, 
selecting and classifying person and things upon which its laws are to operate 
Article 15 (1) specifically bar the state from discriminating against any citizens 
of India on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of 
them. 
Article 15 (1) prohibits differentiation on certain grounds commenting 
on Art 15 (1) the Supreme Court has observed. Article 15 (1) prohibits 
7. Jagannath Prasad v. state of Uttar Pradesh AlK 1961 SC 1245 
8. Gaurishankar v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 55 
9. Chiranjeet lal v. union of India kW. 1951 SC 41. 
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discrimination on ground of religion or caste identities so as to foster national 
dentity which does not deny pluralism of Indian culture but rather to preserve 
it.'" 
Article 15 (1) is an extension of Article 14. Article 15 (1) expresses a 
particular application of the general principle of equality embodied in Article 
14 just as the principle of classification applies to Article 14 so it does to 
Article 15 (1) as well. The combined effect of Article 14 and 15 is not that the 
state cannot pass equal laws, but if it does pass equal laws the inequality must 
be based on some reasonable ground and that due to Article 15 (1) religion, 
race, caste, sex or place of birth alone is not and cannot be a reasonable ground 
for discrimination. The discrimination in Article 15 (1) involves an element of 
unfavorable bias. The use of the word 'only' in the Article 15(1) connotes that 
what is discountenanced is the discrimination purely and solely on account of 
any of the ground mentioned above. A discrimination based on any of these 
grounds and also on other grounds is not hit by Article 15 (1) and 15 (2) though 
it may be hit by Article 14 if religion, sex, caste, race or place of birth is merely 
one of the factors which the legislature has taken into consideration, then it 
would not be discrimination only on the ground of that fact. But if the 
legislature has discriminated only on one of the grounds and no other factor 
could possibly have been present then undoubtedly the law would offend 
against Article 15 (1). 
Article 15 is a facet of Article 14 like Article 14, Article 15 (1) also 
covers the entire range of state activities. But in a way the scope of Article 15 
is narrower than that of Article 14 in several respects. 
One, while Article 14 is general in nature in the sense that it applies both 
to citizens, as well as non-citizens. Article 15 (1) covers only the Indian 
citizens and does not apply to non-citizens. No non-citizens can claim any right 
10. Valsamma Paul v. Cochin university MR 1996 SClOIl at 1019. 
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under Article 15 though he can do so under Article 14. Two, while Article 14 
permit any reasonable classification on the basis of any rational criterion, under 
Article 15 (1), certain grounds mentioned therein can never form the basis of 
classification. 
Article 15 (3), the state is not presented from making any special 
provision for women and children. Article 15 (3) recognizes the fact that the 
women in India have been socially and economically handicapped for centuries 
and as result they cannot fully participate in the socio-economic activities of a 
nation on a ground of equality. The purpose of Article 15 (3) is to eliminate this 
socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in such a 
manner as to bring about effective equality between men and women. The 
object of Article 15 (3) is to strengthen and improve the status of women. 
Article 15 (3) thus relieves the state from the bondage of Article 15 (1) and 
enables it to make special provisions to accord socio-economic equality to 
women. 
A doubt has been raised whether Article 15 (3) saves any provisions 
concerning women or saves only such a precision as is in their favours. The 
better view would appear to be that while the state can make laws containing 
special provision for women and children it should not discriminate against 
them on the basis of their gender only. This appears to be the cumulative effect 
of Article 15(1) and 15 (3). Although there can be no discrimination in general 
on the basis of sex, the Constitution itself provides for special provisions being 
made for women and children by virtue of Article 15 (3). Reading Article 15 
(3) and 15 (1) together, it seems to be clear that while the state may 
discriminate in favour of women against men, it may not discriminate in favour 
of men against women. However, only such provisions can be made in favour 
of women under Article 15 (3) as are reasonable and which do not altogether 
obliterate or render illusionary the Constitutional guarantee mentioned in 
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Article 15 (2). The operation of Article 15 (3) can be illustrated by the 
following few cases. 
Under S-497, of I.P.C the offense of adultery can be consulted only by a 
male and not by a female who can not even be punished as an abettor. As this 
provision makes a special provision for women, it is saved by Article 15 (3) the 
Supreme Court has observed. '' 
Sex is a ground of classification and although there can be no 
discrimination in general on that ground the Constitution itself provides for 
special provision in the case of women and children by clause (3) of Article 15. 
Article 14 and 15 thus read together, validate the last sentence of section 497; 
IPC which prohibits the women from being punished as an abettor of the 
offence of adultery. 
Upholding S. 497, the Bombay High Court had said in an earlier case 
that the discrimination made by S-497, is based not on the fact that women 
have a sex different from that of men, but" women in this country were so 
situated that special legislation was required in order to protect them. 
There existed a common cadre of probation officers for male and 
females. However for the post of the head of the institute for destitute women, 
only female were regarded as eligible. This was challenged as discriminatory. 
In B.R. Anchovy v. State ofGujrat}^ The High Court said that only because 
there was a common cadre, in which the officer's of both sexes were appointed, 
it did not mean that all post in the higher cadre must all be filled in by persons 
belonging to both the sexes, keeping in view the nature of duties to be 
performed the state Govt, may decide, that only a woman will head a women's 
institute. Article 15 (3) enables the state to make any special provision for 
11. Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State ofMaharastra AIR 1954 SC 1618. 
12. 1988 lab IC 1465. 
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women and children and so the impugned rule could not be held to be 
unconstitutional. 
The most significant pronouncement on Article 15 (3) is the Supreme 
Court case Government ofAndhra Pradesh v. P.B. Vijay KumarP 
The Supreme Court has ruled in the instant case that under Article 15 (3) 
the State may fix a quota for appointment of women in government services. 
Also a rule saying that all other things being equal preference would be given 
to women to an extent of 30% of the Posts were held valid with reference to 
Article 15 (3). 
It was argued that reservation of posts or appointments to any backward 
class is permissible under Article 16 (2) but not for women and so no 
reservation can be made in favour of women as it would amount to 
discrimination on the ground of sex in public employment which would be 
violating Article 16 (2). Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court has ruled 
that post can be reserved for women under Article 15 (3) as it is much under in 
scope and cover all state activities. While Article 15 (1) prohibits, the state 
from making any discrimination inter alia on the ground of sex alone, by virtue 
of Article 15 (3) the state may make special provisions for women, thus Article 
15 (3) clearly carves out a permissible departure from the rigours of Article 15 
(1). 
Article 16 
Article 16 (1) is a facet of Article 14. Article 14 and 16 (1) are closely 
inter-connected. Article 16 (1) takes its roots from Article 14. Article 16 (1) 
particularizes the generality of Article 14 and identifies, in a constitutional 
sense, "equality of opportunity" in matters of employment under the state. 
13. AIR 1995 SC 1648. 
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An important point of distinction between Article 14 and 16 is that while 
Article 14 applies to all people's citizens as well as non-citizens. Article 16 
applies only to citizens and not to non citizens. 
Article 16 (1) guarantees equality of opportunity to all citizens in 
matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the state. 
According to article 16 (2), no citizen can be discriminated against or be 
ineligible for any employment of office under the state on the grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth or residence or any of them. 
The Supreme Court has deduced the principal of equal pay for equal 
work from Article 14, 16 and 39 (d) and the preamble to the Constitution. No 
such principle is expressly embodied in the Constitution but the principle has 
now matured in a fundamental Right. As the Supreme Court has explained in 
State ofMadhya Pradesh v. Pramod Bhartiya}'^ The doctrine of "equal pay for 
equal work" is implicit in the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 and 
flows from it. The rule is as much a part of Article 14 as it is of Article 16 (1) 
the doctrine is also stated in Article 39 (d), a directive principle which ordains 
the state to direct its policy towards securing equal pay for equal work for both 
man and woman. 
The Court has enunciated the doctrine as follows.'^  The doctrine of 
equal work for equal pay would apply on the premise of similar work but it 
does not mean that there should be complete identity in all respects. If the two 
classes of persons do the same work under the same employer with similar 
responsibility under similar working conditions the doctrine of equal parcel 
equal pay" would apply and it would not be open to the State to discriminate 
one class with the other in paying salary. But it cannot be said that being a 
Directive Principle it is not enforceable in a court of law because it is also a 
14. AIR 1993 SC 286. 
15. Jaipalv. State of Haryana MK 1988 SC 1504. 
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part of Article 14. The Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are not 
supposed to be exclusionary of each other. 
Employee under one and the same employer holding the same rank 
performing similar functions and discharging similar duties and responsibilities 
must also be given similar seals of pay. The Court has emphasized that this is 
not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. Though not declared expressly in 
the Constitution it is certainly a constitutional goal. 
The principal of equal pay for equal work does not apply when the 
employer are different. Employers of Regional Rural Bank sponsored by a co-
operative bank cannot claim the same salary and allowances as are payable to 
the employees of Regional Rural Bank which are sponsored by the commercial 
and nationalized banks.'^ 
Article 14, as already stated permits reasonable classification which 
means that the classification is to be based on an intelligible basis which 
distinguishes persons or things grouped together from those that are left out of 
the group and the differentia must have a rational nexus with the object to be 
achieved by the differentia made. In other words there ought to be casual 
connection between the basis of classification and the object of classification. 
The doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies in case of unequal scales of 
pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing 
the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. 
Also the fact that appointments and the schemes are temporary in nature 
is irrelevant. Once it is shown that the nature of the duties and functions 
discharged and the work done are similar the doctrine of "equal pay for equal 
work" is attracted.'^ 
16. Kshetriya Kisan Gramin Bank v. D.B. Sharma AIR 2001 SC 168. 
17. Japalv. State ofHaryana AIR 1988 SC 1504. 
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But this Principle cannot be applied invariably to professional service. 
For example dressing of a wound by a doctor or a compunder cannot be 
equated and be compensated on an equal basis. Similarly a senior or a junior 
lawyer cannot be treated equally in matters of remunerations. In the field of 
rendering professional service at any rate the principle for equal work would be 
inapplicable. Therefore doctors with different qualifications can be graded 
differently for purpose of remuneration even though they are in charge of 
dispensaries. 
In Judging the equality of work consideration may be given to 
educational qualifications. Qualitative differences between posts and quantum 
of responsibilities associated with the posts of the classification has reasonable 
nexus with the objective of achieving efficiency in administration, the state 
would be justified in prescribing different pay scales. As the Supreme Court 
has emphasized Equality must be among equals. Unequal cannot claim 
equality. 
The principle of Equal pay for equal work does not apply to two sets of 
employees working in different organizations and when there is qualitative 
deference in the duties and functions discharged by them. 
Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees the right to life and 
personal liberty has come to occupy the position of brooding omnipresence. In 
the scheme of fundamental rights this provision has become a sanctuary for 
human values and therefore has been rightly termed as the fundamental of 
fundamental rights. Like the right to personal liberty which has been given a 
new content, the right to life has been infused with the dynamic concept of 
human dignity which is the foundation of all other human rights. In 'Francis 
18. State of UP v. J.P. Chaurnsia (1989) I SCC 121. 
19. GarhwalJal Sammclan Kamachari v. State of UP AIR 1997 SC 2143, 
134 
Cfiapter-III 
Coralie Mullin v. Delhi Administration, Justice Bhagwati elucidated the 
import of the right to life thus.^' 
The right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere 
animal existence. It means something more than just physical survival the 
inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by 
which life, is enjoyed this would include the faculties of thinking and feeling 
but the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to 
protection of limber faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. 
We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and 
all that goes with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as adequate 
nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head, facilities for reading, writing and 
expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and 
commingle with fellow human beings of course, the magnitude and content of 
the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic 
development of the country, but it must in any view of the matter, include the 
right matter basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such 
functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of oneself 
Thus, the right to life has been held to be wide enough to encompass the 
right to live with human dignity which in turn would include the basic 
necessities of life such as hygienic environment, medical care, safe drinking 
water, food clothing and shelter, and education etc. 
Further, the right to life has been held to include the right to' livelihood. 
In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal corporation. Chief Justice Chandra Chud 
observed the right life does not mean merely that life cannot be taken away 
or extinguished as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death 
sentence except according to Procedure established by law. That is but one 
20. AIR 1981 SC746. 
21. Ibid, Per Justice Baghwati p. 752-753. 
22. AIR 1986 SC 180. 
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aspect of the life. An equally important aspect of it is the right to live livelihood 
is not treated as the part of right to life the easiest way of depriving a person of 
his life right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the 
point of abrogation. In view of the fact that Article 39 (b) and 41 require the 
state to secure an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would 
be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of life." 
Evidently, the right to life seems to be the main right 'from which many 
more basic human rights emanate. However, the main question, in the context 
of the Indian conditions, is to what extent these basic rights be realized? Is the 
presently followed judicial strategy for their realization adequate before we 
advert to this issue it is necessary to appreciate, though in brief, the extent and 
nature of the constitutional protection provided under Article 21 of the 
Constitution.^^ 
Right to life means having all organs of the body intact. 
The right to life is a right to life which is much more than mere animal 
existence. The right to life means to have intact all limbs and faculties through 
which life is enjoyed has meaning. It would obviously, be deprivation of life if 
the body is mutilated or any part of it is amputated or if any organ of the body 
is destroyed. In Kharak Singh v. State ofUP^'* the Supreme Court observed that 
the right to life does not mean the right to the continuance of a person's animal 
existence, but a right to the possession of all organs, his arms, legs etc. The 
right to life thus means right to live with full dignity without humiliation and 
deprivation or denial of any Article Personal liberty obviously means freedom 
from all physical restraint and coercion of any sort. 
23. Ibid, As per C.J. Chanderchud at p. 185. 
24. AIR J 963 SCI 295. 
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Right to personal liberty includes all rights left out of Article 19 
In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,^^ the Supreme Court propounded 
the thesis that "personal liberty" in Article 21 was used as a compendious term 
to include within itself all the varieties of right which tend to make up 
"personal liberty" of a man minus the right guaranteed under Article 19 (1). 
Das J. opined that while Article 19(1) dealt with the particular species or 
attributes of that freedom, personal liberty if Article21 took, and is comprised, 
the residue.^^ His lordship further observed that for example a free man could 
eat what he liked subject to the licensing and prohibition laws and do a hundred 
and one things which were not included in Article 19. This interpretation that 
personal liberty means only liberty relating to or concerning the person is 
obviously, to narrow and the Supreme Court itself has repudiated it. In Kharak 
Singh V. State ofU.P., the domiciliary visits during the night by the Police to 
the house of bad characters and suspects were held to be an invasion or 
personal liberty being violative of the sanctity of a man's home and an 
intrusion into his personal security and his right to sleep undisturbed. 
Right to live with human dignity 
In Maneka Gandhi's case, the Supreme Court gave a new dimension 
to Article 21. It was held that the right to 'live' is not merely confined to 
physical existence but it includes within its ambit the right to live with human 
dignity. Elaborating the same view the Court in Francis Coralie v. Union 
Territory of Delhi^^ said that the right to live is not restricted to mere animal 
existence. It means something more that just physical survival. The 'right to 
life' is not confined to the protection of any faculty or limb through which life 
is enjoyed or the soul communicates with the outside world but it also includes 
25. AIR 1950 SC 27. 
26 C.E.R. Center v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 922. 
27. AIR 1963 SC 1295. 
28. AIR 1978 SC 597. 
29. AIR 1981 SC 746. 
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the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the 
bare necessities of life such as, adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and 
facilities for reading, writing and expressing ourselves in diverse forms, freely 
moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. 
Following Maneka Gandhi and Francis Coralie cases the Supreme 
Court in People Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India/" has held that 
non-payment of minimum wages to the workers employed in various Asiad 
Projects in Delhi was a denial to them of their right to live with basic human 
dignity and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution, Bhagwati, J, speaking 
for the majority held that the rights and benefits conferred on the workmen 
employed by a contractor under various labour laws are "clearly intended to 
ensure basic human dignity to workmen and if the workmen are deprived of 
any of these rights and benefits, that would clearly be a violation of Article 21.'-
It was further held that the non-implementation by the private contractors and 
non-enforcement by the State authorities of the provisions of various labour 
laws violated the fundamental right of workers "to live with human dignity." 
This decision has heralded a new legal revolution; it has clothed million of 
workers in factories, fields, mines and project sites with human dignity. They 
had fundamental right to maximum "wages, drinking water, shelter, creches, 
medical aid and safety in the respective occupations covered by the various 
welfare legislations. 
In Chandra Raja Kutnari v. Police Commissioner Hyderabad,^' it has 
been held that the right to live include, right to live with human dignity or 
decency and, therefore holding of beauty contest is repugnant to dignity or 
decency of women and offends Article 21 of the Constitution. The Government 
is empowered to prohibit the contest as objectionable performance under 
Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Objectionable Performances Prohibition Act, 
30. AIR 1982 SC 1473. 
31.AIR1998AP302. 
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1956, if it is grossly indecent scurrilous or obscene or intended for 
blackmailing. 
In State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan^^ the Court struck down a 
provision of Bombay Civil Service Rules. 1959, which provided for payment 
of only a nominal subsistence allowance of Re. 1 per month to a suspended 
Government servant upon his conviction during the pendency of his appeal as 
unconstitutional, on the ground that it was violative of Article 21 of the 
Constitution. 
Right to good standard of living 
In Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nabob Khan Gulam Khan and 
others," the Apex court considered the provisions of Article 19(l)(e) read with 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India and Article 25(1) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and held that every, one has a right to standard 
living, adequate health and welfare of himself and his family. It also, 
considered Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights which lays down that the States, parties to the Covenant, 
recognize that every one has right to standard living for himself and his family 
including food, clothing, housing and to continuous improvement of living 
conditions. The Court observed: 
Socio-economic justice, equality of status and of opportunity and 
dignity of person to foster the fraternity among all the sections of the society in 
an integrated Bharat is the arch of the Constitution set down in its Preamble. 
Articles 39 and 38 enjoin the State to provide facilities and opportunities. 
Articles 38 and 46 of the Constitution enjoin the State to promote welfare of 
the people by securing social and economic justice to the weaker sections of 
the society, to minimise inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate 
32. (1983) 3 s e c 387. 
33. 1995 (Suppi) 2 SCC 182, AIR 1997 SC 152. 
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inequalities in status. In that case, it was held that to bring the Dalits and the 
Tribes into the mainstream of national life, the State was to provide facilities 
and opportunities as it is the duty of the Sate to fulfill the basic human and 
constitutional rights to residents so as to make the right to life meaningful. In 
Shantislar Builders v. Narayan Khimalai Totame,^'* another Bench of three 
Judges had held that basic needs of man have traditionally been accepted to be 
three - food, clothing and shelter. The right to life is guaranteed in any civilised 
society. That would take within its sweep the right to food, the right to 
clothing, the right to decent environment and a reasonable accommodation to 
live in. The difference between the need of an animal and a human being for 
shelter has to be kept in view. For an animal, it is the bare protection of the 
body; for human being, it has to be a suitable accommodation which would 
allow him to grow in every aspect - physical, mental and intellectual. The 
surplus urban-vacant land was directed to be used to provide shelter to the 
poor. In Olga Tellis case,^ ^ the Constitutional Bench had considered the right to 
dwell on pavements or in slums by the indigent and the same was accepted as a 
part of right to life enshrined under Article 21. Their ejectment from the place 
nearer to their work would be deprivation of their right to livelihood. They will 
be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and pavement 
dwellings. Their eviction tantamounts to deprivation of their life. The right to 
livelihood is a traditional right to life; the easiest way of depriving a person of 
his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point 
of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective 
content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. The 
deprivation of right to life, therefore, must be consistent with the procedure 
established by law. In P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat/'^ another Bench of three 
Judges had considered the mandate of human right to shelter and read it into 
Article 19(1) (e) and Article 21 of Constitution and the Universal Declaration 
34. (1990) 1 s e c 520: AIR 1990 SC 630. 
35. AIR 1986 SC 180. 
36. 1995 (Suppl) 2 SCC 182: 1995 AIR SCW 1540. 
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of Human Rights and the Convention of Civil, Economic and Cultural Rights 
and had held that it is the duty of the State to construct houses at reasonable 
cost and make them easily accessible to the poor. The aforesaid principles have 
been expressly embodied and in-buih in our Constitution to secure socio-
economic democracy, so that everyone has a right to life, liberty and security of 
the person. Article 22 of the Declaration of Human Rights envisage that 
everyone has a right to its realization as the economic, social and cultural 
rights' are indispensable for his dignity and free development of his 
personality. It would, therefore, be clear that though no person has a right to 
encroach and erect structures or otherwise on footpath, pavement or public 
streets or any other place reserved or earmarked for a public purpose, the State 
has the Constitutional duty to provide adequate facilities and opportunities by 
distributing its wealth and resources for settlement of life and erection of 
shelter over their heads to make the right to life meaningful, effective and 
fruitful. Right to livelihood is meaningful because no one can live without 
means of his living that is the means of livelihood. The deprivation of the right 
to life in that context would not only denude right of the effective content and 
meaningfulness but it would make life miserable and impossible to life. It 
would, therefore, be the duty of State to provide the right to shelter to the poor 
and indigent weaker sections of the society in fulfillment of the Constitutional 
objectives. 
Right to livelihood and right to work 
The Supreme Court has held that the word 'life' in Article 21 does not 
include the right of livelihood.' In the case of Begulla Bapi Raju v. State of A. 
P./^ the Court held that the word 'life' in Article 21 does not include 'the right 
of livelihood.' In this case the petitioners were deprived of their surplus land 
which was acquired by the State for giving it to the poor and downtrodden. It 
37. (1984) 1 s e c 66, Following in Re Sant Ram, AIR 1960 SC 932 and A. V. Nachane v. Union of 
India A\K 1962 SC\\26. 
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was held that the derivation was justified on the ground that it was for giving 
effect to the Directive Principles in Article 39. 
In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,^^ popularly known as 
the 'pavement dwellers case' a five judge bench of the Supreme Court has ruled 
that the word life in Article 21 includes the right to livelihood also. The court 
said: 
It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away 
as, for example, by the imposition and execution of death sentence, except 
according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to 
life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because 
no person can live without the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is 
not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of 
depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of 
livelihood. In view of the fact that Articles 39(a) and 41 require the State to 
secure to the citizen an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it 
would be sheer pendentary to exclude the right to livelihood from the content 
of the right to life 
In that case the petitioners had challenged the validity of Sections 
313,313-A, 314 and 497 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 
which empowered the Municipal Authorities to remove their huts from 
pavement and public places on the ground that their removal amounted to 
depriving them of their right to livelihood and hence it was violative of Article 
21. While agreeing that the right to livelihood is included in Article 21, the 
Court held that it can be curbed or curtailed by following just and fair 
procedure. It was held that the above sections of the Bombay Municipal 
Corporation Act were Constitutional since they imposed reasonable restrictions 
on the right of livelihood of pavement and slum dwellers in the interest of the 
38. AIR 1986 SC 180 (1985)3 SCC 545. 
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general public. Public streets are not meant for carrying on trade or business. 
However, the Court took a humanistic view and in order to minimise their 
hardships involved in the eviction, it directed the Municipal authorities to 
remove them only after the end of the current monsoon season. The Court also 
directed the Corporation to frame a scheme for demarcating hawking and non-
hawking zones and give them licenses for selling their goods in hawking zones. 
Licenses in hawking zones cannot be refused except for good reasons. 
In Secretary State ofKarnataka & Ors v. Uma Devi and Others/^ it was 
argued that in a country like India where there is so much poverty and 
unemployment and there is no equality of bargaining power, the action of the 
State in not making the temporary employees permanent, would be violation of 
Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the very argument 
indicates that there are so many waiting for employment and an equal 
opportunity for competing for employment and it is in that context that the 
Constitution as one of its basic features, has included Article 14, 16 and 309 so 
as to ensure that public employment is given only in a fair and equitable 
manner by giving all those who are qualified, an opportunity to seek 
employment the guise of upholding rights under Article 21 of the Constitution 
of India, a set of persons cannot be preferred over a vast majority of people 
waiting for an opportunity to compete for State employment. The Court 
observed. 
The acceptance of the argument would really negate the rights of the 
others conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution, assuming that we are in a 
position to hold that the right to employment is also a right coming within the 
purview of Article 21 of the Constitution. The argument that Article 23 of the 
Constitution is breached because the employment on daily wages amounts to 
forced labour, cannot be accepted. After ail, the employees accepted the 
39. AIR 2006 SC 1806 at pp. 1825-26. 
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employment at their own volition and with eyes open as to the nature of their 
employment. 
The argument that the right to life protected by Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India would include the right to employment was not accepted. 
The Court further held. 
The law is dynamic and our Constitution is a living document, may be at 
some future point of time, the right to employment can also be brought in under 
the concept of right to life or even included as a fundamental right. The new 
statute is perhaps a beginning. As things now stand, the acceptance of such a 
plea at the instance of the employees before us would lead to the consequence 
of depriving a large number of other aspirants of an opportunity to compete for 
the post or employment Their right to employment, if is a part of right to life, 
would stand denuded by the preferring of those who have got in casually or 
those who have come through the back door. The obligation cast on the State 
under Article 39(a) of the Constitution of India is to ensure that all citizens 
equally have the right to adequate means of livelihood. It will be more 
consistent with that policy if the courts recognize that an appointment to a post 
in Government service or in the service of its instrumentalities can only be by 
way of a proper selection in the manner recognized by the relevant legislation 
in the context of the relevant provisions of the Constitution. In the name of 
individualizing justice, it is also not possible to shut our eyes to the 
constitutional scheme and the right of the numerous as against the few who are 
before the court. The Directive Principles of State Policy have also to be 
reconciled with the rights available to the citizen under Part III of the 
Constitution and the obligation of the State to one and all and not to a particular 
group of citizens. We, therefore, overrule the argument based on Article 21 of 
the Constitution. 
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The jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission is in those cases 
where a case is made out of violation of human rights falling under the 
expression right to life and livelihood. There is no dispute that the right to life 
would include right to receive wages. Deprivation of the wage does affect the 
very right of the life and livelihood itself. The question is whether the right to 
be appointed is a fundamental right. The Apex Court has held the right to 
livelihood is a fundamental right, as right to life is protected under Article 21 of 
the Constitution of India. In Air India statutory Corporation v. United Labour 
Unionf° it is noted that Article 41 provides that the State shall, within the 
limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provisions for 
securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in case of 
unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of 
undeserved want. In other words, the right to employment in the absence of 
suitable legislation cannot be placed on the same footing as right to livelihood. 
Though in Para 21, it appears that the Apex Court has observed the right to 
work becomes as much fundamental as right to life that would be once a person 
is appointed. The Apex Court has observed as under: 
When its correctness was doubted and its reference to the Constitution 
Bench was made in Delhi Transport Corporation case, while holding that Delhi 
Road Transport Authority was an instrumentality of the State, it was held that 
employment is not a bounty from the State nor can its survival be at their • 
mercy. Income is the foundation of any Fundamental Rights. Work is the sole 
source of income. The right to work becomes as much fundamental as right to 
life. Law as a social machinery requires to remove the existing imbalances and 
to further the progress serving the needs of Socialist Democratic Republic 
under the rule of law. Prevailing social conditions and actualities of the life are 
to be taken into account to adjudge the dispute and to see whether the 
interpretation would sub serve the purpose of the society. 
40. (1997) 9 s e c 377 (AIR 1997 SC 645). 
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This observation must be considered in tune what is set out in Paragraph 
15 of the judgment. So reading, it would mean that the right to work as 
fundamental right can only be considered is fundamental right in those cases 
where there is a legislative guarantee in the form of legislation. In the absence 
of right to work being fundamental right, it would not fall within expression 
life under Article 21 and if so would not fall within the definition of Human 
rights as set out under Section 2 (d) of the Act. On this count also, the act of the 
commission would be without jurisdiction.'*' 
Right to property 
In T. Vellaiyan v. Registrar, S.H.R. Commission, Chennai it was 
contended that right to life, liberty, equality and dignity includes the right to 
property, with respect to which a petition was made by the second respondent, 
the Court held that it could not extend the definition, of "Human Rights" to that 
extent to include the right to property also within the definition, particularly 
when the legislature explicitly omitted the right to property within the 
definition of human rights. The definition of "Human Rights" as defined under 
Section 2(d) of the Act. 
"Human rights" means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and 
dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the 
International Covenants and enforceable by Courts in India. 
In that case the rights relating to the property got divided under the 
terms of the partition deed between the petitioner and the second respondent 
was in issue. In which event, it cannot be said that the right to property, which 
was complained by the second respondent before the first respondent, is 
inclusive of the right to life, liberty, equality and dignity, alleged to have been 
interfered by the petitioner. The interference of the right to property of the 
41. State ofMaharastra v. Sou. Shobha Vital kolte AIR 2006 Bom 44-48. 
42. AIR 2005 Mad 80. 
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second respondent, as complained before the first respondent, was independent 
inasmuch as the same was based on the partition deed, to decide which, a 
competent civil Court shall only have jurisdiction. In that view of the matter, it 
is impermissible for the High Court while exercising the power of judicial 
review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as well as the first 
respondent/Commission to decide the dimensions of the right to property of the 
second respondent and the petitioner. 
Right to shelter 
In Chameli Singh v. State ofU.P. and others/^ the Supreme Court held 
that right to shelter is a fundamental right available to every citizen and it was 
laid into Article 21 of the Constitution of India as encompassing within its limit 
the right to shelter to make the right to life more meaningful. The Court 
observed as under: 
In any organized society, right to live as a human being is not entered by 
meeting the only animal's need of the man. All human rights are designed to 
achieve, the freedom from restriction which inhibits his growth, right to life 
implies the right to food, water, disentitled environment, education, medical 
care and shelter. All the civil, political, social and cultural rights enshrined in 
UDHR cannot be exercised without this basic right. Shelter for a human being, 
'therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and limbs. It is the home where he 
has opportunity to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually." 
Right to shelter therefore, includes adequate living space, safe and 
decent structure, clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and 
water, electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc, so as to 
have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter, therefore, does not 
mean a mere right to a roof over one's head but right to all the infrastructure 
necessary to enable them to live and develop as a human being. In view of the 
43. AIR 1987 SC 2117. 
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importance of the right to shelter, the mandate of the Constitution, and the 
obligation under the Universal Declaration of Human Right, the Court held that 
it is the duty of the State to provide housing facilities to Dalits and Tribes, to 
enable them to come into the mainstream of national life. 
In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporations'*'' the Constitution 
Bench of the Supreme Court considered the right to dwell on pavement or in 
slums by indigent as part of right to life enshrined under Article 21. In P. G. 
Gupta V. State of Gujarat,^^ the Supreme Court considered the human right to 
shelter and rights enshrined in Article 19(l)(e) of the Constitution of India and 
Articles 21 of the UDHR and the Convention on Civil, Economic and Cultural 
Rights and held that it is the duty of the State to construct houses at reasonable 
cost and make them easily accessible to the poor. The said principle was found 
embodied and in-built in the Constitution of India to secure socio-economic 
democracy so that every one has a right to life, liberty and security of person. 
The Court, also, emphasized on Article 21 of the Declaration of Human Rights 
which envisaged that every one has a right to social and cultural rights are 
indispensable for his dignity and free development of his personality. 
In Prabhakaran Nayyar v. State of Tamil Nadu/'^ the Supreme Court 
held that shelter is a fundamental right and the enquiry involved in it must be 
taken on urgent basis by the competent authority and the State. Right to shelter 
has also been emphasized by the Supreme Court in M/s Shantistar Builders v. 
Narain Khimal Totame and others."^ 
Right to healthcare 
In Vincent Parikurlangara v. Union of'India/^ the Supreme Court held 
that the right to maintenance and improvement of public heath is included in 
44. 1990 (1) s e c 520. 
45. 1995(Suppl)2SCC182. 
46. AIR 1987 (SC) 2117. 
47. 1990(1) s e c 520. 
48. (1987)2 s e c 165: AIR 1987 SC 990. 
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the right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21. A healthy body is 
the very foundation of all human activities. In a welfare State this is the 
obligation of the Stale to ensure the creation and sustaining of conditions 
congenial to good health. 
A healthy body is the very foundation for all human activities. That is 
why the adage "Sariramadyam Khalu dharma Sadhanam " In a welfare State, 
therefore, it is the obligation of the State to ensure the creation and the 
sustaining of conditions congenial to good health. The Supreme Court in 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India *^ aptly observed. 
It is the fundamental right of everyone in this country, assured under the 
interpretation given to Article 21 by this Court in Francis Mullin's case,^^ to 
live with human dignity, free from exploitation. This right to live with human-
dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive 
Principles of State Policy and particulariy clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and 
Arts. 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the 
health and strength of the workers, men and women, and of the tender age of 
children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a 
healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, 
just as humane conditions of work and maternity relief These are the minimum 
requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human 
dignity, and no State - neither the Central Government - has the right to take 
any action which will deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic 
essentials.. 
Article 47 in Part IV of the Constitution provide: 
The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the 
standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among 
49. (1984) 3 s e c 161: (AIR 1984 SC 802). 
50. (1981) 1 s e c 608: (AIR 1981 SC 746). 
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its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about 
prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating 
drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health. 
This Article has laid stress on improvement of public health and 
prohibition of drugs injurious to health as one of the primary duties of the 
State, In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh v. Union of India, the 
Supreme Court has pointed out that, "the Fundamental rights are intended to 
foster the ideal of a political .democracy and to prevent the establishment of 
authoritarian rule but they are of no value unless they can be enforced by resort 
to courts so they are made justiciable. However, it is also evident that 
notwithstanding their great importance, the Directive Principles cannot in the 
very nature of things be enforced in a Court of Law, but it does not mean that 
Directive Principles are less important than Fundamental Rights or that they are 
not binding on the various organs of the State." In a series of pronouncements 
during the recent years the Supreme Court has culled out from the provisions of 
Part IV of the Constitution these several obligations of the State and called 
upon it to effectuate them in order that the resultant pictured by the 
Constitution Fathers may become a reality. The maintenance and improvement 
of public health have to rank high as these are indispensable to the very 
physical existence of the community and on the betterment of these depends 
the building of the society of which the Constitution makers envisaged 
attending to public health, in our opinion therefore, is of high priority perhaps 
the one at the top.^ ^ 
In Parmananda Katara v. Union oflndia,^^ it has been held that it is the 
professional obligation of all doctors, whether government or private, to extend 
medical aid to the injured immediately to preserve life without waiting legal 
formalities to be complied with by the police under Cr. P.C. Article 21 casts an 
51.(1981)1 s e c 246: (AIR 1981 SC 298). 
52. Vincent Parikurlangara v. Union of India il9S7) 2 SCC 165: AIR 1987 SC 990. 
53. AIR 1989 SC 2039. 
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obligation on the State to preserve life. It is the obligation of those who are in 
charge of the health of the community to preserve life so that the innocent may 
be protected and the guilty may be punished. Social laws do not contemplate 
death by negligence which amounts legal punishment. No law or State action 
can intervene to delay the discharge of this paramount obligation of the 
members of the medical profession. The obligation being total law of procedure 
whether institutes or otherwise which would interfere with the discharge of this 
obligation cannot be sustained and must, therefore, give way. The Court 
directed that in order to make everyone aware of this position the decision of 
the Court must be published in all journals reporting decisions of the Supreme 
Court and adequate publicity highlighting these aspects should be given by the 
national media. The Medical Council must send copies of this judgment to 
every medical college affiliated to it. This is a very significant ruling of the 
Court. If this decision of the Court is followed in its true spirit, it would help in 
saving the lives of many citizens who die in accidents because no immediate 
medical aid is given by the doctors on the ground that they are not authorised to 
treat medico-legal cases, let us hope that all doctors (Government or private) of 
this country should follow this ruling of the Court earnestly. 
In Consumer educational and Research Centre v. Union of India, the 
Supreme Court has held that the right to health and Medical care is a 
Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the Constitution as it is essential for 
making the life of the workman meaningful and purposeftil with dignity of 
person. "Right to life" in Article 21 includes protection of the health and 
strength of the work .The expression life' in Article 21 do not connote mere 
animal existence. It has a much wider meaning which includes right to 
livelihood, better standard of life, hygienic condition in workplace and leisure. 
The Court held that the State, be it Union or State Government or an industry, 
public or private, is enjoined to take all such action which will promote health, 
strength and vigour of the workmen during period of employment and leisure 
54. (1995) 3 s e c 42. 
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and health even after retirement as basic essentials to life with health and 
happiness. The right to life with human dignity encompasses within its fold, 
some of the fmer facets of human civilization which makes life worth living. 
Health of the worker enables him to enjoy the fruit of his labour. Medical 
facilities to protect the health of workers are, therefore, the fimdamental human 
rights to make the life of workman meaningful and purposeful with dignity of 
person. The Court made it clear that all authorities or even private persons or of 
an industry are bound by the directions issued by the Court in this regard under 
Article 32 and 142 of the Constitution. The Court accordingly, laid down the 
following guidelines to be followed by asbestos industries: 
(1) All asbestos industries must make health insurance of worker employed in 
industry. 
(2) Every worker suffering fi-om occupational health hazards would be entitled 
for compensation of Rs. 1 lakh. 
(3) All asbestos industries must maintain the health record of every worker up 
to a minimum period of 40 years from the beginning of the employment or 
15 years after retirement or cessation of the employment whichever was 
later. 
(4) "Membrane filter test" to detect asbestos fiber should be adopted by all the 
factories at par with Metalliferrous Mines Regulations, 1961 and Vienna 
Convention. 
(5) All the factories whether covered by the Employees State Insurance Act or 
Workmen's Compensation Act or otherwise, should insure health coverage 
to every worker. 
Right to pollution free environment 
In Subhas Kumar v. State of Bihar,^^ it has been held that Public 
Interest Litigation is maintainable for ensuring enjoyment of pollution free-
55. 1998 (8) sec 296. 
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water and air which is included in the "right to live" under Article 21 of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court observed. 
Article 32 is designed for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights of a 
citizen by the Apex Court, It provides for an extraordinary procedure to 
safeguard the fundamental rights of a citizen. Right to live is a fundamental 
right under Article 21 of the Constitution and it includes the right of enjoyment 
of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment of life. If anything endangers 
or impure that quality of life in derogation of laws, a citizen has right to have 
recourse of Article 32 of the Constitution for removing the pollution of water 
or air which may be determined to the quality of life. A petition under Article 
32 for the prevention of pollution is maintainable at the instance of affected 
persons or even by a group of social workers or journalists. But recourse to 
proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution should be taken by a person 
genuinely interested in the protection of society on behalf of the community. 
Public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a person or body of persons to 
satisfy his or its personal grudge and enmity. If such petitions under Article 32, 
are entertained it would amount to abuse of process of the Court, preventing 
speedy remedy to other genuine petitioners from this Court. Personal interest 
cannot be enforced though the process of this Court under Article 32 of the 
Constitution in the garb of public interest litigation. Public interest litigation 
contemplates legal proceeding for vindication or enforcement of fundamental 
rights of a group of persons or community which are not able to enforce their 
fundamental rights on account of their incapacity, poverty or ignorance of law. 
A person invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 must approach 
this Court for the vindication of the fundamental rights of affected persons and 
not for the purpose of vindication of his personal grudge or enmity. It is duty of 
this Court to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of justice is 
not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by invoking the 
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extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for personal matters under the garb of 
the public interest litigation. ^^  
In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State ofU.P. "^ ^ the Court 
ordered the closure of certain lime stone quarries on the ground that there was 
serious deficiency regarding safety and hazards in them. The Court had 
appointed a committee for the purpose of inspecting certain lime-stone 
quarries. The Committee had suggested the closure of certain categories of 
stone quarries having regard to adverse impact of mining operations therein. 
Large pollution was caused by lime stone quarries adversely affecting the 
safety and health of the people living in the area. 
In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., The 
Supreme Court observed: 
Consciousness for environmental protection is of recent origin. The 
United Nations Conference on World Environment held in Stockholm in June 
1972 and the follow up action thereafter is spreading the awareness. Over 
thousands of years men had been successfully exploiting the ecological system 
for his sustenance but with the growth of population the demand for land has 
increased and forest growth has been and is being cut down and man has 
started encroaching upon Nature and its assets. Scientific developments have 
made it possible and convenient for man to approach the places which were 
hitherto beyond his ken. The consequences of such interference with ecology 
and environment have now come to be realized. It is necessary that the 
Himalayas and the forest growth on the mountain range should be left 
uninterfered with so that there may be sufficient' quantity of rain. The top soil 
may be preserved without being eroded and the natural setting of the area may 
remain intact. We had commended earlier to the State of Uttar Pradesh as also 
56. See Bandeau Mukti Morcha v. Union of India {\9%A) 2 SCR 67: (AIR 1984 SC 802). 
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to the Union of India that aforestation activity may be carried out in the whole 
valley and the hills. We have been told that such activity has been undertaken. 
We are not oblivious of the fact that natural resources have got to be tapped for 
the purposes of social development but one cannot forget at the same time that 
tapping of resources have to be done with requisite attention and care so that 
ecology and environment may not be affected in any serious way there may not 
be any depletion of water resources and long-term planning must be undertaken 
to keep up the national wealth. It has always to be remembered that these are 
permanent assets of mankind and are not intended to be exhausted in one 
generation. 
In Shriram Food Fertilizer case,^^ the Supreme Court directed the 
company manufacturing hazardous and lethal chemicals and gases posing 
danger to health and life of workmen and people living in its neighborhood, to 
take all necessary safety measures before reopening the plant. There was a 
leakage of Chlorine gas from the plant resulting in death of one person and 
causing hardship to workers and residents of the locality. This was due to the 
negligence of the management in maintenance and operation of the caustic 
chlorine plant of the Company. The .matter was brought before the Court 
through public interest litigation. The management was directed to deposit a 
sum of Rs. 20 lakhs by way of security for payment of compensation claims of 
the victims of Oleum gas leak with the Registrar of the Court. In addition, a 
bank guarantee for a sum of 15 lacs was also directed to be deposited which 
shall be encashed in case of any escape of Chlorine gas within a period of three 
years from the date of the judgment, resulting in death or injury to any 
workman or any person living in the vicinity. Subject of these conditions the 
Court allowed the partial opening of the plant. The efforts of the highest Court 
in environment pollution control through public interest litigation was indeed a 
laudable, particularly when the Legislature was lagging behind in bridging the 
59. MC Mehta v. Union of India {m6l 
155 
CHapter-III 
lacuna in the existing legal system and the administration was not well 
equipped to meet the challenge. 
In M.C. Mehta v. Union of Indiaf^ the Supreme Court ordered the 
closure of tanneries at Jajmau near Kanpur, polluting the river Ganga. The 
matter was brought to the notice of the Court by the petitioner, a social worker, 
through a Public Interest Litigation. The Court held that notwithstanding the 
comprehensive provisions contained in the Water (Prevention and control of 
Pollution) Act and the Environmental (Protection) Act, no effective steps were 
taken by the Government to stop the grave public nuisance caused by the 
tanneries at Jajmau, Kanpur. In the circumstances, it was held that the Court 
was entitled to order the closure of tanneries unless they took steps to set up 
treatment plants. 
In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,^^ the petitioner brought a public 
interest litigation against Ganga water pollution requiring the Court to issue 
appropriate directions for the prevention of Ganga water pollution, he claimed 
that although Parliament and the State legislatures have passed several laws 
imposing duties on the Central and State Boards constituted under the Water 
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act and the municipalities. Under the 
U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, they have just remained on paper and no 
proper action had been taken pursuant thereto. The Supreme Court held that the 
petitioner although not a riparian owner (living on the river side), was entitled 
to move the Court for the enforcement of various statutory provisions which 
impose duties on the municipal and other authorities. He is a person interested 
in protecting the lives of the people who make use of the Ganga water. The 
nuisance caused by the pollution that makes use of the Ganga water. The 
nuisance caused by the pollution of the river Ganga is a public nuisance which 
is wide spread and affecting the lives of large number of persons and therefore 
60. (1987) 4 sec 463. 
61.(1998)1 sec 471. 
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any particular person can take proceedings to stop it as distinct from the 
community at large. Accordingly, the Court directed the Kanpur Nagar 
Mahapalika to submit its proposals for effective prevention and control of 
water pollution within 6 months to the Board constituted under the Water Act. 
It also directed the Mahapalika to get the dairies shifted to a place outside the 
city and arrange for removal of wastes accumulated at the dairies so that it may 
not reach the river Ganga, to lay sewerage line wherever it is not constructed, 
to construct public latrines and urinals, for the use of poor people free of 
charge, to ensure that dead bodies or half burnt bodies are not thrown into river 
Ganga and to take action against the industries responsible for pollution, 
licences to establish new industries should be granted only to those who make 
adequate provisions for the treatment of trade effluent flowing out of the 
factories. The above directions apply mutatis mutandis to all other Mahapalikas 
and municipalities which have the jurisdiction over the areas through which the 
river Ganga flows. 
In Vellore Citizen Welfare Forum v. Union of India and others, the 
Court issued direction for maintaining the standard stipulated by Pollution 
Control Board and held that right to have pollution-free environment was a 
fundamental right. 
The traditional concept that development and ecology are opposed to 
each other is no longer acceptable. "Sustainable Development" is the answer. 
In the International sphere "Sustainable Development" as a concept came to be 
known for the first time in the Stockholm Declaration of 1972. Thereafter, in 
1987 the concept was given a definite shape by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development in its report called "Our Common Future". The 
Commission was chaired by the then Prime Minister of Norway Ms. G. H. 
Brundtland and as such the report is popularly known as "Brundtland Report. " 
In 1991 the World Conservation Union, United "Nations Environment 
62. AIR 1996 SC 2715. 
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Programme and World Wide Fund for Nature, Jointly came out with a 
document called "Caring for the Earth" which is a strategy for sustainable 
living. Finally, came the Earth Summit held in June, 1992 at Rio which saw the 
largest gathering of world leaders ever in the history, deliberating and chalking 
out a blue print for the survival of the planet. Among the tangible achievements 
of the Rio Conference was the signing of two conventions, one on biological 
diversity and another on Climate Change. These conventions were signed by 
153 nations. The delegates also approved by consensus three non-binding 
documents namely, a Statement on Forestry Principles, a declaration of 
principles on environmental policy and development initiatives and Agenda 21, 
a programme of action into the next century in areas like poverty, population 
and pollution. During the two decades from Stockholm to Rio "Sustainable 
Development" has come to be accepted as a viable concept to eradicate poverty 
and improve the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity 
of the supporting ecosystems. "Sustainable Development" as defined by the 
Brundtland Report means "Development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own 
needs. "Sustainable Development" as a balancing concept between ecology and 
development has been accepted as a part of the Customary International law 
though its salient features have yet to be finalised by the International law 
Jurists. 
"Some of the salient principles of "Sustainable Development", as called 
out fi"om Brundtland Report and other international documents, are Inter-
Generational Equity, Use and Conservation of Natural Resources, 
Environmental Protection, the Precautionary Principle, Polluter Pays Principle, 
Obligation to assist and co-operate. Eradication of Poverty and Financial 
Assistance to the developing countries. We are, however, of the view that 
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"The Precautionary Principle" and "The Polluter Pays" principle are 
essential features of "Sustainable Development." The "Precautionary Principle" 
in the context of the municipal law means: 
(i) Environmental measures by the State Government and the statutory 
authorities-must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of environmental 
degradation. 
(ii) Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. 
(iii) The Onus of proof is on the actor or the developer/industrialist to show that 
his action is environmentally benign. The Polluter Pays principle has been 
held to be a sound principle by this Court in Indian Council for Enviro-
Legal Action v. Union of India, ^^ The Court observed. We are of the 
opinion that any principle evolved in this behalf should be simple, practical 
and suited to the conditions obtaining in this country. The Court ruled that 
once the activity carried on is hazardous or inherently dangerous, the person 
carrying on such activity is liable to make good the loss caused to any other 
person by his activity irrespective of the fact whether he took reasonable 
care while carrying on his activity. The rule is premised upon the very 
nature of the activity carried on. Consequently the polluting industries are 
absolutely liable to compensate for the harm caused by them to villagers in 
the affected area, to the soil and to the underground water and hence, they 
are bound to take all necessary measures to remove sludge and other 
pollutants lying in the affected areas. The Polluter Pays principle as 
interpreted by this Court means that the absolute liability for harm to the 
environment extends not only to compensate the victims of pollution but 
also the cost of restoring the environmental degradation. Remediation of the 
63. (1996) 2 n (SC) 196: AIR 1996 SCW 1069. 
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damaged environment is part of tiie process of Sustainable Development 
and as such polluter is liable to pay the cost to the individual sufferers as 
well as the cost of reversing the damaged ecology. 
The precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle have been 
accepted as part of the law of the land. Article 21 of the Constitution of India 
guarantees protection of life and personal liberty. 
Right to privacy 
The right to privacy and the power of the State to 'search and seize' 
have been the subject of debate in almost every democratic country where 
jflindamental freedoms are guaranteed. History takes us back to Semayne's 
case,^" where it was laid down that 'Every man's house is his castle.' One of 
the most forceful expressions of the above maxim was that of William Pitt in 
the British Parliament in 1763, He said, the poorest man may in his cottage bid 
defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail, its roof may shake, the 
wind may blow through it the storm may enter, the rain may enter, but the King 
of England cannot enter his entire force dare not cross the threshold of the 
ruined tenement. 
When John Wilkes attacked not only governmental policies but the King 
himself pursuant to general warrants, State officers raided many homes and 
other places connected with John Wilkes to locate his controversial pamphlets. 
Entick, as an associate of Wilkes, sued the State officers because agents had 
forcibly broken into his house, broke locked, desks and boxes, and seized many 
printed charts, pamphlets and the like. In a landmark judgment in Entick v. 
Carrington,^^ Lord Camden declared the warrant and the behaviour as 
subversive 'of all the comforts of society and the issuance of a warrant for the 
seizure of all of a person's papers and not those only alleged to be criminal in 
64. Decided in 1603 (5 coke's Rep 419 77Eng. Rep 194) (KB). 
65. (1765) (19 Howells State Trials 1029). (45 Eng Rep 807). 
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nature was 'contrary to the genius of the law of England'. Besides its general 
character, the warrant was, according to the Court, bad inasmuch as it was not 
issued on a showing of probable cause and no record was required to be made 
of what had been seized. In Boyd v. United States,^^ the US Supreme Court 
said that the great Entick judgment was' one of the landmarks of English 
liberty one of the permanent monuments of the British Constitution.' 
The Fourth Amendment in the US Constitution was drafted after a long 
debate on the English experience and secured freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. It said. 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) refers 
to privacy and it states. 
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondences or to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
Everyone has right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks." 
Article 17 of the international Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (to 
which India is a party) refers to privacy and states that: 
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawfiil interference with his 
privacy, family, home and correspondence, or to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation." 
66. (1886) 116 u s 616 (626). 
161 
^ Cfiapter-III 
The question whether the right of privacy is invaded in a matrimonial 
case where the parties are subjected to a medical test has been set at rest by the 
ApQX Court in casQ of Sharda v. Dharampal,. The Apex Court interpreting 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India has ruled that the privacy of a person is 
not an absolute rule. In a matrimonial case directing the parties to undergo 
medical test, does not offend Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Apex 
Court has also cautioned that such power will have to be exercised only if the 
applicant has a strong prima facie case. The Apex Court in that case has held: 
"The right to privacy has been developed by the Supreme Court over a 
period of time. A Bench of eight Judges in M.P, Sharma v. Satish Chandra, 
in the context of search and seizure observed that; 
When the Constitution makers have thought fit not to subject such 
regulation to constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to 
privacy, analogous to the American Fourth Amendment, we have no 
justification to import it, into a totally different fundamental right, by some 
process of strained construction. 
Similarly in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.^^ the majority judgment 
observed thus, 
The right to privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution and, 
therefore, the attempt to ascertain the movements of an individual which is 
merely a manner in which privacy is invaded is not an infringement of 
fundamental right guaranteed by Part III. 
In Gavind v. State ofMadhya Pradesh it was held,^° 
67. AIR 2003 SC 3450. 
68. AIR 1954 SC 300 SC 306. 
69. AIR 1963 SC 1295. 
70. AIR 1975 SC 1378. 
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"Assuming that the fundamental right explicitly guaranteed to a citizen 
have penumbral zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right, 
that fundamental right must be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling 
public interest." 
In Zahida Begum v. Mushtaque Ahamed, ^ ' the specific case made out 
by the petitioner was that the marriage could not be consummated, as the 
defendant-respondent was impotent and he was unable to perform the 
matrimonial obligations. The Court held that in the circumstances, the question 
whether the petitioner was a virgin or not was wholly urmecessary. In the 
circumstances, the learned trial Judge could not have directed the petitioner to 
undergo virginity test at the hands of a Gynecologist. But the right to privacy is 
terms of Article 21 of the Constitution are not absolute right. The Court 
observed: 
To sum up, our conclusion is:-
1. A matrimonial Court has the power to order a person to undergo 
medical test. 
2. Passing of such an order by the Court would not be in violation of the 
right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the India Constitution. 
3. However, the Court should exercise such a power if the applicant has a 
strong prima facie case and there is sufficient material before the 
Court. If despite the order of the Court, the respondent refuses to 
submit himself to medical examination, the Court will be entitled to 
draw an adverse inference against him. 
The Court has the power to order a person to undergo medical test and 
such an order would not be in violation of the right to personal liberty under 
Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the Court should exercise such a 
power only when it is expedient in the interest of justice and when the fact 
71. AIR 2006 Kant 10-
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situation in a given case warrants such an exercise. The DNA test cannot rebut 
the conclusive presumption envisaged under Section 112 of the Act. The 
parties can avoid the rigor of such conclusive presumption only by proving 
non-access which is a negative proof. It is always open to the Court to draw an 
adverse inference when the spouse refuses to undergo the test despite the 
direction given by the Court.'^ 
Right to education 
In a landmark judgment in Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, 
popularly known as the Captivation Fee Case, the Supreme Court has held that 
the right to education is a ftindamental right under Article 21 of the 
Constitution which can not be denied to a citizen by charging higher fee known 
as the captivation fee. The right to education flows directly from right to life. 
The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual cannot be 
assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education. In this case the 
petitioner had challenged the validity of a Notification issued by the 
government under the Karnataka Education Institutions (Prohibition of 
Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 passed to regulate tuition fee to be charged by the 
private Medical Colleges in the State. Under the Notification the tuition fee to 
be charged from students was as follows; Candidates admitted against 
Government seats Rs. 2,000 per year, the Karnataka Students Rs. 25,000 per 
annum and students from outside Kamataka Rs. 60,000 per annum. The 
petitioner was denied admission on the ground that she was unable to pay the 
exorbitant tuition fee of Rs. 60,000 per annum. The two judge Division Bench 
held that the right to education at all level is a fundamental right to citizen 
under Article 21 of the Constitution and charging captivation fee for admission 
to education institutions is illegal and amounted to denial of citizen's right to 
education and also violative of Article 14 being arbitrary, unfair and unjust. 
72. Shaik Fakruddin v. Shaik Mohammad Hasan and another AIR 2006 AP 48-52. 
73. (1992) 3 s e c 666. 
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Captivation fee makes the availability of education beyond the reach of poor. 
The right to education is concomitant to the fundamental rights enshrined under 
Part III of the Constitution. The fundamental right to speech and expression can 
not be fully enjoyed unless a citizen is educated and conscious of his 
individualistic dignity. The education in India has never been a commodity for 
sale. 
In Uni Krishna v. State of A.PJ'^ The Supreme Court was asked to 
examine the correctness of the decision given by the Court in Mohini Jain's 
case. The petitioners miming Medical and Engineering Colleges in the State of 
Andhra Pradesh, Kamataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu contended that if 
Mohini Jain decision is correct and followed by the respective State 
Government they will have to close down their colleges. The five judge bench 
by 3-2 majority partly agreed with the Mohini Jain decision and held that right 
to education is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution as 'it 
directly flows' from right to life. But as regards its content the court partly 
overruled, the Mohini Jain's case, and held that the right to free education is 
available only to children until they complete the age of 14 years, but after that 
the obligation of the state to provide education is subject to the limits of its 
economic capacity and development. The obligations created by Articles 41,45 
and 46 can be discharged by the State either establishing its own institutions or 
by aiding, recognizing or granting affiliation to private institution. Private 
education institutions are necessity in the present day context. Mohini Jain's 
case was not right in holding that charging of any amount must be described as 
captivation fee. Saying so amounts to imposing an impossible condition. It is 
not possible for the private educational institutions to survive if they charge fee 
prescribed by government institutions. The private sector should be involved 
and encouraged in the field of education. But they must be allowed to do so 
under strict regulatory controls in order to prevent private educational 
institutions from commercializing 'education. The charging of the permitted 
74.(1993)1 sec 645. 
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fees by the private educational institutions which is bound to be higher than 
charged by in similar government institutions cannot itself be characterized as 
captivation fee. 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has been interpreted that every 
child under age of 14 years has a right of basic education. In Bandhicwa Mukti 
Morcha v. Union of India and others J^ it has been held that it is the solemn 
duty of the State to provide basic education to the children also working in 
different industries or factories and the Court directed the Government to take 
such steps and evolve scheme assuring education to all children either by the 
77 
industry itself or in coordination with it. In Gaurav Jain v. Union of India, 
the Apex court has held that State has to provide education to the children bom 
to prostitutes. The Court further issued various directions to protect said 
children from exploitation and bring them into the main stream of life by 
educating them. 
As far back as 1957, it has been held by the Supreme Court in the case 
of Stale of Bombay v. R. M. D. ChamarbaugwalaJ^ that education is per se an 
activity that is charitable in nature. Imparting of education is a State function. 
The State, however, having regard to its financial constraints is not always in a 
position to perform its duties. The function of imparting education has been to 
a large extent taken over by the citizens themselves. In the case of Unni 
Krishnan, J.P v. Stale of A.P.J^ looking to the above ground realities, this 
Court formulated a self-financing mechanism/ scheme under which institutions 
were entitled to admit 50% students of their choice as they were self financed 
institutions, whereas rest of the seats were to be filled in by the State. For 
admission of students, a common entrance test was to be held. Provisions for 
free seats and payment seats were made therein. The State and various statutory 
75. Unni Krishnan v. State ofAP AIR 1993 SC 2178. 
76. (1991) 4 s e c 177. 
77. AIR 1997 SC 3021. 
78. AIR 1957 SC 699. 
79. AIR 1993 SC 2178: (1993 AIR SCW 863). 
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authorities including Medical Council of India, University Grants Commission 
etc. were directed to make end or amend regulations so as to bring them on par 
with the said Scheme. In the case of TMA Pai Foundation v. Stale of 
Karnataka, the said scheme formulated by this Court in the case of Unni 
Krishnan was held to be an unreasonable restriction within the meaning of 
Article 19(6) of the Constitution as it resulted in revenue shortfalls making it 
difficult for the educational institutions. Consequently, all orders and directions 
issued by the State in furtherance of the directions in Unni Krishnan s case 
were held to be unconstitutional. This Court observed in the said judgment that 
the right to establish and administer an institution included the right to admit 
students; right to set up a reasonable fee structure; right to constitute a 
governing body, right to appoint staff and right to take disciplinary action. TMA 
Pai Foundation's case for the first time brought into existence the concept of 
education as an "occupation," a term used in Article 19(l)(g) of the 
Constitution. It was held by majority that Article 19(I)(g)and26 confer rights on 
all citizens and religious denominations respectively to establish and maintain 
educational institutions. In addition, Article 30(1) gives the right to religious 
and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institution of 
their choice. However, right to establish an institution under Article 19( 1 )(g) is 
subject to reasonable restriction in terms of Clause (6) thereof Similarly, the 
right conferred on minorities, religious or linguistic, to establish and administer 
educational institution of their own choice under Article 30(1) is held to be 
subject to reasonable regulations which inter alia may be framed having regard 
to public interest and national interest. In the said judgment, it was observed 
para 56 that economic forces have a role to play in the matter of fee fixation. 
The institutions should be permitted to make reasonable profits after providing 
for investment and expenditure. However, capitation fee and profiteering was 
held to be forbidden. Subject to the above two prohibitory parameters, the 
80. (2002) 8 sec 481: AIR 2003 SC 355: (2002) SCW4957. 
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Supreme Court in TMA Pai Foundation's case held that fees to be charged by 
the unaided educational institutions cannot be regulated. 
The judgment in TMA Pai Foundation's case was delivered on 31 -10-
2002. The Union of India, State Government and educational institutions 
understood the majority judgment in that case in different perspectives. It led to 
litigations in several Courts. Under the circumstances, a Bench of five-Judges 
was constituted in the case of Islamic Academy of Education v. State of 
Karnataka,^' so that doubts/anomalies, if any, could be clarified. One of the 
issues which arose for determination concerned determination of the fee 
structure in private unaided professional educational institutions. It was 
submitted on behalf of the managements that such institutions had been given 
complete autonomy not only as regards admission of students but also as 
regards determination of their own fee structure. It was submitted that these 
institutions were entitled to fix their own fee structure which could include a 
reasonable revenue surplus for the purpose of development of education and 
expansion of the institution. It was submitted that so long as there was no 
profiteering, there could be no interference by the Government. As against this, 
on behalf of Union of India, State Govemments and some of the students, it was 
submitted, that the right to set up and administer an educational institution is not 
an absolute right and it is subject to reasonable restrictions. It was submitted that 
such a right is subject to public and national interests. It was contended that 
imparting education was a State function but due to resource crunch, the States 
were not in a position to establish sufficient number of educational institutions 
and consequently the States were permitting private educational instimtions to 
perform State functions. It was submitted that the Government had a statutory 
right to fix the fees to ensure that there was no profiteering. Both sides relied 
upon various passages from the majority judgment in TMA Pai Foundation's case. 
In view of rival submissions, four questions were formulated. We are concerned 
with first question, namely, whether the educational institutions are entitled to fix 
81. (2003) 6 s e c 697, AIR 2003 SC 3 724, (2003 AIR SCW 4240). 
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their own fee structure. It was held that there could be no rigid fee structure. Each 
institute must have freedom to fix its own fee structure, after taking into account 
the need to generate fiinds to run the institution and to provide facilities 
necessary for the benefit of the students. They must be able to generate surplus 
which must be used for betterment and growth of that educational institution. The 
fee structure must be fixed keeping in mind the infi^ astructure and facilities 
available, investment made, salaries paid to teachers and staff future plans for 
expansion and or betterment of institution subject to two restrictions, namely, non-
profiteering and non-charging of capitation fees. It was held that surplus/profit 
can be generated but they shall be used for the benefit of that educational 
institution. It was held that profits/surplus cannot be diverted for any other use or 
purposes and cannot be used for personal gains or for other business or enterprise. 
The Court noticed that there were various statutes/regulations which governed the 
fixation of fee and, therefore, this Court directed the respective State 
Governments to set up Committee headed by a retired High Court Judge to be 
nominated by the Chief Justice of that State to approve the fee structure or to 
propose some other fee which could be charged by the institute. 
In Modern School v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has held the 
right of education further means that a citizen has a right to call upon the state 
to provide educational facilities within the limits of its economic capacity and 
development. As the Government has neither resources nor the ability to 
provide for the same, the legislature has permitted the societies or trusts to start 
educational institution from the savings made by them from the unaided 
institutions. Though there is no fundamental right in respect of secondary 
education. Education is part of human development therefore; indisputably it is 
a human right. 
Article: 39 (d), "the State has to ensure that there is equal pay for equal work 
for both men and women." 
82. AIR 2004 SC 2236,2004 AIR SCW2698. 
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Parliament has enacted the Equal Remuneration Act 1976 to implement 
Article 39(d). The Act provides for payment of equal remuneration to men and 
women workers for the same work, or work of a similar nature and for the 
prevention of discrimination on ground of sex. The Act also ensures that there 
will be no discrimination against recruitment of women and provides for the 
setting up of advisory committee to provides employment opportunities for 
women. Provisions are also made for appointment of officers for hearing and 
deciding complaints regarding contravention of the provisions of the Act. 
Inspectors are to be appointed for the purpose of investigation whether the 
provision if the Act are being complied by the employer. Non-observance of 
the act by government contractors has been held to raise question under Article. 
Beside the principle of gender equality in the matter specifically 
embodied in Article 39 (d) the Supreme Court has extracted the general 
principle of equal pay for equal work by reading Article 14, 16, and 39 (d).^ '* 
The Supreme Court has emphasized in Randhir Singh referring to Article 39 
(d) that the principles of "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine 
but one of substance. Though the principle is not expressly declared by the 
Constitution to be a Fundamental Right yet it may be deduced by construing 
Article 14 and 16 in the light of Article 39 (d). The word 'socialist' in the 
preamble must at least mean "equal pay for equal work." The Supreme Court 
O f 
has observed in Grin kalian Kendra v. union of India 
"Equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by the Constitution 
as a Fundamental Right but in view of the Directive Principles of State policy 
as contained in Article 39 (d) of the Constitution "Equal pay for equal work" 
has assumed the States of Fundamental Right in service Jurisprudence having 
83 People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India. AIR 1982 SC 1473. 
84 Randhir Singh v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 879. 
85 AIR 199180 1173. 
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regards to the constitutional mandate of equality in Article 14 and 16 of the 
Constitution. 
The principle of "equal pay for equal work" may properly be applied to 
cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational 
classification though those drawing different scales of pay do identical work 
under the same employer. 
86 The Supreme Court has explained the general principles as follows. 
"We have interpreted and applied the doctrine even more widely to 
present discriminatory pay scales with in an organization which is owned by or 
is an instrumentality of the state, provided that the different pay scales exist in 
one organization are applied to employees doing work of equal value, and there 
is no rational explanation for the difference." 
As to applying the doctrine between two different organizations the 
court has wamed.^ ^ 
When the same principle is sought to be extended, to compare pay scales 
in one organization with pay scales in other organization although employees 
doing comparable work, the stretching of the doctrine. If at all it is done must 
be done with caution lest the doctrine snaps. 
The court has held that differentiation in pay scales among government 
servants holding same posts and performing similar work on the basis of 
difference in the degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality would 
be a valid differentiation. As the principle of equal pay for equal work 
emerges out of a combined reading of Article 14, 16 and 39 (d), when ever a 
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question of infraction of this rule arises, the concept of reasonable classification 
and all other rules evolved with respect of Article 14, and 16 come into play ^^  
Article 42 
"Requires the State to make provisions for securing just and humane 
conditions of work and for maternity relief" 
Article 42 provides the basis of the large body of Labour law that 
obtains in India. Referring to Article 42 and 43, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that the Constitution expresses a deep concern for the welfare of 
the workers. The courts may not enforce Directive Principle as such, but they 
must interpret law so as to further and not hinder the goals set out in the 
Directive Principle. 
In D.B.M. Patnaik v. State ofAndhra Pradesh'^^ the Supreme Court has 
suggested that Article 42 may 'benevolently' be extended to living conditions 
in Jails the barbarous and subtle forms of punishment to which convicts and 
under trials are subjected to offend against the letter and spirit of our 
Constitution. By reading Article 21 along with several directive principles, 
such as Article 39 (d) and (f), 41 and 42, the Supreme Court has given a very 
broad Connotation to Article 21 so as to include therein "the right to live with 
human dignity." This concept "derives its life breath from the Directive 
Principle of State Policy. 
Women and Protective Labour Legislation 
In the sphere "of labour and industrial laws we have several protective 
legislations particularly meant for the benefit of the women workers. Besides, 
we also have specific provisions in certain other labour legislations for the 
women working in the field. The Constitution of India, guarantees equal 
89. Stale ofMadhya Pradesh v. Pramod Bhartiya AIR 1993 SC 286. 
90. AIR 1974 SC 2092 
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protection of all and contain provisions debarring discrimination against 
women in order to protect the interest of the women workers. We have 
committed to secure to all its citizens economic, social and cultural justice 
along with equality of status and opportunity. So women enjoy the same status 
and are treated equally along with their male counter parts. In the international 
sphere we also have international documents raising concern for the women 
workers particularly those working in the industrial sector which calls upon the 
states to take all precautionary and protection measures for their benefit. Thus, 
respecting the sentiments of national provisions and international documents 
we have several legislations, protective measures .in other allied laws taking 
into considerations the health and other beneficial aspects of women workers 
working in various labour fields. We have Equal Remuneration Act, 1976,^ ' 
providing equal remuneration for men and women working in the same field 
and doing the same job, Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, a beneficial legislation 
to regulate the employment of women working in certain establishments for 
certain periods before and after the birth of a child and providing maternity and 
other benefits. The Employees State Insurance Act, 1948^ ^ and Regulations '^' 
made consequently also provide for extending maternity benefits to the women 
workers. Besides we also have specific provisions in the Factories Act, 1948^ ^ 
and Mines Act, 1952^ ^ for the safety and benefit of women workers. 
Equal Pay for equal work 
Article 39 of the Indian Constitution specifically dealing with equal pay 
for equal works directs all the states to secure equal pay for equal work for both 
men and women. This has been meant to serve the purpose of women workers 
who are placed in a similar position and discharging similar duties but getting 
91.ActNo25of 1976. 
92. Act No 53 of 1961 which received the assent on 12th Dec. 1961. 
93. Act No 34 of 1948. 
94. Employees State Insurance (General) Regulation 1950. 
95. Act No 34 of 1948. 
96. Act No 35 of! 952. 
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differential treatment as regards the scale of pay is concerned. To remove this 
disparity while respecting the constitutional provisions, the Government 
enacted the "Equal Remuneration Act, 1976"'^  to provide equal remuneration 
to men and women thereby preventing discrimination in employment basing on 
the grounds of sex. 
Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 
It is of interests to note that the principle of equal pay for equal work 
was not accepted in India even in large scale organized industries and 
considerable differences existed between the wages and earnings of men and 
women before the enactment of the Equal remuneration Act, 1976. That is the 
reason this Act is made to have an overriding effect superseding all laws, 
contracts, and awards making discrimination of women employees when the 
work is equal. 
The Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, applies to an extensive range of 
classes of employment listed in the schedule, which include the formal sector 
provisions of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, have been extended to 
plantation, agriculture, mine and construction industry. 
This Act also imposes duty upon the contractor to ensure equal pay for 
equal work irrespective of sex. Under the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 an 
obligation is imposed upon the employer not to pay any worker employed in 
his establishment remuneration less favourable than those at which 
remuneration is paid by him to workers of the opposite sex in such an 
establishment for performing the same work of a similar nature.^' 
The term 'same work' or work of a similar nature'°° means work in 
respect of which skill efforts, and responsibility required are the same, when 
97. 5MpraNote9I. 
98. Section 16(b). 
99. Section 4 of Equal Remuneration Act, 1976. 
100. Section 2(h) of Equal Remuneration Act 1976. 
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performed under similar working conditions by a man or a woman and the 
difference, if any, between the skill efforts, and responsibility required of a 
man and those required of a woman are not of practical importance in relation 
to the terms and conditions of employment. Admittedly, Equal Remuneration 
Act 1976 was the first step in recognition that a woman's economic worth and 
their work in the economy was not less that of men. It is important to note that 
the concept of equal pay for equal work will have validity only if a woman is 
employed on like work with man and her work is of the same or similar nature. 
It is essential that comprehensive schemes for Job evaluation as also 
suggested by Supreme Court be introduced. By this. Jobs are assessed 
according to the skill, efforts, and responsibility involved and consequently 
awarded wages. Achieving pay equality requires comparing and establishing 
the relative value of two jobs that differ in content buy breaking jobs down into 
components or 'factors' and 'sub-factors' and assigning point to them. In 
relation to analytical job evaluation methods, such factors generally include 
skills, qualifications, responsibility efforts and working conditions. Two jobs 
that are found to have same numerical value are entitled to equal remuneration. 
Job evaluation is concerned with the content of job and not with the 
characteristic or the performance of the persons doing the job. 
As women and men tend to perform different jobs, in order to eliminate 
wage discrimination on the basis of sex it is vital to establish appropriate 
techniques and procedures to measure the relative value of jobs with varying 
content. This application of this concept has come to be known as 'comparable 
worth' could be defined under section 2 of the equal remuneration Act, 1976, 
as work in which the level of skill, efforts and responsibility required are of 
equal worth to the employer regardless of whether the work involves task of 
similar or different nature."" 
101. Nomita Agarwal, fVomen and the Law, Delhi, New Century publication, 135 (2002). 
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The concept of comparable worth had been introduced in the United 
States of America but there is a difficulty as regards it definition on what 
constitutes worth. Some define it in terms of skill, efforts and responsibility 
while others define it in terms of the value of the work to an employer or 
society at large. 
The Act which is applicable to various establishments as provided in the 
Act lays down that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding 
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law or in the terms of 
any award, agreement or contract of service, whether made before or after the 
commencement of this Act, or in any instrument having effect under any law 
for the time being in force.'°^ 
Duty of the Employer to Pay Equal Remuneration 
Section 4 of the Act provides that it is the duty of the employer to pay 
equal remuneration to the workers, both male and female being employed by 
him in any establishment or employment for performing the same work or 
work of a similar nature. The section further provides that if there was 
existence of different pay structure for die same work or work of a similar 
nature only on the ground of sex, before the commencement of this Act, the 
higher structure should be payable to both men and women fi-om the date of the 
commencement of the Act. 
Prohibition of Discrimination in Recruitment 
The Act stipulates that there should be no discrimination regarding the 
recruitment against any women as contained in Section 5 of the Act. This 
Section says that no employer shall, while making recruitment for same work 
or the work of similar nature or in any condition of service subsequent to 
recruitment such as promotions, training of transfer, make an discrimination 
102. Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, Section 03. 
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against women except where the employment of women such work is 
prohibited or restricted by or under any law for the being in force. 
Advisory Committee 
The Act also provides appointment of an Advisory Committee 
consisting of at least ten persons (half of which should be women) to advise the 
Government on the matters relating to the employment of women in any 
establishment or employment.'"^ The said Committee is to regulate its own 
procedure and while tendering its advice, the Committee shall have regard to 
the number of women employed in the concerned establishment or 
employment, the nature of work, hours of work, suitability of women for 
employment, as the case may be, the need for providing increasing 
employment and such relevant factors as the Committee may think fit.'°'' 
Besides appointing an Advisory Committee, the Government may also 
appoint authorities (not below the rank of a Labour Officer) for hearing and 
deciding complaints regarding the construction of any provision of the Act and 
claims arising out of non-payment of wages as equal to men and women 
workers for the same work or the work of a similar nature and may define the 
local limits whiting which each such authority shall exercise its jurisdiction. 
The authority receiving a complaint or claim, and after giving the applicant 
and employer an opportunity of being heard and after such enquiry, if it 
considers necessary it may direct the employer to settle the claims of the 
employee regarding non-payment of wages at equal rate and see that there 
is no contravention of any provisions of the Act.'°^ 
\03. Ibid, Section 06. 
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Maintenance of Register and Documents 
Section 8 of the Act makes it obligatory on the part of the employers to 
maintain certain prescribed registers and other documents in relation to the 
workers employed by him. Besides, the Government may by notifications 
appoint any such person as it thinks fit as Inspectors for the purpose of 
making investigation as to whether the provisions of this Act, or the Rules 
made there under are being complied with by employers. For this purpose, 
the Inspector may enter any building factory etc. at any "reasonable time, 
require any person to produce the register and other documents relating to 
the employment of workers, take on the spot verifications, examine the 
employer or his agent or servant and take copies of any of the registers or 
documents.' ^ 
Offences and Penalties 
Section 10 of the Act provides for the penalties for violating the 
provisions of the Act. The Section says-
(1) If any employer being required by or under the Act, so to do-
(a) Omits or fails to maintain any register or other document in relation 
to workers employed by him; or 
(b) Omits or fails to produce any register, muster roll or other document 
relating to the employment of workers; or 
(c) Omits or refuses to give any evidence or prevents his agent, servant or 
any other person in charge of the establishment, or any workers from 
giving evidence; or 
106. Ibid., Section 09. 
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(d) Omits or refuses to give any information, he sliall be punishable with 
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or 
with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both. 
(2) If any employer; 
(a) Makes any recruitment in contravention of the provisions of this Act; or 
(b) Makes any payment or remuneration at unequal rates to men and women 
workers, for the same work or work of similar nature; or 
(c) Makes any discrimination between men and women workers in 
contravention of the provisions of the Act; or 
(d) Omits or fails to carry out any direction made by the appropriate 
Government under Section 6 (5). he shall be punishable with fine which 
shall not be less than ten thousand rupees but which may extend to 
twenty thousand rupees, or with imprisonment for a term which shall not 
be less than three months but which may extend to one year or with both 
for the first offence, and with imprisonment which may extend to 
two years for the second and subsequent offences. 
(3) If any person being required so to do, omits or refuses to produce to an 
Inspector any register or document or to give any information, he shall 
be punishable with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. 
Section 11 of the Act relates to the offences committed by companies 
which says that if any person at the time of the offence, was in charge of, 
and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the 
company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the 
offence and punished accordingly, but such person win be excluded of the 
offence, if he proves that the offence was committed without his 
knowledge or he has taken all due diligence to prevent the commission of 
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the offence.'^ ^ Also where the offence has been committed by a company 
and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or 
connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the pan of any director, 
manager, secretary or other officer of the company such persons shall be 
deemed to be guilty of that offence and are liable to be proceeded against and 
punished accordingly.'°* Cognizance of Offence: Section 12 of the Act 
provides "no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a. 
Magistrate of the First Class shall try any offence punishable under this Act. 
Such a Court may take cognizance of an offence either upon its own 
knowledge or a complaint made by the appropriate Government or an officer 
authorized by it in this behalf or a complaint made by the aggrieved person or 
by a recognized welfare institution or organization. 
Thus trying to fulfill the constitutional obligation of providing equal 
remuneration to men and women, this Act has been enacted by making 
specific provisions and also providing for appointment of authorities to see 
that the principles and provisions of the Act are strictly adhered to violation 
of which will attract punishment for imprisonment and fine. 
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 
To fiilfill the constitutional obligation as provided in Article 42 which 
speaks that the state is to make provisions for securing just and humane 
conditions of work and for maternity benefit', the Maternity Benefit Act, 
1961'"^ was enacted. The Act aims at "to regulate the employment of 
women in certain establishments for certain periods before and after child-
birth and to provide for maternity benefit and certain other benefits". The Act 
which has been amended several times applies to "every establishment 
being a factory, mine or plantation including any such establishment 
101. Ibid, Section 11 (1). 
108.//>/W., Section 11 (2). 
109. Supra Note 92. 
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belonging to Government and to every establishment wherein persons 
are employed for the exhibition of equestrian, acrobatic and other 
performances,"° "Further the Act applies to "every shop or establishment 
within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to 
shops an establishments in a state, in which ten or more persons are 
employed or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelve 
months.'" The State Government is empowered to apply me provisions of 
this Act to any other establishment, industrial, commercial, agricultural or 
otherwise by giving a notice of not less than two months with the approval of 
the Central Government. 
Prohibition of Employment or work by women for certain period 
Section 4 of the Act prohibits employment of or work by women for 
certain periods. As per the provision of this Section no woman will be 
employed by any employer knowingly nor will she work in any 
establishment during the six weeks immediately following the day of her 
delivery or miscarriage or medical termination of pregnancy. The Section 
further provides that no pregnant woman be required to work which is of an 
arduous nature or which involves long hours of standing or which in any way 
is likely to interfere with her pregnancy or the normal development of the 
fetus or is likely to cause her miscarriage or otherwise to adversely affect 
her health, during the period of one month immediately preceding the 
period of six weeks, before the date of her expected delivery or during the 
said period of six weeks for which the pregnant woman does not avail of 
leave of absence. 
110. Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, Section 2(1) (9). 
11 l./ft/W., Section2(1)(b). 
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Entitlement as to maternity benefit 
Every woman is entitled to maternity benefit and her employer is 
liable to extend such benefit at the rate of the average daily wages for the 
period of her actual absence only when she has actually worked in an 
establishment of the employer from whom she claims maternity benefit for a 
period of not less than eighty days on the twelve months immediately 
preceding the date of her expected delivery and the maximum period for 
which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit shall be twelve weeks 
of which maximum six weeks shall precede the date of her expected 
delivery."^ 
In case of the death of the woman during the above mentioned period 
of twelve weeks, maternity benefit will be payable only for the days up to and 
including the day of her death. If the woman dies during or after her delivery 
leaving behind the child, the employer is liable to pay the maternity benefit 
for the entire period but if the child also dies during the said period the 
employer is liable to pay the benefit only for the days up to including the date 
ofthe death of the child. "^ 
Procedure for claiming maternity benefit 
Any woman employed in any establishment who is entitled to 
maternity benefit should apply to the employer in the prescribed format by 
giving a notice m writing stating details of her maternity benefit and any other 
amount to which she may be entitled which may be paid to her or her 
nominated person and also stating that she will not work in any 
establishment during the period she receives maternity benefit. The 
pregnant woman shall state the date of her absent from work and such date 
112. Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 Section 05. 
113./^;^., 
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should not be a date earlier than six weeks from the date of expected 
delivery."'' 
The concerned woman can give a notice as soon as possible after the 
delivery if she has not given the notice earlier and on receiving the notice the 
employer permits such woman to remain absent from work during the period 
she receives maternity, benefit."^ 
The employer is liable to pay in advance the amount of maternity 
benefit for the period preceding the date of her expected delivery on 
production of such proof showing that the woman is pregnant and the amount 
due for the subsequent period shall be paid by the employer within forty eight 
hours of the delivery of the child on the production of proof that the woman 
has delivered the child."^ 
Besides the maternity benefit, the Act also provides for certain the 
benefits to a pregnant woman, which are enumerated below. 
(i) Medical Bonus - Every woman who is entitled to maternity benefit 
under this Act is also entitled to receive from her employer a medical 
bonus of two hundred fifty rupees in case the employer does not 
1 1 7 
provide pre-natal confinement and post natal care free of cost, 
(ii) Leave for miscarriage etc. In case of a miscarriage or medical 
termination of pregnancy, the concerned woman on production of such 
proof as may be prescribed is entitled to leave with wages at the rate of 
maternity benefit for a period of six week immediately following the 
day of miscarriage or medial terminafion of pregnancy as the case 
may be."^ 
114. Ibid., Section 6 (1) and (2). 
115. Ibid.. Section 6 (3) and (4). 
116./6/(/.,Section6(5). 
117./*/</., Section 08. 
118./ft/</., Section 09. 
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(iii) Leave with wages for tubectomy operation - On production of such 
proof as may be prescribed relating to a tubectomy operation, the 
woman will be entitled to leave with wages at the rate of maternity 
benefit for a period of two weeks immediately following the day of 
such operation."^ 
(iv) Leave for illness arising out of pregnancy etc.- If a woman 
suffers from illness arising out of pregnancy, delivery, pre-mature 
birth of a child or miscarriage, medical termination of pregnancy or 
tubectomy operation shall be entitled in addition to period of 
absence as mentioned above to leave with wages at the rate of 
maternity benefit for a & period of one month maximum on 
production of such proof as may be required.'^° 
(v) Nursing breaks - Every woman who returns to duty after delivering 
a child is entitled to two breaks in the course of her daily work in 
addition to the regular intervals of rest allowed to her for nursing the 
child until the child attains the age of fifteen months.'^' 
(vi) Dismissal during absence or pregnancy - Where a woman absents 
her from work in accordance with the provisions of this Act, her 
employer cannot discharge or dismiss her during or on account of 
such absence. No notice shall also be served on her stating such 
discharge or dismissal. If such a discharge or dismissal takes 
place during the period of her pregnancy, such discharge or 
dismissal will have no effect on. Her maternity benefit or 
medical bonus or both.'^^ 
(vii) No deduction of wages in certain cases- Where a woman who is 
entitled to maternity benefit is assigned a job which should not be 
arduous in nature or which may affect her pregnancy etc. and who gets 
a break for nursing the child in addition to the regular interval of rest, 
119. Ibid., Section 9-A insirted by section 5 of the maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act 1995. 
120./*W., Section 10. 
121./few., Section 11. 
122./fe;W., Section 12. 
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is entitled to receive her normal and usual daily wages and no 
deduction can be made from such wages because of concession 
allowed to such women. 
Appointment of Inspector and his powers: The Act provides for the 
appointment of Inspectors by the appropriate Government and prescribe 
limits of the jurisdiction for such Inspector to exercise the powers and 
functions assigned to them'^ '* and every Inspector so appointed shall be 
deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the 
Indian Penal Code, I860; The Inspector is empowered to enquire 
and on his own or receiving a complaint from a woman worker 
regarding non-payment of maternity benefit or any other amount to 
which she is entitled after enquiry on being satisfied the inspector may 
direct the payment be made in accordance with his orders. Regarding 
complaints relating to discharge or dismissal during or on account of 
her absence from work order may be passed which should be just and 
proper according to the circumstances of the case."'^ ^ 
Forfeiture of maternity benefits 
If a woman works in any establishment after she has been permitted 
by her employer to absent herself from work for any period during such 
authorized absence she shall forfeit her claim to maternity benefit for such 
period.'^ ^ 
Penal Provisions 
If any employer fails to pay any amount of maternity benefit to a 
woman under this Act or discharges, dismisses such woman during or on 
123./Z>/c/., Section 13. 
124./6W., Section 14. 
125./6/</., Section 16. 
126./fcW., Section 17. 
127./AW., Section 18. 
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account of her absence from work in accordance with the provisions of this 
Act, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a period not less than 
three months which can be extended to one year and with a fine ranging from 
two thousand rupees to five thousands rupees. Further, on contravention 
of any of the provisions of the Act will attract a punishment of 
imprisonment extended to one year and a fine up to five thousand rupees or 
both for the" employer.'^^ 
When, the contravention relates to the maternity benefit and any other 
amount and such benefit or amount has not been recovered the Court in 
addition to the penalty recover such benefit or amount as if it were a fine and 
pay the same to the person entitled there to.'^° Where, the Inspectors appointed 
by the Government are obstructed by the employers from exercising their 
power conferred on them, concerned employers will be liable to be punished 
with imprisonment which may extend to one year or with a fine extending up 
to five thousand rupees or with both. 
Cognizance of offence 
A Magistrate of the First Class or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the 
case may be are empowered to try an offence under this Act. Hence, any 
aggrieved woman, or on her behalf any office bearer of a registered Trade 
Union of which she is a member or any registered voluntary organization 
may file a complaint regarding the 12g commission of an offence before the 
Court mentioned above.'^^ No, such complaint will be entertained after the 
expiry of one year of the alleged commission of offence. 
128./6;«/., Section 21 (1). 
129/*/^., Section 21 (2). 
130./*/^., 
131./ft/fi^ ., Section 22. 
132./6/i/., Section 23. 
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The Factories Act, 1948 
Several sections of the Factories Act, 1948 specifically deal with 
welfare measures that are to be provided to women workers. The relevant 
provisions are as follows: Latrines and Urinals - Section 19 (1) of the Act 
provides that in every factory -
(a) Sufficient latrine and urinal accommodation of prescribed types shall 
^ ' be provided conveniently situated and accessible to workers at all times 
while they are at the factory; 
(b) separate enclosed accommodation shall be provided for male and female 
workers; 
(c) Such accommodation shall be adequately lighted and ventilated, and 
no latrine or urinal shall, unless specially exempted in writing by the 
Chief Inspector, communicate with any workroom except through an 
intervening open space or ventilated passage; 
(d) All such accommodation shall be maintained in a clean and sanitary 
'condition at all times; 
(e) sweepers shall be employed whose primary duty would be to keep 
clean latrines, urinals and washing places. 
Work on or near machinery in motion - The Act provides that no 
woman or young person shall be allowed to clean, lubricate or adjust any 
part of a prime mover or of any transmission machinery while the prime 
mover or transmission machinery is in motion, or to clean, 1 fabricate or 
adjust any part of any machine if the cleaning, lubrication or adjustment there 
of would expose the woman or young person to risk of injury from any 
moving part either of that machine or of any adjacent machinery.'^ ^ 
Creches - Section 48 of the Act provides that in every factory where 
more than thirty women workers are ordinarily employed, they should be 
133. The Factories Act, 1948, Section 22 (2). 
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provided with suitable rooms for use of their children below six years of age. 
Such rooms which should be adequately Sighted and ventilated shall provide 
accommodation and should be maintained in a clean and sanitary condition 
and should be under the charge of a woman who is adequately trained in the 
care of children and infants. Further, the section provides that the State 
Government may make rules. 
(a) Prescribing the location and the standards in respect of construction, 
accommodation, furniture and other equipment of rooms to be provided, 
under this section; 
(b) Requiring the provision in factories to which this section applies of 
additional facilities for the care of children belonging to women workers, 
including suitable provision of facilities for washing and changing their 
clothing; 
(c) Reacquiring the provision in any factor of free milk or refreshment or 
both for such children; 
(d) Requiring that facilities shall be given in any factory for the mothers of 
such children to feed them at the necessary intervals.'^'* 
Further Restrictions on employment of women 
Section 66 (1) of the Act imposes certain other restrictions which 
should be supplemented to the already existing provisions. These are (a) no 
exemption from the provisions of Section 54 may be granted in respect of any 
women and (b) no woman shall be required or allowed to work in any factory 
except between theTiours of 6 A.M. and 7.P.M. The State Government may 
by notification in the official Gazette, in respect of any factory or group 
or class or description of factories, vary the limits laid down in Clause (b)5 
but no such variation shall authorize the employment of any woman between 
the hours of 10 A.M and 5 P.M. (c) there shall be no charge of shifts except 
134.//)/c/., Section 48 (3). 
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after a weekly holiday or any other. Further it is provided that the State 
Government may make rules providing for the exemption from the 
restrictions set out in Subsection (1) to such extent and subject to such 
conditions as it may prescribe, of women working in fish-curing or fish-
canning factories, where the employment of women beyond the hours 
specified in the said restrictions is necessary to prevent damage to, or 
deterioration in, any raw material'^ ^ and such rules made under Sub-section 
(2) shall remain in force for not more three years at a time.'^ ^ 
Prohibition of employment of women in dangerous operations: 
Lection 87 of the Act provides that where the State Government is of 
opinion that any manufacturing process or operation carried on in a factory 
exposes any person employed it to a serious risk of bodily injury, poisoning 
or disease, it may make rules applicable any factory or class or description 
of factories in which the manufacturing process or operation is carried on, 
prohibiting or restricting the employment of women, adolescents or children 
in the manufacturing process or operation. 
The Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 
Section 50 of the Employee's State Insurance Act, 19.48 which 
deals with maternity benefit provides that "the qualification of an insured 
woman to claim maternity benefit, the conditions subject to which such 
benefit may be given, the rates and period there of shall be such as may be 
prescribed by the Central Government. 
The Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950 
Provisions for maternity benefit are being laid down under Regulations 
87 to 94 to which an insured woman is entitled for. The Regulations are-
135./6/V., Section 66 (2). 
136./6/V/., Section 66 (3). 
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Notice of Pregnancy Regulation 87 provides that an insured woman, who 
decides to give notice of pregnancy before confinement, shall give such 
notice in Form 19 to the appropriate local office by post or otherwise and 
shall submit, together with such notice, a certificate of pregnancy in Form 20 
given in accordance with these Regulations on a date not earlier than seven 
days before the date on which such notice is given. 
Claim for maternity benefit commencing before confinement 
As per Regulation 88, every insured woman claiming maternity 
benefit before confinement shall submit to the appropriate Local Officer by 
post or otherwise; 
(i) a certificate of expected confinement in Form 21 given in 
accordance with these Regulations, no earlier than fifteen days before 
the expected date of confinement; 
(ii) a claim for maternity benefit in Form 22 stating therein the date on 
which she ceased or will cease to work for remuneration; and 
(iii) within thirty days of the date on which her confinement takes place, a 
certificate of confinement in form 23 given in accordance with these 
Regulations. 
Claim for maternity benefit only after confinement or for miscarriage 
Regulation 89 says that every insured woman claiming maternity 
benefit for miscarriage shall within 30 days of the date of the miscarriage, 
and every insured woman claiming maternity benefit after confinement, 
shall submit the appropriate office by post or otherwise a claim for maternity 
benefit in Form 22 together with a certificate of confinement or miscarriage in 
Form 23 given in accordance with these Regulations, 
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Claim for maternity benefit after the death of an insured woman leaving 
behind the child 
As per the Regulation 89-A the person nominated by the deceased 
insured woman on Form 1 or on such other form as may be specified by 
the Director-General in this behalf and if there is no such nominee, the 
legal representative, shall submit to the appropriate office by post or 
otherwise a claim for maternity benefit, as may be due, in Form 24-A 
within 30 days of the death of the insured woman together with a death 
certificate in Form 24-B given in accordance with these Regulations. 
Claim for Maternity Benefit in case of Sickness Arising out of Pregnancy, 
Confinement, Premature Birth of Child or Miscarriage 
Regulation 89-B provides that (1) Every insured woman claiming 
maternity benefit in case of sickness arising out of pregnancy, 
confinement, premature birth of child or miscarriage, shall submit to the 
appropriate office by post or otherwise a claim for benefit in one of the 
Forms [12-A, 13 and 13-A] appropriate to the circumstances of the case 
together with the appropriate medical certificate in Form 8,9, 10 or 11 as 
the case may be given in accordance with these Regulations, (2) The 
provisions of Regulations 55 to 61 and 64 shall so far as may be, apply in 
relation to a claim submitted and certificate given in accordance with this 
Regulation as they apply to certification and claims under those Regulations. 
Other Evidence in Lieu of a Certificate 
Regulation 90 says that the Corporation may accept any other 
evidence in lieu of a certificate of pregnancy, expected confinement, 
confmement death during maternity, miscarriage or sickness arising out of 
pregnancy, if in its opinion, the circumstances of any particular case so justify. 
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Notice of Work for Remuneration 
As per Regulation 91 except as provided in Regulation 89-B 
every insured woman who has claimed maternity benefit shall give notice 
in Form 24 if she does work for remuneration on any day during the period 
for which maternity benefit would be payable to her but for her working for 
remuneration. 
Date of Payment of Maternity Benefit 
Regulation 92 says that the maternity benefit shall be payable from 
the date it is claimed. 
(iii) by a registered midwife who can issue certificate of pregnancy, of 
expected confinement or of confinement duly countersigned by the Insurance 
Medical officer. The Mines Act, 1952 Section 46 of the Mines Act, 1952 
which speaks of employment of women lays down that 
(1) No woman shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, 
be employed -
(a) In any part of mine which is below ground; 
(b) In any mine above ground except between the hours of 6 A.M. and 7 
P.M. 
(2) Every woman employed in a mine above ground shall be allowed an 
interval of not less than eleven hours between the termination of 
employment on any one day and the commencement of the next period 
of employment. 
(3) Notwithstanding contained in subsection (1), the Central 
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, vary the 
hours of employment above ground of women in respect of any 
mine or class or description of mine, so, however, that no 
Employment of any woman between the hours of 10 PM and 5 
A.M. is permitted thereby. 
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POSITION OF WORKING CLASS WOMEN AND OFFENCES 
AGAINST THEM 
An attempt is made in this chapter to show the position and the 
important problems concerning life and work of the women workers in India. 
Though their problems are fundamentally the same as those of women workers 
in other occupations they differ many much in practical aspects. 
To improve the position of women workers recommendations are also 
made for the improvement of the existing conditions and of the women workers 
in India either by amending the present legislation or by suggesting new 
legislations or by extending the application of the legislation to additional 
classes of women workers. 
There should be special legislation for women with regard to their 
employment on dangerous, unhealthy and heavy work. It is a matter for 
medical experts to decide if women are more liable to dangers than men. If the 
same piece of work which comes under the category of dangerous work affects 
women more adversely than man, it is certainly necessary to protect women 
against such dangerous work. There maybe certain types of work women may 
not find themselves physically capable of doing and it is necessary to exclude 
then from such work. 
Women should be prohibited from night work as night work is an 
abnormal activity for all workers, both men and women. Medical experts have 
proved that night work is more injurious in the case of women. It is therefore 
more necessary to prohibit night work for women. 
The beginning of the modem industrial era starting with the industrial 
Revolution witnessed a tremendous change in the character of work assigned to 
women. ' 
1. Usha Sharma, (ed) Female Labour in India, p. 141 (2006). 
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Historically, traditionally and culturally women have not faired well at 
least in the matter of education and employment in any region of the world vis-
a-vis men. Triple E's (Education, Employment, and Empowerment) have 
boosted women's movement and taken as indicators of their freedom. Its 
testimony are all those convention, seminaris and conferences organized by 
international bodies like, UN, and its various agencies like, ILO, UNICEF, 
WHO, RED CROSS and other national and international NGOs for the 
advancement of women. 
Currently one of the most talked about and discussed subject has been 
women Empowerment. It took centuries and a lot of deliberations to come to a 
stage where empowerment of women is on high agenda. Traditionally women 
are denied land title right to heir ancestral property and even right to vote for a 
long time. Religions are blocked their way even in religions matters and 
hierarchy. Still these are monasteries, mosques and temples/deities when 
women are forbidden. More over religions scriptures of various faiths have 
assigned secondary status to women empowerment may not be possible unless 
equal legal rights are conferred upon them and accepted by the society. The 
importance of educating women has realized contributions of women without 
which economic development can not reach to its maximum still a lot is to be 
done in the area of accounting as a due place is given to women. Indirect 
contribution of women needs more attention that what the world has given to 
them. The equivalence accounting system is yet to be evolved and matured so 
that women's non monetary work and time use are recognized in terms of 
protectively, value addition and reflected in a country's GNP. 
Gender differential in employment and there by in earnings is wide 
spread. Moreover, status of women won't change to desirable extent unless 
financial or economical freedom is not attained by them. Gender inequality in 
general and discrimatory practices in particular led to proliferation of literature 
2. M I Siddiqui, Women Workers, p. 14 (2004). 
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on issues pertaining to women. Employment has attracted enough attention to 
make a strong case for women as its results in economic empowerment. A 
gainful employment provides women not only financial freedom to a large 
extent but they also become a part in decision making a right which has long 
been denied to them particularly in developing regions. Simultaneously their 
status in the family gets elated.^  
Many people in our country are still of an opinion that proper place for 
women is her home. Freedom of choice of work and right to work are provided 
for in the directive principle of State policy of our Constitution. There has been 
a gradual switch-over of employment of women from traditional occupations to 
more remunerative and higher status jobs. The expert committee on 
unemployment (Dantwala committee on unemployment Estimates)'' has also 
shown grave concern over the reduction in the number of women workers in 
certain industries like textile, hosiery etc. 
The committee has suggested that "it is desirable to encourage the 
employment of women at least up to a level at which it has been prevailing 
hitherto by offering some incentives to those employers who maintain the ratio 
of women in their labour force at a prescribed level," the altitude of the 
employers has however, been rather Luke-warm towards employment of 
women due to the fact that there had been enforcement of legislative protection 
with reference to women employees in particular. 
The enforcement of equal pay principle for men and women, the 
additional financial of maintenance of creches and the payment of maternity 
benefits seems to have affected women's employment. The restrictions on 
hours of work and prohibition of women employment during night shifts and 
3./6W., p.32. 
4. The Dantwalw Committee originally appointed for estimating the backlog of unemployment for 
Fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74) Chaired by M.L.Dantwala. 
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limitation on load wearying are real obstacles. In the greater absorption, of 
women workers in jobs particularly, in heavy industries.^  
Another plea, often put forth by employees for non-employment of 
women, is that women worker take long leave due to pregnancy and child birth. 
This argument can be nullified because even men go on long period of leave 
including sickness leave. No doubt, some women up jobs and leave then after 
getting married but the number of such cases is gradually decreasing 
irrespective of factors of mobility. Due to these reasons some women do have 
to undergo tremendous emotional and psychological torture of neglecting their 
homes, children and house chores. This factor does affect the carrier patterns of 
women as compared to those of men. 
The development of education among women has affected their 
employment. The increased opportunities for training and education have 
enhanced their employment potential. However opportunities for entering an 
occupation and progressing in it have not increased proportionality white the 
need for women from lower middle class families to earn it basically to 
supplement their family income, women from higher income groups have been 
entering various professions with a view to utilizing leisure time or attaining 
social prestige and status, ft is indeed a very happy trend that educated women 
in India today aspire for a professional carrier. The professions in which the 
education women have so far engaged themselves are mainly teaching, medical 
and health services, nursing and social work. There professions seen to be more 
suitable for women not only because of their professional training but also by 
impermanent. However, much has to be achieved so far as working women's 
role in society and their total fiilfillment as professional individual is 
concerned.^  
5. C. Swarajyalaxmi., IVomen at Work, p. 12(1992). 
6./bid.,pA5 
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There has been and still is segmentation of women in employment. They 
are generally accepted and considered suitable for low paid jobs with very little 
promotional avenues, or for marginal economic activities, women are 
consequently predominant in the occupations of clerks, receptionists, houses 
keepers, primary teaching and nursing in most of the countries. In India 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and west Asia women are largely in such occupations due 
to suitability factor. The labor market is still highly segmented for women 
across the globe. Even in the west equal work does not command equal pay. 
Another factor, which acts as deterrent women employment has been 
their immobility in terms of time, energy and space. Due to their familial 
responsibilities women are not considered mobile in terms of space. Hence they 
are discriminated against, at least in developed countries. A married woman in 
general and with children in particular is less mobile than married man with 
children. Women of course have familial ties in developing would make the 
less mobile.^  
Gender inequality in employment is a well establish and documented 
fact. Societal attitude and attributes are mainly responsible for gender 
discrimination in employment, at least in developing countries. Young women 
have larger share in employment and hence age-based discrimination against 
women has also been noticed. It is true particularly in private sector of a 
developing economy. Moreover, similar trend has also been observed in the 
informal sector where most of women find employment. Such and other 
discriminatory practices are still prevalent and these may be attributed to 
societal attitude. 
Women are largely concentrated in low-paid jobs where advancement 
is either negligible or non-existent. It leads to segregation of occupation and 
hence dissimilarity indices have been developed. Since women are considered 
7. Supra Note, 1 p.33. 
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immobile in terms of time, energy and space it also becomes a cause to 
discriminate them. 
Dual labour market theory is based on the presumption of segmentation. 
Labour market divided into primary and secondary sectors has women in 
secondary jobs where organizational hierarchy does not exist. Thus 
advancement opportunities are negligible and working conditions are generally 
poor. 
The encouraging note regarding women has been their increased share in 
total labour force. On the contrary, men's economic activity rate has 
generally declined. It does not auger well. An increased share of women in 
employment by displacing, if not replacing, men workers may not be taken as 
a good sign. 
Data disaggregated at occupational level of women reflect striking 
similarities in different regions of the world. They have a relatively higher 
percentage in the professional, technical and related occupations which drops 
to a lower level for the occupational group of administrative and managerial 
positions in every region. Again, a peak is attained in the category of clerical, 
sales and services. They have a low representation in the occupational group 
of production, transport and workers. By and large, these trends reflect 
universal phenomenon. The only occupation where women dominate has been 
the clerical, sales and services. 
Women are not uniformly distributed in the informal sector in various 
regions. African, Latin American and Asian particularly south-east Asian 
countries have significant employment of women in their informal sector. 
Africa tops the list in this regard. 
Women employment is generally categorized into (i) employers (own-
account workers) (ii) family labour, (unpaid) and (iii) employees. Women's 
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contribution in the secondary category has turned out highest in every region. 
It creates the problem of accounting of women work which is generally under 
Q 
reported and sometimes misreported. 
Gender discrimination in employment and wages is well established, at 
least in developing countries including India. It is reflected in the size of 
women's employment and disparity in wages. Women are still a fraction of 
total employment in the formal as well as informal sectors in Indian economy. 
Agriculture claiming sizeable work force of women has inequality between male 
and female workers in terms of size and nature of employment and wages. In 
fact wage differentials are more pronounced in agricultural or rural sector than 
elsewhere. Even feminization of work seems to perpetuate inequality between 
men and women workers. 
What are the factors that have caused women lagging behind men in the 
world of work? These impediments may be categorized, though over-lapping is 
not ruled out. 
The list is, however, not exhaustive rather indicative and suggestive in 
nature. A general description is given below:-
RELIGIOUS FACTORS 
Dogma 
Religious scriptures intended to provide a way of life to the followers 
where women have been assigned more or less secondary role in the society. 
They are directed and even commanded to follow men folk and hence women 
were deprived any role in decision-making. All this confined them within the 
four walls of the house and also discouraged women to be earners. Religious 
principles from which code of conduct emanated restricted the role of women in 
8.1bici.,p.6l. 
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general and in economic sphere in particular. Subordination of women is one of 
the command common in most religions. 
Categories of Factors Affecting Women's Employment 
Religious Social Economic Biological Psychological 
Dogma Attitude Investment in Reproduction Sense of Insecurity 
Education 
Segregation Customs Training Child Rearing Lack of Confidence 
Traditions 
Domestic Low Payment Physical Inward Looking Chores 
Marriage Supplementing Income Fear of sexual Harassment 
Child Care Lack of Unionism 
Immobility Inheritance 
Dependency Lack of Accommodation.^  
Segregation 
All religions generally preach segregation between spheres for men and 
women. It is one of the commands for women to be home-maker. Their duties are 
to look after families, take care of children and remain confined to home. In 
fact women's reproductive role demarcates them from productive role of men. 
Such a social milieu commanded by religion leaves little room for the 
employment of women. 
Indian Society is still religious and largely believes in men-women 
inequality and to some extent, segregation in the work sphere Still women are 
mainly recognized for their reproductive functions and familial ties in the Indian 
society where religion holds low level of women's employment, such an attitude 
which does not encourage women for employment has its roots in the 
patriarchy existing in the society since ages. It also relegated women to a 
9. Sw/7raNote2p.75. 
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secondary position and confined them to play the role of home maker. Society 
in India does not favour employment of women as they are still looked upon as 
reproductive and not productive actors. Though matriarchic at system 
prevails in some parts of India, especially in tribal belts, such examples may 
not be generalized to overrule patriarchy and hence men's dominance in the 
country at large. Working women is still an urban phenomenon due to 
changed attitude of urban society towards employment of women. The attitude 
of the society is changing mainly because of economic compulsions but has not 
changed enough to drastically affect the employment structure in the country. 
Traditions, Customs and Taboo 
Indian society values its traditions in the context of ancient civilization. 
Families still believe not to allow girls to work for income. And if they are 
allowed to work their income is not meant to run the house. Fathers are 
reluctant for their girls' employment in die first instance, and against utilizing 
their money for household expenses. 
Customarily female children are discouraged to go out of town for 
education and particularly for employment. Again, economic compulsions are 
weakening such traditions and customs but not enough to mend societal 
attitude and make it positive for women's employment. 
Certain occupations and jobs are considered favourable for women's 
employment. These are teaching, caressing and medical jobs. On the contrary 
a number of jobs are just like taboo in our society and women either 
discouraged or legally bar form employment. For example taxi, truck or auto 
driving is not meant for women in India as these jobs are considered not safe, 
this protective umbrella rules out employment of women in a number of 
occupations and professions. Women are movers in the society but earth 
moving jobs are denied to them. 
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Health and welfare 
Problem of health and welfare are to a very large extent common for 
men and women. However, women at the reproductive stages are exposed to 
special risk during pregnancy and child bearing and material morbidity and 
morality are factors which require special consideration. It could also be 
distinguished by the health standards of large groups of women workers, such 
as those in mines and plantation.'° 
Domestic Chores 
Since ancient time women's prime responsibility has been domestic 
chores as if they are meant for it. Any time-use survey of women would show 
that they have to spend considerable time performing domestic chores day after 
day. These have a wide range and mainly-consisted of cooking, dish washing, 
laundry house keeping and a host of other such activities. Even working women 
are not exempted from domestic chores. 
It adversely affects their employment prospects. They have to do only 
those jobs which would give them enough time for domestic chores. 
Casualisation of women's employment is also because of their duty to perform 
domestic chores. Working women are not supposed to dispense with domestic 
chores and it seriously hampers their advancement. Those women .who have 
nuclear family have to balance between domestic chores and job 
responsibilities. The same dilemma is faced by working women living with 
joint family. Women try to avoid those assigimients in job which jeopardize 
their domestic activities and schedule. A compromise with their jobs due to 
unavoidable domestic chores affects their options in employment and 
promotions as well. 
JO. Supra hotel, p.U2. 
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Marriage 
In our society marriage seriously undermines employment of a female. 
Consequently she enters late in the job market or makes re-entry because they 
have to, sometimes; discontinue their employment on account of marriage. This 
particular custom has priority over every other thing and marriage comes first in 
case of females. The prime age, that is, around twenty-five is important for 
males to find employment but females are to marry at this juncture, Hence 
they loose employment opportunity in their prime age. Consequently women 
face the problem of re-entry or hue entry into labour market. Therefore 
women's employment or prospects are compromised on account of marriage 
which is always on high agenda of every girl's parents. 
Siblings/Child Care 
Indian society has tradition of assigning responsibility, partially if not 
fully to female children to look after young siblings in the family since female 
children are asked to take care of their young brothers and sisters, even in their 
childhood. Women have to devote a lot of time in taking care of their children 
as child care is taken as their sole responsibility in our society. Bearing and 
rearing children compels them to compromise with their employment. It acts as 
one of the main hurdles in the employment of women. 
Migration 
Women's plight is further affected by migration which is often thrust 
upon them by host of social and cultural factors, the incidence of migration 
among females (with in the country) is far greater than among the males. 
Women have immobility in terms of space, time and energy. They are 
generally reluctant or have barriers to their movement from one place to another. 
Madhuri Nath , Rural Women Work Force in India, p.43 (2003). 
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It is either their own sense of insecurity or familial ties which bar their 
mobility in terms of space. Similarly their mobility in terms of time also gets 
affected during pregnancy and few months after delivery of baby. It makes them 
not very suitable for employment in those occupations requiring field work or 
traveling frequently. Hence immobility of women is considered an obstacle in 
their employment. Or they have to forego such jobs where mobility is a pre-
requisite. It curtails their employment opportunities and options, and also 
acts as deterrent to their promotion in employment. 
Dependency 
The way female, children are brought up in our society, especially in 
villages and towns that they become dependent on male persons. When they 
travel even as grown up, females depend on some male member of the family. It 
is observed that female applicants appearing for interview are usually 
accompanied by some family member. Such dependency discourages them to 
go for employment, particularly out of town. It makes them to remain confined 
to their place and hence restricts their employment opportunities and 
options. Dependency of women thus hinders their employment. 
Accommodation 
Women who get job or employment out of their town face the problem of 
accommodation from the point of view of safety and security. Those who are in 
employment and have transferable job find it difficult to move to far away 
places or rural area due to fear that they may not get a suitable 
accommodation. Therefore women workers try to avert this situation, 
sometimes at the cost of their employment. The problem of safe 
accommodation for women, especially working women is so grave that various 
committees have been formed to find a solution. Since working women hostels 
are extremely limited in number, women avoid such jobs where they have to 
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move out from their town. Hence accommodation poses a big problem for 
working women and becomes a hindrance in employment, particularly out 
station employment in the interior places and rural area. 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Education 
Investment in education gets priority for male children in Indian society. 
Female children rarely get preference in the matter of education especially at 
tertiary level. However returns to education in case of female education are 
high enough and make a strong case for education of girls. Parents usually 
compromise for the quality of education and expenses in case of female children 
as they invest just to educate them and not from the viewpoint of employment. 
On the contrary, male children's education primarily aims at their career and 
hence best possible education is provided to them. It is the reason for inequality 
in enrolment sex-ratio right from primary to tertiary level. 
Training 
Job-oriented courses of elementary nature are generally preferred for 
females rather than males. Women are largely in computer courses, boutique 
and fabric painting and similar elementary courses which lead them to low-
paid jobs and land them in the secondary segment of labour market. Moreover, 
participation rate of women in training programmes to update knowledge and 
skills has been very low. Therefore, women's advancement in employment is 
generally hampered. Exclusive women training programmes are very few at 
least in the private sector. It partly explains the reason for women being 
largely in the low-paid jobs. 
12.5M;?raNote2p.78. 
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Unionism 
Trade unionism reflects the consciousness of the right of the industrial 
workers and measured by this yard stick, it can well be said that class 
consciousness among women is increasing day by day. 
Unionism is traditionally a male bastion and women have not registered 
significance in this regard. Women generally lack unionism as they have dual 
responsibility, consequently women's unions are rare and as a member of 
common union they are occasionally active. In most of the organizations they 
are members as it is compulsive. 
Lacking unionism among women workers make them relatively vulnerable 
and does not inspire to fight against sex based problems or odds. They rather 
depend on protective measures such as reservation in promotion and training 
programmes. As a result discrimination against women could not be 
eliminated in India. 
Employment 
A number of programmes have been launched with the ultimate 
objective of making women economically independent. Some of the 
programmes extent 30 to 40 percent reservation of benefit for women. These 
include Integrated Rural Development Programe (IRDP) Jawahar Rojgar 
Yojana (JRY), Nehru Rojgal Yojana (NRY) and Prime Ministers Rojgar 
Yojana (PMRY), Some programmes have also been undertaken which can be 
called women specific employment cum training programme. These 
comprises development of women and children in Rural Areas (DWCRA), 
Indra Mahila Yojana (IMY), Mahila Samridhi, Yojana (MSY), 1993 Balika 
Samridhi Yojana (BSY), 1997 etc.'^ 
13.5M/jraNote 1 p.263. 
14 S Murty, Women and Employment, p. 245 (2001). 
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Payment 
Low payment offered to women has confined them to the lower cadre in 
employment. They usually accept discriminating wages and hence inequality 
has got perpetuated in rural and informal sectors. In small cities and towns 
women teachers, for example, get less remuneration than minimum wages paid 
to menial workers. Their own attitude is also responsible to some extent. They 
accept less remuneration rather than sitting idle at home. Wage differentials 
discourage them to go for performance and hence their career advancement gets 
blocked. 
Supplementing Income 
It is one of the objectives of most females seeking employment, societal 
attitude has inculcated in their minds that males are bread earners for the family 
and their role is secondary. Girls waiting for marriage work to supplement 
family income in large cases. This attitude is an obstacle for their career 
making. Similarly a large number of women particularly in the informal sector 
work to supplement family income. 
Inheritance 
Inheritance laws and traditions have made women more vulnerable in 
the matter of title to land and other assets. Customarily women do not inherit 
assets and property equal to their counterparts. Religion also plays a role in 
such law of inheritance. For example, Islamic laws entitle a female to inherit 
only half of male share in the family. 
Infrastructure 
Lack of infrastructure and other facilities is hindrance in women's 
employment. Women have relatively negligible access to facilities, especially in 
the matter of credit. Even collateral rule does not accept women as guarantors 
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unless they have fixed assets in their names. A discriminatory approach to 
provide infrastructural facilities to women is commonly observed in India. It 
also hampers their employment prospects. 
Biological Factors 
Women are discriminated against in employment on biological 
grounds, jobs requiring physical strength are denied to them. Security jobs 
particularly in the private sector are restricted for women due to protective 
measures. Reproductive nature of women restricts their employment 
opportunities as it is presumed to increase the rate of labour turn-over. 
It has been observed and studied that young women are preferred in 
employment. Women beyond their prime age are discriminated against and 
those making re-entry find it difficult to get suitable employment. Age has 
become a deterrent for women above 40-45 age groups as there are very few 
takers in the job market. 
Child Rearing 
Mothers with infants avoid employment as child rearing is considered 
their "natural" prime responsibility. Though the provision of creches has been 
made mandatory, informal sector rarely provides such facilities to women 
workers with infants. Therefore child bearing and rearing are deterrent for 
women's employment.' 
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
Insecurity 
Women feel insecure and avoid employment in such places where their 
security is not up to the mark. The poor law and order conditions aggravate 
15. Supra Note 2 p.79. 
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their sense of insecurity. Consequently, working at not-so-familiar places and 
interior rural area is generally ruled out by them. In some cases feeling of 
insecurity is so strong that women prefer to remain home makers. 
Confidence 
Women's confidence for jobs other than considered suitable for them is 
not so strong and therefore they do not go for employment in a number of 
occupations like sales representative etc. They also lack confidence in case of 
employment requiring frequent travel by public transport. A majority of women 
is risk avers or by nature and avoid employment where risk element has high 
probability. 
Inward Looking 
Women bom and brought up in traditional setting are generally inward 
looking and do not give much weight to employment prefer a settled married 
life. Hence a large number of women never try for employment and remain 
home makers. In words looking altitude of Indian women, especially married 
women, deters them to go for employment. Their personal world revolves 
around their family. '^  
PROVISIONS UNDER INDIA PENAL CODE, 1860 
Section 354, IPC has been enacted with a view to protect a woman 
against indecent assault as well as to safeguard public morality and decent 
behavior. 
Section -354 IPC. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to 
outrage her modesty.- Who ever assault or uses criminal force to any woman, 
intending to outrage or knowing, it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her 
modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term 
16./*/</., p.83. 
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which shall not be less than five years but which may extent to two years, or 
with fine, or with both. 
Provided that the court may for adequate and special reasons to be 
mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may be less than five years, but which shall not be 
less than two years.'' 
Ingredients 
(1) A woman was assaulted or criminal force was used against her. 
(2) The accused intended to outrage her modesty or knew that her modesty 
was likely to be outraged 
An indecent assault upon a woman is punished under this Section. Rape 
is punishable under Section-376; but the offence under this Section is of less 
gravity than rape. A person who is guilty of attempting rape cannot be allowed 
to escape with the lazier penalty of this Section. Where the accused walked into 
the room where a female child of seven and a half months was sleeping and 
committed an indecent assault on the child, he was held to have committed an 
offence under this Section as he had out raged and intended to outrage 
1 ft 
whatever modesty the little victim was capable of 
Unless culpable intentions is proved move touching the belly of a female 
in a public bus can not modesty of a female with in the meaning of this Section. 
In the circumstances of the cause the act of the accused was held to be 
accidental and not intentional.'^ 
Where the accused caught hold of a married women and tried to open 
the string of her salwar with a view to committing rape on her but being hit by 
17. Section-354 Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
18. Major Sing v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 63. 
19. Divender Singh v, Hari Ram 1990 Cr LJ 1845 HP. 
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a woman with a kulhari field away, it was held that he could not be convicted 
under Section -376 read with Section-511 IPC as his action did not show a 
determination to have sexual intercourse at all events and in spite of resistance. 
The conviction of accused was accordingly changed to one under Section -354; 
IPC.2° 
Where a married woman alleged that the two accused persons had 
dragged her in her own home and raped her one after the another and the 
medical evidence showed that thought there were traces of semen on her 
clothes, there were none on the clothes of the accused persons, the court opined 
that the case was not made out; the presence of semen on the clothes of the 
married women is not unusual and therefore the accused could have been 
prosecuted only for outraging the modesty of a woman. 
Some laborers, including a woman, were taken to a police Station for 
some work. When they demanded wages, they were betan up. The woman was 
stripped bare and thrashed. The matter came before Supreme Court in a writ 
petition under Article 32 of the constitution. The Supreme Court held that the 
offence under Section 354, IPC was established in reference to the woman and 
awarded compensations to be recovered from the salary of the guilty officers. 
In another case the accused outraged the modesty of a woman. He was 
convicted under Section -354 solely on the basis of the evidence of the victim. 
The court observed the normally a rustic woman could not come to the court to 
implicate a co-villager if the imputation were not true. A victim under Section -
354 is in the same category as an Infijsed witness. Her testimony was found to 
20. Ram Asrey v. State of UP 1990 Cr LJ 405. 
21. Musa V. State 1991 Cr LJ 2168 Orissa. 
22. People Union for Democratic Rights v. Police Commissioner, Delhi Police Head quarter and 
aw/Aer(1989)4SCC730. 
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be reliable. Due to the lapse of eight years since the incident the accused was 
not sent back to Jail. He was made to sit in the court for five days. 
Where a nine year school going girl was criminally assaulted by the 
accused her evidence was corroborated and the accused had no explanation as 
to why she and her father would falsely implicate him, his conviction under 
Section -354 was upheld.^ '* where the accused touched the hand of the belind 
prosecutrix, removed the quilt with which she was covering herself and put his 
hand in her midi, conviction of the accrued for attempt to commit rape was set 
aside but conviction under Sections 354,457, and 506 was confirmed." 
Women come out early in the morning to get water from the village 
well. The accused caught her hand and force fully pulled her to him to be taken 
to a nearby place. She resisted and raised shouts. Her bangle was broken and 
she was injured. The accused was found guilty of the offence under Section 
354 and was convicted accordingly setting aside his acquittal. 
Where the accused forcibly laid the prosecutrix on bed and broke the 
string of her pajama and force her under wear but did not undress himself, the 
offence fell under Section 354 and the offence of attempt to commit rape was 
not made out.^'' 
In a case a man forcibly carried away a young girl into bushes, over 
powered her and raped her. The prosecution failed to prove the charge under 
Section 376. The court convicted him under Section-354 and released him 
under the provisions of Probation of offenders Act. The High Court observed 
that the courts below should act with firm hand in awarding punishment under 
Section 354 and be not carried away by some decisions suggesting leniency. 
23. Panchu Parida v. State ofOrissa 1993 Cr LJ 953 Orissa. 
24. Pranodh Kumar v. State ofJ& K AIR 1995 SC 1964. 
25. Keshav Baliram Naik v. State of Maharasthra 1996 Cr LJ 1111 Bombay. 
26. State ofMaharastra v. Manohar 1994 Cr LJ 2536 (Bombay). 
27. Jai Chand v. State 1996 Cr LJ 2039 (Delhi). 
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The punishment was enhanced. Where the accessed person caught 
hold of a woman and removed the source from her person but ran away on 
racing some one approaching, their act attracted Section 354 and Section 
375/511. Their conviction under Section 376/511 read with Section 34 was 
altered to one under Section-354/ 34. 
Rape -defined Under Section 375 of Indian Penal Code means- A man is said 
to commit "rape" who, except in the case herein after excepted has sexual 
intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six 
following descriptions. 
First -Against her will 
Secondly - without her consent 
Thirdly- \vith her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her 
or dry person in whom she is interested in fear or death, or of hart. 
Fourthly- with her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, 
and that her consent, is given because she believes that he is another man to 
whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. 
Fifthly-with her consent when at the time of giving such consent by reason of 
unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personality 
or through another of any stupefying or un wholesome, substance, she is unable 
to understand the nature and consequence of that to which she give consent. 
Sixthly- with or without her consent when she is less than sixteen years of age 
Explanation- Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse 
necessary to the offence of rape. 
28. PPA.P. High Court v. Godise Devaiah, 1994 Cr LJ 349. 
29. Damodar Behera v. State ofOhssa 1996 Cr LJ 346 Orissa. 
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Exception- Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife not being under 
fifteen years of age, is not rape. 
Sexual Intercourse- To constitute this offence sexual inter course by a man 
with a woman is necessary. A 'man' is defined by Section 10 of the India Penal 
Code. 
In Kripal S/o. Ram Shyam Lai Charmakar v. State of Madhya 
Pradesh,^^ Victim had gone to field to collect grass, on her way back 
accused obstructed her and proposed for sexual intercourse. On her refusal 
accused forcibly committed sexual intercourse. The evidence of victim and 
medical evidence confirmed fact of penetration of his male organ, it was held 
that in case of offence of rape penetration of male organ in female organ is a 
sine qua non which was satisfied in this case and hence conviction of 
accused for offence of rape was proper. 
It was held in Sakshi v. Union oflndia,^^ that by a process of judicial 
interpretation the provisions of Section 375 of IPC, cannot be altered so as to 
include all forms of penetration such as penile/vaginal penetration, penile/oral 
penetration, finger/vagina and finger/penile/and penetration and 
object/vaginal penetration within its ambit. Section 375 uses the expression 
"sexual intercourse" but the said expression has not been defined. The 
dictionary meaning of the word "sexual intercourse" is heterosexual 
intercourse involving penetration of the vagina by the penis. It was also 
held that only sexual intercourse, namely heterosexual intercourse involving 
penetration of the vagina by the penis coupled with the explanation that 
penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary for the 
offence of rape has been held to come within the purview of Section 375 of 
IPC. An exercise to alter the definition of rape, as contained in Section 
30. 2007 II Cri LJ 2302 (SC). 
31. 2004 CriLJ 2881 (SC). 
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375 of IPC. by a process of judicial interpretation and that top when there 
is no ambiguity in provisions of the enactment is bound to result in good 
deal of chaos and confusion, and will not be in the interest of society at 
large. 
It was also pointed out that the wide definition which the petitioner 
wants to be given to "rape" as defined under Section 375, IPC. So that the 
same may become an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC, has 
neither been considered nor accepted by any Court in India so far. 
In Uday v. State of Karnataka,^^ accused expressed love and promised to 
marry the prosecutrix on a later date. Prosecutrx was quite aware that they 
belonged to different castes and proposal of their marriage will be opposed by 
their family members. Yet prosecutrix started cohabiting with the accused 
consciously and became pregnant. On a charge for rape the Court held that the 
consent given by the prosecutrix for cohabitation cannot be said to be given 
under misconception of fact i.e., a promise to marry but because she also 
desired for it. She had freely, voluntarily and consciously consented to have 
sexual intercourse with the appellant not only on belief of promise for 
marriage but because of their deep love with each other. The appellant made a 
promise to marry on more than one occasion and in such circumstances the 
promises lose all significance particularly when' they are overcome with 
emotions and passions and find them in situations and circumstances where 
they in a weak moment, succumb to the temptation of having sexual 
relationship. "This is what happened in this case and prosecutrix willingly 
consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She had sufficient 
intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she 
32.2003CrLJ 1539 (SC). 
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was consenting to. Hence appellant is not liable to be convicted for an offence 
of rape under Section 376, Indian Penal Code. 
In Pradeep Kumar Verma v. Slate of Bihar, It was held that in 
case of a representation deliberately made by the accused with a view to elicit 
the assent of victim without having intention to marry her, will vitiate the 
consent given by victim. It was also observed that if on the facts it is 
established that at the very inception of the making of promise the accused did 
not ready entertain the intention of marrying victim and the promise to marry 
held out by him was a mere hoax, the consent ostensibly given by the victim 
will be of no avail to the accused to exculpate him from the ambit of Section 
375 clause second. Such representation would only vitiate the consent. 
Sixth clause—Sexual intercourse with a woman with or without her 
consent when she is tinder 16 years amounts to rape. 
The proscculrix left her mother's house and joined the accused because 
her mother has turned down the proposal of her marriage with the accused on 
the ground that she was too young. While she was with the accused he had 
sexual intercourse with her against her will. The act of intercourse with the 
prosecutrix will be covered by this clause. 
A, a minor girl, aged 15 years having been rebuked by her mother 
leaves her house. At railway station she meets 'B' who takes her to his 
house. 'B' provides her clothes, money and ornaments at his house and has 
sexual intercourse with the girl with her consent. In this case since the girl has 
left her guardianship voluntarily and met B at the railway station who took 
him to his house, B is not liable for kidnapping from lawful guardianship. 
But B will definitely be liable for committing the offence of rape even though 
sexual intercourse was committed with the consent of the girl because the girl 
was a minor and could not give a valid consent in view of clause (6) of 
33.2007 IV Cr LJ 4333 (SC). 
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Section 375. The girl being below 16 years of age is not competent to give a 
valid consent. 
Indecent assault and attempt to commit rape distinguished.—an 
offence of indecent assault on a woman cannot be complete unless there is 
intention or knowledge that the woman's modesty will be outraged. An indecent 
assault on a woman does not amount to an attempt to commit rape, unless it is 
shown that there was a determination in the accused to gratify his passion at 
all events, and in spite of all resistance. 
Corroboration of evidence.—a woman who has been raped is not an 
accomplice. A woman who was ravished is the victim of an outrage and if 
she consented there is no rape. In the case of a girl below the age of 
consent, her consent will not matter so far as the offence of rape is 
concerned, but if she has consented her evidence will be looked upon with 
suspicion as that of an accomplice. The true rule of prudence requires that in 
every case of this type the advisability of corroboration should he present in 
the mind of the judge and that must be indicated in the judgment. But 
corroboration can be .dispensed with if in the particular circumstances of 
the case the judge is satisfied that it is safe to do so. 
In State ofH.P v. Raghubir Singh^^ a girl Raksha Devi aged about 7/8 
years was alleged to have been raped by Raghubir Singh aged about 16 
years. Father of the victim saw the accused lying on top of the prosecutrix 
under the mango tree. On alarm being raised he ran away carrying with 
him his underwear. On examination the Doctor found her hymen ruptured 
and slight bleeding coming out of the vaginal edges. Blood clot was also 
present. Shawl on which the prosecutrix was made to lie while committing 
the rape was found having some mud and blood-stains. Mud was found on 
the shawl because it was raining at the time of occurrence. Doctor opined 
34. AIR 1958 SC 143. 
35. (1993) 2 s e c 622. 
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that the accused was capable of sexual intercourse and the girl was raped It 
was held that circumstances such as absence of spermatozoa on the vaginal 
slide and absence of injuries on the male organ is not always fatal to the 
prosecution cases, these circumstances should be considered in the light of 
the peculiar factual set up of the case. There is no legal compulsion to look 
for corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an 
order of conviction. Therefore on facts, convincing and trustworthy 
testimony of the prosecutrix corroborated by medical evidence and testimony 
of other prosecution witnesses, conviction is maintainable. 
Accomplice.—In a case of rape the victim is not treated as an 
accomplice. The evidence of the victim is to be treated almost like the 
evidence of an accomplice requiring corroboration. There must be an 
indication in the course of the judgment that the judge had this rule in mind 
when he prepared the judgment. Where the conviction is based on the 
evidence of a prosecutrix without any corroboration, it will not be illegal on 
the sole ground. In the case of grown up and married woman it is always safe 
to insist on such corroboration. Wherever corroboration is necessary it should 
be from an independent source but it is not necessary that every part of the 
evidence of the victim should be confirmed in every detail by independent 
evidence. Such corroboration can be sought from either direct evidence or 
circumstantial evidence or from both. 
It was held in Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana, that it is well 
settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence 
of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her 
testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material 
particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the 
latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is 
36. Sheikh Jakir v. State of Bihar, 1983Cr LJ 1285 (SC). 
37.2004CrLJ1399(SC). 
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physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the Court 
finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, 
it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend 
assurance to her testimony. Assurance short of corroboration as understood in 
the context of an accomplice would suffice. 
It was further held that to constitute the offence of rape, it is not 
necessary that there should be complete penetration of the penis with 
emission of semen and rupture of hymen. Partial penetration within the 
lebia majora of the vulva or pudendum with or without emission of semen 
is sufficient to constitute the offence of rape as defined in the law. The 
depth of penetration is immaterial in an offence punishable under Section 
376 IPC. 
Section-376, Punishment for rape.—(1) Whoever, except in the 
cases provided for by Sub-Section (2), commits rape shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than 
seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to 
ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless the woman raped is his 
own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which case, he shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to two years or with fine or with both : Provided that the court 
may for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, 
impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years, 
(2) Whoever,— 
(a) Being a police officer commits rape— 
(i) within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed ; or 
(ii) So the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the 
police station to which he is appointed; or 
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(iii) on a woman in his custody or in the custody of a police officer 
subordinate to him; or 
(b) being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and 
commits rape on a woman in his custody as such public servant or 
in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him ; or 
(c) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or 
other place of custody established by or under any law for the 
time being in force or of a women's or children's institution takes 
advantage of his official position and commits rape on any inmate 
of such jail, remand home, place or institution ; or 
(d) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, takes 
advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in 
that hospital ; or 
(e) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or 
(f) commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age ; 
or 
(g) commits gang rape— 
Shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which 
shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also 
be liable to fine: 
Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be 
mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either 
description for a term of less than ten years. 
Explanation 1.—where a woman is raped by one or more in a 
group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention, each 
of the persons shall be deemed to have committed gang rape within the 
meaning of this Sub-Section. 
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Explanation 2.—"Women's or children's institution" means an 
institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected women 
or children or a widows home or by any other name, which is established 
and maintained for the reception and care of women or children. 
Explanation 3.—"Hospital" means the precincts of the hospital 
and includes the precincts of any institution for the reception and treatment 
of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention 
or rehabilitation. 
3D 
In State of Chhattisgarh v. Derha, evidence of doctor showed that 
the injuries suffered by the victim could not have been self-inflicted. There 
was blood on her private part, the hymen was torn and medial side of 
the labia minora was inflamed. This was even after 4 days of the incident. 
The doctor in specific terms had stated that the victim is not habituated 
to sexual intercourse. It was held that the mere fact that to a suggestion 
made in cross- examination that such injuries could be suffered by the 
victim by falling on a hard and blunt substance by itself would not suffice 
to reject the evidence of victim who had no enmity whatsoever to implicate 
the accused. The suggestion which has come in the form of Section 313 
statements merely says that there was some enmity between the parents 
of the accused and that of the victim. Neither the nature nor gravity of 
enmity has been stated; therefore the explanation would be of no 
assistance to the accused to establish the fact that he has been falsely 
implicated. It is well settled law that if the Court is satisfied from the 
evidence of victim, a conviction can be solely based on such evidence 
without looking for further corroboration. Therefore the factum of injury 
suffered by victim and the opinion of doctor that such injury could have 
been caused by sexual intercourse and the victim having not been 
habituated to earlier sexual intercourse itself goes to show that the injury 
38.2004 CrLJ 2109 (SC). 
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suffered by the victim was one that could have been caused only by an 
act of rape. Even the identification of the accused by the victim was not 
doubtful because he was known to the victim. 
As far the delay in filing F.I.R. is concerned it was satisfactorily 
explained by the mother of the victim. Father of the victim was out of 
station on the date of occurrence. The fact that the accused did not suffer 
any injury on his private part will also not be of much help to him 
because he was medically examined 4 days after the incident. In the 
circumstances the acquittal of the accused would be liable to be set 
aside, 
In Rajendra Datta Zarekar v. State of Goa,^^ accused, Rajendra, 
an young man aged about 20 years was living in a room near the house of 
the victim's father. One day victim, Sonia, a girl aged about six year was 
playing in courtyard and her elder sister was studying at her home. At 
about 5 p.m. on the day of incident Pushpa, mother of victim heard cries of 
her daughter, Sonia from inside the room of Rajendra. She rushed of the 
room and found it closed from inside and therefore she knocked at the door 
and when Rajendra opened the door she enquired from the accused as to 
what he was doing inside the room along with her daughter, he kept quiet. 
Sonia the victim narrated to her mother that Rajendra removed her panty 
and also his own pant and lied down over her and did some movement on 
her private part. After sometime when father of victim come both victim's 
mother and father went to police station. The girl was medically examined. 
During trial the accused pleaded that he was falsely implicated. 
It was held that rape leaves a permanent scar and has a serious 
psychological impact on victim and also her family members. Therefore, 
no one would normally concoct a story of rape just too falsely implicate a 
39.2008ICrLJ710(SC). 
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person. It was further pointed out that rupture of hymen is not essential to 
constitute rape. Therefore the accused was held liable under Section 376, 
I PC for commission of rape. 
In State of M.P v. Bala, alias Balaram,^'^ in case of conviction of 
accused for rape sentence was reduced below prescribed minimum without 
assigning satisfactory reasons. The Supreme Court held that reduction of 
sentence to nine and half months was liable to be set aside being below 
the prescribed minimum because in its opinion long pendency of trial, 
offer of rapist to marry victim or age of offender arc not relevant reasons 
for reduction of sentence below prescribed minimum. 
The Supreme Court in Om Prakash v. State ofU.P.,^' observed that 
the Indian women who is a victim of sexual assauh in normal course does 
not like to disclose such offence even before her family members much less 
before public or before police. The Indian women have a tendency to 
conceal such offence because it involves her prestige as well as prestige of 
her family. Only in few cases, the victim girl, or the family 
members have courage to go before the police station and lodge a case. 
Therefore, the suggestion given by the defence that the victim has falsely 
implicated the accused does not appeal to reason. There was no apparent 
reason for a married woman to falsely implicate the accused after scatting 
her own prestige and honour. Therefore the plea of false implication was 
held not tenable. 
It was held in State of M.P v. Dayal sahu,^^ that once the statement of 
prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by Court as such, conviction 
can be passed only on solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no 
corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which 
40. 2005 Cr LJ 4375 (SC). 
41. 2006 CrLJ 2913 (SC). 
42. 2005 Cr LJ 4375 (SC). 
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necessitate the Courts for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of 
testimony of prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a 
requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and 
circumstances. Non-examination of Doctor who examined her and non-
production of doctor's report would not be fatal to the prosecution case, if 
the statement of prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses inspire 
confidence. 
Section 376(2) (f).—In State ofRajasthan v. Madan Singh/^ a case 
relating to rape on girl below 12 years of age, it was held that imposition of 
sentence below minimum prescribed on the ground that accused was 
young and only bread earner of his family is not adequate and special 
reason for imposing sentence lesser than the minimum prescribed. 
Therefore the order reducing sentence to 7 years rigorous imprisonment was 
held liable to be set aside. 
It was also observed that the measure of punishment in a case of 
rape cannot depend upon the social status of the victim or the accused. It 
must depend upon the conduct of the accused, the state and age of the 
sexually assaulted female and the gravity of the criminal act. Crimes of 
violence upon women need to be severely dealt with. The socio-economic 
status, religion, race, caste or creed of the accused or the victim is 
irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy. Protection of society and 
deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is required to 
be achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence. 
Rape on Pregnant Woman.—The Supreme Court in Om 
Prakash v. State of Uttar Pradesh,'*'^ observed that for punishing an 
accused by application of Section 376(2)(e) the prosecution has to 
establish that the accused knew that the victim was pregnant because it is 
43. 2008 II Cr LJ 1939 (SC). 
44.2006 CrLJ 2913 (SC). 
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for this reason that stringent punishment is prescribed for offence under 
Section 376(2)(e). In this case there was no such evidence. The Trial 
Court has only come to conclusion that there was "full possibility" of the 
accused knowing that the woman was pregnant. It was held that there is 
a gulf of difference between possibility and certainty. What is needed 
under this Section is "certainty of knowledge and not merely" possibility 
of knowledge. "Where a case relates to one where because of the serious 
nature of the offence, as statutorily prescribed, more stringent sentence is 
provided, it must be established and not a possibility is to be inferred. The 
language of Section 376 (2) (e) is clear. It requires prosecution to establish 
that the accused knew her to be pregnant. This is clear from the use of 
expression "knowing her to be pregnant". On this criteria the judgment of 
the courts below are unsustainable. However, minimum sentence prescribed 
under Section 376(1) I.P. Code is clearly applicable. Therefore, the sentence 
of imprisonment was reduced from 10 years to 7 years. 
Gang rape.—In Santosh Kumar v. State ofM.P^^ the prosecutrix 
Halki Bai had been deserted by her husband. One day in order to maintain 
herself she came in search of work to Silvani by bus and reached at about 10 
p.m. On 20-05-1985. When she was trying to get down from the bus, 
Munim Misra, conductor of the bus told her that she may sleep in the bus 
in night and may go in the morning to search work. She slept on the rear 
seat of the bus. At about mid night when all the shops at the bus stand had 
closed the driver of the bus Santosh Kumar, the appellant pressed her breast 
and started removing her dhoti which she was wearing. When she tried to 
raise alarm Munim Misra caught holds her hands and gagged her and then 
Santosh Kumar ravished her. Thereafter Santosh caught hold her and 
Munim Misra ravished her. Hearing her alarm three constables who were 
on petrol duty and some others came near the bus, but both the accused 
managed to run away. After investigation both the accused Santosh Kumar 
45. 2006 Cr LJ 4594 (SC). 
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and Munim Misra were tried and convicted. The prosecutrix was 
medically examined at about 2.00 a.m. on 21-5-1985. No injuries were 
found on private parts of her body. Dismissing the appeal the Supreme 
Court held that absence of injury on private parts of prosecutrix is not a 
ground to hold that no rape was committed upon her since victim was a 
married and grown up lady, The deposition of prosecutrix and evidence 
of witnesses including the two police constables and other witnesses was 
sufficient enough to justify conviction of the appellant. The defence 
version that they were falsely implicated on ground of non-payment of 
'hafta' was not found tenable. Hence the conviction of accused persons was 
found proper. 
In Priya Patel v. State ofM.P^^ the prosecutrix was returning by 
Utkal Express after attending a sports meet. When she reached her 
destination at Sagar, accused Bhanu Pratap Patel husband of the accused 
appellant met her at railway station and told her that her father has asked 
him to pick up from the railway station. Since the prosecutrix was suffering 
from fever, she accompanied Bhanu Pratap Patel to his house. There he 
committed rape on her. When Commission of rape was going his wife Priya 
Patel, the present appellant reached there. The prosecutrix requested the 
appellant to save her. Instead of saving her the appellant slapped her, 
closed the door of the house and left the place of incident. A report was 
lodged and after investigation Bhanupratap was charged under Section 323 
and 376, whereas the appellant was charged under Section 323 and 376(2) 
(g) IPC. 
The Supreme Court held that a woman cannot be prosecuted for 
gang rape. The Court held that Section 376(2) (g) provides that whoever 
commits gang rape shall be punished. The explanation only clarifies that 
when a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in 
46. 2006 Cr LJ 3627 (SC). 
226 
CHapter-II^ 
furtherance of their common intention each such person shall be deemed 
to have committed gang rape within Sub-Section (2) of Section 376. Since 
a woman cannot commit rape, therefore she cannot be guilty to commit 
gang rape as well. The explanation is only a deeming provision. By 
operation of deeming provision, a person who has not actually committed 
rape is deemed to have committed rape even if only one of the groups in 
furtherance of common intention has committed rape. The sine qua non for 
bringing in application of Section 34 IPC is that the act must be done in 
furtherance of the common intention to do a criminal act. The expression "in 
fiirtherance of their common intention as appearing in the explanation to 
Section 376(2) relates to intention to commit rape and therefore appellant 
accused cannot be prosecuted for alleged commission of the offence 
punishable under Section 376(2)(g). 
It was held in State ofM.P v. Babulal/^ that in case of conviction of 
accused under section 376, IPC for imposition of sentence less than the 
minimum prescribed recording of "adequate" and "special" reasons is a 
sine qua non. The reason that the accused was illiterate agriculturist" from 
rural area can neither be said to be special nor adequate for reducing 
sentence to period already undergone which was only two months and three 
days. Therefore, sentence was set aside. The Supreme Court further 
remarked that undeserved indulgence or liberal attitude in not awarding 
adequate sentence was not proper. 
It was held in State ofKarnataka v. Raju,^^ in case of rape on a 10 
years old child, the imposition of only 3-1/2 years imprisonment on the 
accused which is less than the prescribed minimum, on the ground that he 
is an illiterate and rustic boy of 18 years is improper and impermissible in 
the absence of any reason which could have been treated as "special" and 
47.2008ICrLJ714(SC). 
48. 2007 IV Cr LJ 4700 (SC). 
227 
CHapter-lV 
"adequate reason". The measure of punishment in case of rape cannot 
depend upon social status of the victim or the accused. It must depend upon 
the conduct of the accused, the state and age of sexually assaulted female 
and the gravity of the criminal act. Crimes of violence upon women need to 
be severely dealt with. The socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or 
creed of the accused or the victim is irrelevant consideration in sentencing 
policy. Protection of society and deterring the criminal is avowed object of 
law that is required to be achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence. 
There are no extenuating or mitigating circumstances available on the 
record in this case which may justify imposition of a sentence less than 
the prescribed minimum on the respondent. To show mercy in the case of 
such a heinous crime would be a travesty of justice and the place for 
leniency is wholly misplaced. 
Cruelty by Husband or Relatives of Husband 
Section, 498-A IPC, Husband or relatives of husband of a woman 
subjecting her to cruelty.—whoever, being the husband or the relative of the 
husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall he punished 
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall 
also be liable to fine. 
Explanation.—for the purposes of this Section, "cruelty" means— 
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the 
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, 
limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman , or 
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to 
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful 
demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of 
failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 
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This Section was enacted to meet the cases of dowry deaths. It 
was introduced in the year 1983. Its objective is to protect a woman who is 
being harassed by her husband or relatives of husband. The act of 
harassment would amount to cruelty for the purpose of this section. In 
Inder Raj Malik and others v. Mrs. Sumita Malik,'*^ was contended that 
this section is ultra vires Article 14 and Article 20 (2) of the Constitution. 
There is the Dowry Prohibition Act which also deals with similar type of 
cases; therefore, both statutes together create a situation commonly known 
as double jeopardy. But Delhi High Court negatives this contention and 
held that this section does not create situation for double jeopardy. 
Section 498-A of IPC, is distinguishable from Section 4 of the Dowry 
Prohibition Act because in the latter mere demand of dowry is punishable 
and existence of element of cruelty is not necessary, whereas Section 498-
A of IPC, deals with aggravated form of the offence. It punishes such 
demands of property or valuable security from the wife or her relatives as 
are coupled with cruelty to her. Hence a person can be prosecuted in 
respect of both the offences punishable under Section 4 of the Dowry 
Prohibition Act and this Section. It is just a case similar to Section 5(2) of 
the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 409 of the Indian Penal 
Code. 
It was held in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana,^^ that the object of 
Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by 
her husband or his relatives in connection with demand of dowry. This 
Section was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives 
who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy 
unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper technical view would be counter 
productive and would act against interests of women and against the 
object for which this provision was added. In the present case proceedings 
49. 1986CrLJ 1510 (Del). 
50. 2003 Cr LJ 2028 (SC). 
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were initiated by wife under Section 498-A against her husband and his 
relatives and subsequently she settled her disputes with husband and agreed 
for mutual divorce. Later she moved an application for quashing 
proceedings initiated by her against husband and his relatives. 
The Supreme Court held that refusal by High Court to exercise the 
inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings to meet 
the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not 
the object of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 
It was further held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent 
powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 
320 of the Cr.P.C. does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of 
the Cr.P.C. 
Meaning of Cruelty.—It was held in Kaliyaperumal v. State of 
Tamil Nadu^', that cruelty is a common essential in offences under both the 
Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The two Sections are not 
mutually inclusive but both are distinct offences and a person acquitted under 
Section 304-B for the offence of dowry death can be convicted for an offence 
under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code. The meaning of cruelty is given in 
explanation to Section 498-A. Section 304-B does not contain its meaning but 
the meaning of cruelty or harassment as given in Section 498-A applies in 
Section 304-B as well, under Section 498-A of Indian Penal Code cruelty by 
itself amounts to an offence whereas under Section 304-B the offence is that 
of dowry death and the death must have occurred within seven years of 
marriage. But no such period is mentioned in Section 498-A. 
It was held in Hansraj v. State ofHaryana, ^^ that the mere fact that 
a woman committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and that she 
51. 2003 CrLJ 4321 (SC). 
52.2004CrLJ1759(SC). 
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had been subjected to cruelty by her husband, does not automatically give rise to 
the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. The Court 
is required to look into all the other circumstances of the case. One of the 
circumstances which have to be considered by the Court is whether the 
alleged cruelty was of such nature as was likely to drive the woman to 
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of 
the woman. 
It was further observed that when in a criminal trial against husband 
for abetment of suicide by his wife, the prosecution improves its case from 
stage to stage in as much as the allegations that the accused did not like to 
keep the deceased wife with him because she was not good looking, or that 
he was addicted to liquor or that the deceased had reported these matters to 
her parents and others, or that the accused intended to re-marry and had told 
his wife about it, or that the deceased had once come to her father's house 
in an injured condition, or even the allegations regarding beatings, did not 
find place in the statements recorded by the police in the course of 
investigation and these allegations were made at the trial for the first time 
and all that was alleged in the F.I.R. or even at the stage of investigation 
was that there were frequent quarrels between the husband and wife, 
sometimes resulting in physical assault, on account of the husband being 
addict to the consumption of 'bhang' and the other allegation that the 
accused was aggrieved of the fact that his sister was not being properly 
treated by her husband who was brother of deceased also appeared to be 
untrue, it was held that the presumption under Section 113-A of the 
Evidence Act could not be invoked to find the accused guilty of the offence 
under Section 306 of IPC. 
It was fiirther held that having regard to the facts of the case, though the 
prosecution failed to establish the offence under Section 306 IPC, the 
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evidence on record justified the conviction of the accused under Section 498-
A of IPC. 
Cruelty for dowry demand and murder.—In Balbir Singh v. 
State of Punjab,^^ the decease Amarjeet Kaur was married to appellant. 
She had been complaining of ill-treatment at the hands of her husband and 
in-laws. Sometime a Panchayat was held to settle the dispute but ill-
treatment continued while her husband had come home on two months leave. 
She in view of a settlement came to her matrimonial home on 12-10-1995. 
She received 90% burn injuries. In her dying declaration before the doctor the 
victim had stated her husband had put kerosene oil upon her and upon igniting 
locked doors of both the rooms from outside. The victim was rescued by 
neighbours. Victim in her second dying declaration before the investigating 
officer not only named her husband but also her mother-in-law. 
Witnesses in evidence stated how she was maltreated at the hands of 
accused persons on account of non-fulfillment of their demand of dowry. The 
Supreme Court held that in view of the fact that victim was rescued by 
neighbour case of suicide must be ruled out and the conviction of accused 
under Section 302 I.P. Code was held proper. However, in view of 
inconsistencies between two dying declarations benefit of doubt must be 
given to mother-in-law as for the offence under Section 302 is concerned. 
However, conviction of both the accused under Section 498-A was held 
proper. The mother-in-law was already in custody for four years therefore, 
she was ordered to be released forthwith. It was also made clear that only 
because dying declaration was not recorded by a Magistrate it by itself may 
not be a ground to disbelieve entire prosecution case. 
53.2006 CrU 1243 (SC). 
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SejQiaCHarassment At M^or^ 
<p[ace: JudkiaC <R^sponse 
Chapter-V 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT WORK PLACE: 
JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
Women and their problems have acquired growing importance both in 
developed and under developed countries and it is recognized they have been 
victims of discrimination every where which is manifested in many spheres, 
political, social, economic and employment. 
The beginning of the modem industrial era, consequent of industrial 
revolution witnessed a tremendous change in the character of work outside the 
household in order to augment the family income. In the early stages of 
industrial development women workers were victims of long hours, physical 
and mental tortures sexual abuse etc. Humiliation, harassment and exploitation 
of women is as old as the history of family life and it has become more 
widespread with industrialization. 
Now women workers constitute an important component of Indian 
labour force. An increasing number of women are today compelled to leave the 
security of their homes and venture out in search of work depending upon the 
socio-economic status. Sharing of economic activity by women is neither a new 
phenomenon nor a new development, but the magnitude of their involvement is 
co-relative to socio-economic and political conditions prevalent in a country. 
With the change in the out look, attitude and approach towards living, it has 
now become necessary by and large for the families with inadequate incomes 
to supplement their requirements through additional earnings. For this reasons, 
women have recorded impressive gains in employment from 1991onwards-as-4& 
evident from the economic survey.' 
As per the survey, total number of women employees was 36.44 lacks in 
1990 that increased to 49.49 lacks in 2001 an impressive increase of 35.81 
1. Economic Survey, 2003-04, Ministry of Finance, Government of India p-55. 
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percent. The gain appears significant when seen in the face of decHning 
number in overall employment especially since mid-nineties. That is, even in 
the face of tumbling total employment numbers, new women workers have 
joined the world of work, but these figures do not cover the unorganized 
sector, wfiich constitute 92% of the total labour force and where in majority of 
then ^ women. It is quite pertinent that globalization has accelerated the way 
for women to enter the field of employment to lead a dignified life. 
According to National Resource Centre for Women, Department of 
Women and Child Development, Government, of India the number of case of 
sexual harassment in India in 2002 was 10,155, an increase of 4.2 percent over 
the previous year (9,746). A survey by the National Women's Commission in 
2000 showed that 46.85% of women were sexually harassed in the work place. 
In 1991 statistics in India every 51 minutes a woman is sexually harassed and 
every 26 minute a women is sexually molested.^  
But the other side of the picture is that it hks led to many evils, such as 
gender discrimtnation, physical and mental harassment and more specifically 
sexual harassment at work place. According to a report of the ILO, the women 
in industrial society are sexually harassed at work place. It has now become a 
global issue.'* It is considered to be a violation of human rights, discrimination 
and a safety and health issue. It offends the dignity and personal integrity of 
workers. It is a potential threat both to workers and to the enterprise.^  In India 
according to the statistics recorded by the National Crime Records Bureau, the 
number of cases recorded on sexual harassment in the year 2000 is 11024. 
There is 50% increase in cases of sexual harassment in 2000-01 over 1996-97.^  
2. Preetam Khandlwal," Employment in organized sector in 1990s an analysis from gender 
perspective". Indian Journal of industrial relations, vol 40, No. 1 July 2004, p-24. 
3. Purvi Dabbiru and Satabdi Chatterjee, In labour and Industrial cases 41 (4) 2008 Apr J- p-114-119. 
4. S.C. Srivastava, "Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace. Law and policy" IJIR; Vol 39, No 
111 Jan 2004, p-344. 
5. ILO: ABC of women workers rights and gender equality, Geneva, international labour office, 2000 
p-92-93. 
6. See legal News and views, vol 17, No, 9 at, 17 (2003). 
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This shows unlearning situation, which calls for immediate action to tackle it. 
Sexual harassment is deeply entrenched in cultural practices and is 
aggravated by power relations in the workplace. Incidents of sexual harassment 
are not just isolated incidents but involve a powerful formation governing 
relations of gender, and successfully constituting an entire section of the 
community as powerless in the face of molestation and harassment sexual 
harassment and use are act of violence and domination but can hardly contain 
the perception of sensuality and filtration. 
Defining sexual harassment 
It seems that the term sexual harassment came to be used in the public 
media fi-om the year 1971iinwards. Till then no term existed to describe what 
is now universally called 'sexual' harassment in a legal sense seems to have 
been first coined in the United States of America and subsequently 'exported' 
from there to other industrialized countries including Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand Japan, and a number of Countries in Western Europe. 8 
These countries had their fir^t brusm with the term sexual harassment in 
a formal legal sense only in 1 PSoV^TTfiie beginning of 1990. The term sexual 
harassment as a legal concept gained meaningful application in the United 
States only in the mid 1970s when the US court held it to be a form of sex 
discrimination prohibited under title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964. 
In India the term sexual harassment was first defined in a formal legal 
sense in the year 1997 by the Supreme Court in Vishaka v. State ofRajasthan. 
May reports on the working conditions of women also refer to "lie down or lay 
off' practices. How ever, it is the term 'sexual harassment' that has acquired 
the largest acceptance as it more fully denotes the malady than the other terms. 
/ 
1. Purvi Dibbru and Satabdi Chatterjee, In Labour and industrial case, 41 (4) 2008 April -p. 114-119. 
8. ILO, Condition of work digests, Vol. 11, 1/1992, "Combating sexual harassment at work" p-53. 
^ 9. (1997) 6 s e c 241: AIR 1997 SC 301 i 
235 
Chapter-V 
Sexual harassment may take diverse and varied forms. It is not limited to 
demands for sexual favours made under threats of adverse job consequences 
should be recipient refuses to comply with such demands. Victim of sexual 
harassment need not establish that they were not hired, were denied a 
promotion or were dismissed from service as a result of their refiisal to 
participate in sexual activity. This form of harassment, in which the victim 
suffers concrete economic loss for failing to submit to sexual demands, is 
simply one manifestation of sexual harassment albeit a particularly blatant and 
ugly one. Sexual harassment also encompasses situations in which sexual 
demands are toisted upon unwilling employees in which employees must 
endure sexual groping propositions, and in appropriate comments, but where no 
tangible economic rewards are attached to involvement in the behaviour. 
Speaking generally sexual harassment is behaviour with a sexual 
connotation that is abusive, injurious and unwelcome. For the victim, sexual 
harassment has direct consequences for the maintenance or improvement of his 
or her living condition and/or places him or her in an atmosphere of 
intimidation, humiliation or hostility. 
In India, in the absence of any statutory definition of the term sexual 
harassment it was left to the Supreme Court to do the needful. Relying on 
international convention and norms, particularly General Recommendation No 
19 (January 1992) of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) constituted by the United Nations, the Supreme 
Court defined the term sexual harassment for the first time in the years 1997 in 
Vishaka v. state of Rajas than J" The definition is almost in Pari Materia with 
the one proposed by the CEDAW, United Nations and reads: 
Sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually determined 
behaviour (whether directly or by implications) as-
10. (1997)6 sec 241. 
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(a) Physical contacts and advances, 
(b) A demand for sexual favours, 
(c) Sexual couloured remark, 
(d) Showing pronography 
(e) Any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual 
nature. 
Where any of these acts is committed in circumstances where under the 
victims of such conducts has a reasonable apprehension that in relation to the 
victim's employment or work whether she is drawing salary, or honorarium or 
voluntary, whether in government, public or private enterprise such conduct 
can be humiliating and may constitute a health and safety problem. It is 
discriminatory for instance when the women has reasonable ground to believe 
that her objection would dis- advantage her in connection with her employment 
or work including recruiting or promotion or when it creates a hostile work 
environment. Adverse consequence might be visited if the victim does not 
consent to the conduct in question or raises any objection there to. 
The above definition of sexual harassment as provided by the Indian 
Supreme Court thus recognizes both forms of sexual harassment viz quid pro 
quo sexual harassment and hostile environment sexual harassment. "An 
analysis of the above definition," said Dr. A.S. Anand CJ in Apparel Export 
Promotion Council v. A .K Chopra.^^ shows that sexual harassment is a form 
of sex discrimination projected through unwelcome sexual advances, request 
for sexual favour and other verbal or physical conduct with sexual overtones, 
whether directly or by implication, particularly when submission to or rejection 
of such a conduct by the female employee was capable of being used for 
11.(1999)1 sec 759. 
237 
Cfiaper-V 
affecting the employment of the female employee and unreasonably interfering 
with her work performance and had the effect of creating an intimidating or 
hostile working environment for her. 
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan.^^ J.S. Verma CJ noted the hazards to 
which a working women may be exposed and the depravity to which sexual 
harassment can degenerate.'^ Realizing the urgency for safeguard by an 
alternative mechanism in the absence of legislative measures or enacted law to 
provide for the effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender 
equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse more particularly 
against sexual harassment at work places the Supreme Court laid down certain 
guidelines and norms for due observance at all workplace or other institution, 
until a legislation is enacted for the purpose. The court did so in exercise of the 
power available under Article 32 of the constitution for enforcement of the 
fundamental rights and emphasized that this would be treated as the law 
declared by this court under Article 141 of the constitution the court also 
clarified that these guidelines would not prejudice any right available under the 
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. The court further made it clear that 
these guide lines and norms shall govern the behaviour of the employers and all 
others at the work places. So as "to curb this social evil" of sexual harassment 
at work. 
As per the guidelines and norms laid down by the Supreme Court in 
Vishaka case. It shall be the duty of the employer or other responsible persons 
in workplaces or other institutions to prevent and to provide the procedures for 
the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment by taking 
all steps required. 
The apex court prescribed the following preventive steps for the 
employers without prejudice to the generally of this obligation. 
12. (1997) 6 s e c 241. 
13. This was a case of alleged brutal gang rape of a social worker in a village in Rajasthan. 
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(a) Express prohibition of sexual harassment as defined at the workplace 
should be notified, published and circulated in appropriate ways. 
(b) The rule/regulations of government and public sector bodies relating to 
conduct and discipline should include rules/regulations prohibiting 
sexual harassment and provide for appropriate penalties in such rules 
against the offender. 
(c) As regards private employers steps should be taken to include the 
aforesaid prohibitions in the standing orders under the Industrial 
Employment (standing order) Act 1946. 
(d) Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of work, 
leisure, health and hygiene to further ensure that these is no hostile 
environment towards women at workplace and no women employee 
should have reasonable grounds to believe that she is disadvantaged in 
connection with her employment. 
The Supreme Court also directed to establish an effective complaint 
mechanism for dealing with complaints of sexual harassment. 
Complaint Mechanism- An appropriate complaint mechanism should 
be erected in the employer's organization for redress of the complaint made by 
the victim. Such complaint mechanism should ensure time bound treatments of 
complaints.''* 
Complaint Committee- The complaint mechanism referred to in above 
guideline should be adequate to provide, where necessary a complaints 
committee a special counselor or other support service, including the 
maintenance of confidentiality. 
The complaint committee should be headed by a woman and not less 
than half of its member is woman. Further to prevent the possibility of any 
14. (1997) 6 s e c 241. 
\S.Ibid.. 
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undue pressure or influence from senior level, such complaint committee 
should involve a third party, either NGO or other body who is familiar with the 
issue of sexual harassment. 
The complaint committee must make an annual report to the government 
department concerned of the complaints and action taken by them. 
The employers and the person in charge will also report the compliance 
with the aforesaid guidelines including on the reports of the complaints 
committee to the government department. 
Complaint committee as envisaged by the Supreme Court in its 
Judgment will be deemed to be an inquiry authority for the purpose of central 
civil services (conduct) Rules 1964 and the report of the complaint committee 
shall be deemed to be an inquiry report under the central civil service Rules, 
there after the disciplinary authority will act on the report in accordance with 
the rules. 
The Apex court has also laid down, where such conduct amounts to a 
specific offence under the Indian Penal Code or under any other law, the 
employer shall initiate appropriate action in accordance with law by making a 
complaint with the appropriate authority. The employers are also duty bound to 
take appropriate disciplinary action against the perpetrators of sexual 
harassment. They have to set up an appropriate complaint mechanism for 
redress of the complaint mode by the victim. 
Awareness of the rights of female employees in this regard should be 
created in particular by prominently notifying the guidelines in a suitable 
manner. Further wh^ e^ ,>8^ 5ajar^  harassment occurs as a result of an act or 
omission by any thirii pantry or outsider, the employer and person incharge will 
take all steps necess^ and reasonable to assist the affected person in terms of 
support and preventive action. The Supreme Court unambiguously and 
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unequivocally directed that the guidelines and norms should be strictly 
observed in all workplace for the preservation and enforcement of the right to 
gender equality of the working women. 
Supreme Court held that it includes protection from sexual harassment 
and right to work with dignity which is a universally recognized basic Human 
Right. The common minimum requirement of this right has received global 
acceptance. 
Referring to the incidents of sexual assault on working women the 
Supreme Court said that each such incident results in violation of the 
fundamental rights of Gender equality and the Right to life and liberty; it is a 
clear violation of the rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. 
One of the logical consequences of such an incident is also the violation of the 
victim's fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g) to practice any profession or 
to carry out any occupation trade or business. The fundament right to carry on 
any occupation trade or profession depends in the availability of a safe working 
environment Right to Life means life with dignity. 
The Supreme Court has also obligated the employers to initiate 
appropriate authority action in accordance with law by making a complaint 
with the appropriate if the harasser conduct amounts to a specific offence under 
the Indian Penal Code or under any other law. 
The guidelines number 10 obligates the employers to take appropriate 
preventive and remedial action to prevent sexual harassment of their employees 
by non-employees. 
Where sexual harassment occurs as a resuh of an act or omission by any 
third party or outsider, the employer and person in charge will take all steps 
16. Vishaka v. state ofRajasthan guideline no. 10 
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necessary and reasonable to assist the affected person in terms of support and 
preventive action.'^ 
Apart from Article 32, 14, 19 (1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution of India, 
Supreme Court in Vishaka case also found the provisions of Articles 15, 42,51-
A, 51 and 253 relevant as they also envisage judicial intervention for 
eradication of this social evil. The court also held in the absence of domestic 
law occupying the field to formulate effective measures to check the evil of 
sexual harassment of working women at all workplaces, the contents of 
International Conventions and norms are significant for the purpose of 
interpretation of the guarantee of gender equality right to work with human 
dignity in Articles 14, 15, 19(1) (g) and 21 of Constitution and the safeguard 
against sexual harassment implicit therein. Any International Convention not 
inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights and in harmony with its spirit must 
be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to 
promote the object of the Constitutional guarantee. 
The court has defined having regard to the definition of "Women 
Rights" in the section 2(d) of the protection of Human Right Act 1993, "sexual 
harassment" as including any unwelcome sexually determined behaviour 
(whether directly or by implications) like physical contact and advances, a 
demand or request for sexual favours, sexually coloured remark showing 
pornography and any other unwelcome physical verbal or non-verbal conduct 
of sexual nature.'^ 
MRS. RUPANDEOL BAJAJ AND ANOTHER, V. KANWAS PAL SINGH 
GHL AND ANOTHER''^ 
In this first case point before the court was to define the term 'modesty' 
as the word Modesty has not been defined in Indian Penal Code. ~ 
17. (1997) 6 sec 241. 
\Z.lbid.. 
19. (1995) 6 sec 194. 
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The court relied on various definitions given in dictionaries. Fact of the 
case were in 1988 a senior lady officer of the Indian Administrative Service 
belong to tibie Punja|^ ,.«atlfe~and working at the relevant time as the Special 
Secretary, Finance Lodge a p'omplaint with the Inspector General of Police, 
Chandigarh that the accused who was Director General of Police Punjab has 
outraged her modesty at a dinner party. The accused slapped on the 
posterior. This was done in the full presence of the ladies and guests. 
The complainant challenged the High Court's order before the Supreme 
Court where the moot point was whether the above allegations would 
constitute any or all of the offences for which the case was registered. In the 
absence of any definition of the word 'modesty' in the Indian Penal Code, 
the Supreme Court profitably looked into its dictionary meaning. According 
to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Ed.) modesty is the quality of 
being modest and in relation to woman means womanly propriety of 
behaviour, scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct. The above 
dictionary defines the word 'modest' in relatioij. to woman as decorous in 
manner and conduct; not lewd; shame /fast. Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary of the English Laiaguage defines 'modesty' as 
freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in 
dress, speech or conduct. In the Oxford English Dictionary the meaning of 
the word 'modesty' is given as "womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous 
chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reserve or sense 
of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse 
suggestions^^. The Supreme Court also relied on its decision in State of 
Punjab V. Major Singh, in which Mudholkar, J who along with Bachawat, 
J spoke for the majority, held that when any act done to or in the presence of 
a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of 
mankind, that must fall within the mischief of Section 354 IPC. Bachawat, J 
20. Ibid., 14 
21. AIR 1967 SC 63. 
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said that the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex and from her very 
birth she possesses the modesty, which is the attribute of her sex. From the 
above dictionary meaning of 'modesty' and the interpretation given to that 
word by this Court in Major Singh case. 
M.K. Mukherjee, J considered it appears to us that the ultimate test for 
ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is the action of the offender 
such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of 
decency of a woman. Applying this test to the facts in Rupan Deol Bajaj 
case. 
M.K. Mukherjee, J further said, It cannot but be held that the alleged act 
of Mr. in slapping Mrs on her posterior amounted to 'outraging of her 
modesty' for it was not only an affront to the normal sense of feminine 
decency but also an affront to the dignity of the lady 'sexual overtones' or 
not, notwithstanding," M.K. Mukherjee, J also said that the common notions 
of mankind referred to by Mudholkar, J in Major Singh case has to be 
gauged by contemporary societal standards. 
He must be attributed with such knowledge 
The accused "strenuously" urged that even if it was assumed that he had 
outraged the modesty of the complainant, still no offence under Section ^ ^54, 
IPC could be said to have been committed by him for the other ingredient of 
the offence, namely, that he intended to do so was totally lacking. He urged 
that the culpable intention of the offender in committing the act is the crux 
of the matter and not the consequences thereof. While agreeing that if 
intention or knowledge is one of the ingredients of any offence, it has got to 
be proved like other ingredients for convicting a person, M.K. Mukherjee, J 
reminded that those ingredients being states of mind may not be proved by 
direct -evidence and may have to be inferred from the attending 
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circumstances of a given case. This case being only at the incipient stage, 
the Court had to ascertain, only prima facie, whether the accused by 
slapping the complainant on her posterior, in the background detailed by her 
in the FIR, intended to outrage or knew it to be likely that he would thereby 
outrage her modesty, which is one of the essential ingredients of Section 354 
IPC. From the sequence of events detailed earlier, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the slapping was the finale to the earlier overtures of the 
accused, which considered together, showed that he had the requisite 
culpable intention. Even if we had presumed he had no such intention, the 
Supreme Court held, he must be attributed with such knowledge, as the 
alleged act was committed by him in the presence of a gathering comprising 
the elite of the society. Further, there was nothing in the FIR to indicate, 
even remotely, that the accused committed the indecent act, accidentally or 
by mistake or it was a slip. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court held 
that apart from the offence under Section 354 IPC, an offence under Section 
509 IPC was also made out based on the allegations contained in the FIR, as 
the words used and gestures made by the accused were intended to insult the 
modesty of the complainant. 
"Sagacity will be the first casualty" 
Having found that the allegations made in the FIR, prima facie, did 
disclose offences under Sections 354 and 509 IPC, the Supreme Court in 
this case adverted to the applicability of Section 95 IPC. In Veeda Menezes 
V. Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan": a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme 
Court explained that the object of framing Section 95 was to exclude from the 
operation of the Indian Penal Code those cases which from the imperfection 
of language may fall within the letter of the law but are not within its spirit 
and are considered, and for the most part dealt with by the courts, as 
22. Ibid., para 16 
23. AIR 1966 SC 1773. 
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innocent. In other words, the section is intended to prevent penalisation of 
negligible wrongs or of offences of trivial character. In interpreting the 
expression harm appearing in the section, the Supreme Court said that it is -
wide enough to include physical injury, as also injurious mental reaction. As to 
the applicability of the section in a given case, the Supreme Court observed as 
follows.^^ 
Whether an act which amounts to an offence is trivial would 
undoubtedly depend upon the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, 
the knowledge or intention with which the offending act is done, and other 
related circumstances. There can be no absolute standard or degree of harm 
which may be regarded as so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper 
would not complain of the harm. It cannot be judged solely by the measure of 
physical or other injury the act causes. 
Relying upon the above principles, M.K. Mukherjee concluded that 
Section 95 of IPC could have no manner of application to the allegations made 
in the FIR of the complainant. On perusal of the FIR", the Judge said, we have 
found that the accused, the topmost official of the State Police, indecently 
behaved with the complainant, a senior lady IAS Officer, in the presence of a 
gentry and in spite of her raising objections continued with his such behaviour. 
If we are to hold, on the face of such allegations that, the ignominy and 
trauma to which she was subjected to were so slight that the complainant, as a 
person of ordinary sense and temper, would not complain about the same, 
sagacity will be the first casualty. 
One of the reasons given by the High Court for quashing the FIR was: 
In the present case there were 48 more persons present; 24 ladies and 
equal number of gentlemen. It sounds both unnatural and unconscionable that 
the petitioner (accused) would attempt or dare to outrage the modesty of the 
24. Ibid, para 20 
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author of the First Information Report in their very presence inside the 
residential house of Financial Commissioner (Home). 
We are constrained to say, said the Supreme Court that in making the 
above observations the High Court has flagrantly disregarded unwittingly 
we presume the settled principle of law that at the stage of quashing an FIR 
or complaint the High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry 
as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made 
therein. While agreeing that an FIR or a complaint may be quashed if the 
allegations made therein are so absurd and inherently improbable that no 
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient 
ground for proceeding against the accused, the Supreme Court pointed out 
that the High Court had not recorded such a finding, obviously because on 
the allegations in the FIR it was not possible to do so. Holding that the 
High Court had committed a gross error of law in quashing the FIR and 
the complaint, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court 
and dismissed the petition filed by the accused in the High Court under 
Section 482 Cr.PC. The court directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take 
cognizance of the offences under Sections 354 and 509 IPC. 
Accused convicted 
The Chief Judicial Magistrate, thereafter, framed the charges and, after 
a full-fledged trial, found the accused guilty of offences punishable under 
sections 354 and 509 IPC. The Magistrate sentenced the accused: (i) for the 
offence under Section 354 IPC to undergo imprisonment for a period of three 
months and pay a fine of Rs 500; and (ii) for the offence under Section 509 
IPC, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months and pay a fine 
of Rs 200. On appeal, the Sessions Judge confirmed the conviction, but altered 
the sentence and directed the accused to be released on probation in lieu of 
custodial sentence. However, the fine was enhanced to Rs 50,000 with a further 
247 
CHapter-'U 
direction to pay half of it to the complainant. In revision, the High Court did 
not interfere with the conviction of the harasser under Sections 354 and 
509. However, it enhanced the fine to Rs 2,00,000 and directed that the entire 
amount should be paid to the complainant. The High Court also imposed costs 
of Rs 25,000 on the accused. 
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court against conviction and 
sentence. The complainant also appealed and sought enhancement of the 
punishment imposed on the accused. 
K. G. Balakrishnan and B. N. Srikrishna, JJ gave short shift to the 
contention of the accused that the complaint was filed after three months from 
the date of the alleged incident. In the view of K. G. Balakrishnan, J the delay 
in filing the complaint before the Magistrate was by itself not sufficient to 
reject the complaint of the prosecutrix. The Judge took note in this regard that 
the prosecutrix recounted the entire incident immediately to the Chief 
Secretary and other officers and raised objections and also sought for stringent 
action against the accused. When she failed in all these attempts, she and her 
husband filed the criminal complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate.^^ 
The Supreme Court also rejected the contention of the accused that no 
such incident happened and this was a part of a conspiracy to malign him as he 
had taken many serious actions to control the activities of the militants. 
Dismissing the appeal filed by the accused, K. G. Balakrishnan, J said. 
There is nothing to suggest that the prosecutrix acted in connivance with 
some others and that she hatched a conspiracy to malign the accused. If the 
whole incident is viewed in correct perspective, it is clear that the behaviour of 
the accused on the date of the incident was not consistent with the high standard 
expected of a top-ranking police officer. The finding of the various courts is to 
the effect that the accused gently slapped on the posterior of the prosecutrix in 
25. Ibid, para \i. 
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the presence of some guests. This act on the part of the accused would certainly 
constitute the ingredient of Section 354 IPC. It is proved that the accused used 
criminal force with intent to outrage the modesty of the complainant and that 
he knew fully well that gently slapping on the posterior of the prosecutrix in the 
presence of other guests would embarrass her. Knowledge can be attributed to 
the accused that he was fully aware that touching the body of the prosecutrix at 
that place and time would amount to outraging her modesty. Had it been 
without any culpable intention on the part of the accused, nobody would 
have taken notice of the incident. The prosecutrix made such a hue and cry 
immediately after the incident and the reaction of the prosecutrix is very much 
relevant to take note of the whole incident. The accused being a police officer 
of the highest rank should have been exceedingly careful and failure to do so and 
by touching the body of the complainant with culpable intention he committed 
the offence punishable under Sections 354 and 509 IPC. In view of the findings 
of fact recorded by the two courts and affirmed by the High Court in revision, 
the order of the High Court cannot be set aside on the mere assertion by the 
accused that the whole incident was falsely foisted on him with ulterior 
motives. 
In her appeal the complainant contended that crimes against women 
were on the rise and the courts should have dealt with the matter severely and 
the accused should not have been released on probation. Noting that the incident 
happened in 1988 and the accused had completed the period of probation; and 
there was no occasion for any complaint or violation of any of the terms of the 
bond; the Supreme Court concluded that it would be unjust and improper to 
impose any other punishment. The Supreme Court, therefore, dismissed the 
complainant's appeal as well. 
In the decision it was held that the act will amount to outraging her 
modesty and being a police officer of highest rank he had to be more 
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conscious about his behaviour and the Supreme Court also rejected the 
contention of the accrued that this was to malign him. 
APPAREL EXPORT PROMOTION COUNCIL V. A K CHOPRA^\ 
In this case the Supreme Court case set aside the Judgment of the High 
Court and held that the accused acted in a unhealthy manner creating hostile 
environment as high Court over looked the ground realities and against moral 
sanctions. 
Sexual harassment is not confined to unwelcome physical conduct on the 
part of the perpetrator. Therefore, physical contact of the perpetrator with the 
victim is not an essential ingredient of'sexual harassment'. This was made 
clear by a Division Bench of the Indian Supreme Court. In this case the 
perpetrator worked as a Private Secretary to the Chairman of the Apparel Export 
Promotion Council, the appellant. The victim, a lady, was employed with the 
appellant as a clerk- cum-typist. She was not competent or trained to take 
dictation. The perpetrator, however, insisted that she go with him to the business 
centre of a hotel for taking dictation from the Chairman and type out the matter. 
Under the perpetrator's pressure she went to take dictation from the 
Chairman. While the victim was waiting for the Director, the perpetrator tried to 
sit too close to her and despite her objection, did not give up his 
objectionable behaviour. The victim later on took dictation from the 
Director. The perpetrator told her to type it at the Business Centre of the Hotel, 
which was located in the basement of the Hotel. He offered to help her so 
that the Director did not find fauh with her typing. He volunteered to show her 
the Business Centre for getting the matter typed and, taking advantage of the 
isolated place, again tried to sit close to her and touch her despite her 
objection. After the Director corrected the draft-typed matter and asked the 
victim to retype it, the perpetrator again went with her to the Business Centre 
26.(1999)1 s e c 759. 
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and repeated his overtures. The victim told the perpetrator that she would 
leave the place if he continued to behave like that. However, the perpetrator did 
not stop. Though he went out from the Business Centre for a while, he again 
came back and resumed his objectionable acts. 
The above definition of 'sexual harassment' as provided by the 
Indian 'Supreme Court, thus, recognizes both forms of sexual harassment, viz., 
quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environment sexual harassment. An 
analysis of the above definition, said Dr A.S. Anand, CJ shows that sexual 
harassment is a form of sex discrimination projected through unwelcome 
sexual advances, request for sexual favours and other verbal or physical 
conduct with sexual overtones, whether directive or by implication, 
particularly when submission to or rejection of such a conduct by the female 
employee was capable of being used for affecting the employment of the 
female employee and unreasonably interfering with her work performance and 
had the effect of creating an intimidating or hostile working environment for 
her.2« 
The appellant Council dismissed the perpetrator for causing 'sexual 
harassment' to the victim. In the departmental enquiry that preceded the 
perpetrator's dismissal, the enquiry officer concluded that the perpetrator had 
'molested' the victim and tried to touch her person with ulterior motives despite 
reprimands by her. 
A Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, on the reasoning that the 
perpetrator had only tried to molest the victim, but did not in fact molest her, 
allowed the perpetrator's writ petition against his dismissal. 
On appeal, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court upheld the Single 
Judge's order. The Division Bench even reasoned that the perpetrator had "not 
27. Id., para 4. 
28. Ibid., para 26. 
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managed to make the slightest physical contact with the lady" and thus had 
not "actually" molested her. In fact, based on the evidence, the Division Bench 
even expressed its inability to agree that the perpetrator had even attempted to 
molest the victim as there had been no physical contact. 
Setting aside the High Court's judgment, a Division Bench of the 
Supreme Court said that the perpetrator acted in a manner which 
demonstrated unwelcome sexual advances, both directly and by implication, 
and his actions "created an intimidating and hostile working environment" for 
the victim. 
Dr A.S. Anand, CJ, said for the Supreme Court that the victim had 
used the expression "molestation" in her complaint in a general sense, which 
she had duly explained and elaborated in her evidence in the enquiry. 
Assuming for the sake of argument", said the Judge, "that the perpetrator did 
not manage to establish any 'physical contact' with the victim", even though 
one witness had deposed having seen the perpetrator put his hand on the hand 
of the victim, it did not mean that the perpetrator had not made any 
objectionable overtures with sexual overtones". The Supreme Court held the 
dictionary meaning of the word "molestation" or "physical assault" as 
irrelevant. The Court said, 'The entire episode reveals that the perpetrator 
had harassed, pestered and subjected the victim by a conduct which was 
against moral sanctions and which did not withstand the test of decency and 
modesty and which projected unwelcome sexual advances." The Court held 
that the material on the record clearly established an unwelcome sexually-
determined behaviour" on the part of the perpetrator against the victim, which 
was also an attempt to outrage her modesty. Such an action on the part of the 
perpetrator was squarely covered" by the term 'sexual harassment'. The 
Supreme Court said, "Any action or gesture, whether directly or by 
implication, sic aims at or has the tendency to outrage the modesty of a female 
employee, must fall under the general concept of the definition of sexual 
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harassment. The evidence on the record clearly established that the 
perpetrator caused sexual harassment to the victim, taking advantage of his 
superior position in the Council. Glossing Cover the observations of the High 
Court to the effect that the perpetrator did not "actually molest" the victim but 
only "tried to molest" her and, therefore, his removal from service was not 
warranted, the Supreme Court said,^ ^ 
The High Court's observations rebel against realism and lose their 
sanctity and credibility. In the instant case, the behaviour of the perpetrator 
did not cease to be outrageous for want of an actual assault or touch by the 
superior officer. The High Court overlooked the ground realities and ignored 
the fact that the conduct of the perpetrator against the junior female employee 
... was wholly against moral sanctions, decency and was offensive to her 
modesty. The act of the perpetrator was unbecoming of good conduct and 
behaviour expected from a superior officer and undoubtedly amounted to 
sexual harassment of the victim. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The international covenant on Economic, Social and cultural rights 
contain several provisions particularly important for women. Article 7 
recognize her right to fair conditions of work and reflect that women shall not 
be subjected to sexual harassment at the place of work with may vitiate the 
working environment. 
Supreme Court has taken the view that in a case involving sexual 
harassment of a female employee by her male superior officer, resulting in 
an intimidating and hostile working environment for the victim, dismissal of 
the harasser from service would be the appropriate penalty. Castigating the 
High Court for quashing the harasser's dismissal on the purported ground 
that the harasser did not "actually molest" the victim but only tried to molest" 
29. Ibid, para 23. 
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her, the Supreme Court said, "The High Court's observations rebel against 
realism and lose their sanctity and credibility. In the instant case, the 
behaviour of the harasser did not cease to be outrageous for want of an actual 
assault or touch by the superior officer?° 
Dr. A.S. Anand, CJ for the Supreme Court said, Sympathy in such 
cases in favour of the superior officer is wholly misplaced and mercy has no 
relevance. The Court also said that reduction of punishment in such a case is 
bound to have a demoralising effect on the women employees and is a 
retrograde step. Holding that there was no justification for the High Court to 
interfere with the punishment of dismissal, the Supreme Court observed, 
The Act of the respondent was unbecoming of good conduct and behaviour 
expected from a superior officer and undoubtedly amounted to sexual 
harassment and the punishment imposed was thus commensurate with the 
gravity of his objectionable behaviour and did not warrant any interference by 
the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. 
Dr. A.S. Anand, CJ, held while the proceedings were nearing 
conclusion, the harasser's counsel submitted that the harasser was repentant of 
his actions and was tendering an unqualified apology. He also said that the 
harasser was also willing to go and apologise to the victim. "We are afraid," 
said the Court rejecting the purported apology, it is too late in the day to show 
any sympathy to the harasser in such a case. Any lenient action in such a case 
is bound to have a demoralising effect on working women. Sympathy in such 
cases is uncalled for and mercy is misplaced." 
The Bench reiterated that fundamental rights guaranteed by our 
Constitution encompass all facets of gender equality and, hence, include 
protection from sexual harassment and abuse. The Bench also held that the 
30. Ibid, para 27. 
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courts are "under a constitutional obligation to protect and preserve those 
fundamental rights." 
An ILO publication recommends that while drafting legislation to provide 
explicit legal protection against sexual harassment, these elements should be 
addressed Development and adoption of a nationally accepted explicit definition 
of sexual harassment; Delineate clearly the liability of the employer and the 
alleged harasser; provide affirmative duties to act towards the prevention of 
sexual harassment; ensure fair, clear and suitable procedures of due process for 
both accused and claimant covering filing and hearing of complaints, 
investigations, evidence, burden of proof, protection of confidentiality and 
privacy, protect against victimization; provide for a wide range of damages, 
remedies and sanctions that both punish and deter harassing conduct, supplement 
legislation with guidelines; and establish an administrative body or mechanism 
with resources and competence to handle complaints and promote application of 
thelaw.^' 
Dr A.S. Anand, CJ said for a Division Bench of the Supreme Court, 
there is no gainsaying that each incident of sexual harassment at the place of 
work, results in violation of the fundamental right to gender equality and the 
Right to life and liberty the two most precious fundamental rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution of India. He noted that as early as in 1993, at the ILO 
Seminar held at Manila, it was recognized that sexual harassment of women 
at the workplace was a form of "gender discrimination against women". The 
judge further said," the contents of the fundamental rights guaranteed in 
our Constitution are of sufficient amplitude to encompass all facets of 
gender equality, including prevention of sexual harassment and abuse and the 
courts are under a constitutional obligation to protect and preserve those 
fundamental rights, That sexual harassment of a female at the place of work is 
incompatible with the dignity and honour of a female and needs to be 
31./6/rf, para27. 
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eliminated and that there can be no compromise with such violations, admits 
of no debate. 
Supreme Court held each incident of sexual harassment amounts to 
violations of fundamental rights of equality and right to life with human 
dignity. 
AVINASH NAGRA V. NAVODAYA VIDYALAYA SAMITI AND 
OTHERS/^ 
In this case, the alleged harasser worked as a postgraduate teacher in the 
respondent-institution, which was a co-educational institution. His service was 
terminated in terms of his appointment letter giving salary in lieu of notice on 
the ground of his improper conduct with a girl student. The High Court having 
dismissed his writ petition, the alleged harasser appellant approached the 
Supreme Court and contended that an enquiry ought to be held into the alleged 
misconduct. The Supreme Court directed the management to issue show-cause 
notice to the appellant, conduct an enquiry and submit the report within a 
specified time. In compliance with the Court's directions, the management 
issued a show-cause notice to the appellant and also supplied to him the 
statements of the girl victim, her room mates and one other witness, B. After 
receipt of the appellant's explanation and consideration of the entire record, the 
management drew up a report and submitted the same to the Supreme Court 
with the finding that the appellant was guilty of moral turpitude involving 
exhibition of immoral sexual behaviour towards the girl student.^ ** 
The appellant contended before the Supreme Court that the charges 
leveled against him impinged upon his character, conduct and career. Therefore, 
he should have been given an opportunity to cross-examine the girl student 
(victim) and her colleagues who had given their statements, and also to 
32. /bid, para 27. 
33. (1997) 2 s e c 534. 
34. Ibid, para 6. 
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examine himself. He, therefore, contended that the procedure adopted was in 
viotatrofl^of the settled legal principles including the principle of audi alteram 
partem, tie urged that the matter required remittance to the disciplinary 
authority for conducting a de novo enquiry in which he should be given 
importunity to establish his innocence. 
Point of issue before the Supreme Court important question, therefore, that 
arose for the consideration of the. Whether the dismissal of the appellant in 
terms of his letter of appointment was vitiated by any error of law and whether 
he was entitled to a full-fledged enquiry and opportunity to cross-examine the 
girl students who had given the statements against the appellant. 
The provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 of the Government of India 
were applicable to the employees of Navodaya Vidyalaya. The respondent was 
running nation-wide co-educational specialized and prestigious schools in 
which 1/3'"'' of the students were girls. In order to ensure safety and security of 
girl students, to protect their modesty and prevent their unnecessary exposure at 
an enquiry in relation to the conduct of a teacher resulting in sexual harassment 
of the girl students, etc. involving misconduct or moral turpitude, a resolution 
prescribing special summary procedure was proposed and published by a 
notification, after due approval of the Executive of the respondent-Samiti. The 
Minister of Human Resources and Development, Government of India was 
its Chairman. The notification enabled dispensing with regular enquiry under 
the Rules.^ ^ In the case of a temporary employee whose integrity and conduct 
was doubtful but difficult to prove with sufficient documentary evidence to 
establish the charge and whose retention in service was prejudicial to the 
interest of the institution or whose grave misconduct and the enquiry under the 
Rules was likely to result in embarrassment to the class of employees or 
endanger the reputation of the institution, the appointing authority, for reasons to 
be recorded, was conferred power to terminate the employee's services in terms 
35. [bid, para 6. 
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of the letter of appointment. Though the order of termination need not contain 
any reasons, but the appointing authority had to obtain prior approval of the 
Deputy Director. Similarly, when the Director was satisfied, after summary 
enquiry, that there was a prima facie guilt of moral turpitude involving sexual 
harassment or exhibition of immoral behaviour towards any girl student, under 
the above notification, the Director could terminate the services of that employee 
by giving one month's or three months' pay and allowances in lieu thereof, 
depending upon whether the guilty employee was temporary or permanent. In 
such cases, procedure prescribed for holding enquiry for imposing major penalty 
under the Rules could be dispensed with provided that the Director was of the 
opinion that it was not expedient to hold regular enquiry on account of serious 
embarrassment to the student or his guardians or such other practical difficulties. 
The Director was obliged to record in writing the reasons due to which it was 
not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry and also to keep the Chairman of 
the Samiti informed of the circumstances leading to such termination of services. 
Thus, in a given situation, instead of adopting the regular procedure under the 
Rules to terminate the services of an employee, the notification prescribed the 
procedure to dispense with such enquiry, subject to the conditions mentioned 
above. 
The Supreme Court took note of, inter alia, the need for the education 
and the place of the teacher in that behalf 
The Supreme Court observed that the society has given a very high 
pedestal to a teacher. Therefore, the conduct, character, ability and 
disposition of a teacher should be to transform the student into a disciplined 
citizen. The quality, competence and character of the teacher are most 
significant to mould the caliber, character and capacity of the student for 
successful working of democratic institutions and to sustain them in their later 
years of life as a responsible citizen in different responsibilities. Without a 
dedicated and disciplined teacher, even the best education system is bound to 
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fail. It is, therefore, the duty of the teacher to take such care of the pupils as a 
careful parent would take of its children.''^ 
The Supreme Court also noted that the percentage of education among 
girls, even after independence, is fathom deep due to indifference on the part of 
all in rural India except some educated people. Education to the girl children 
is nation's asset and foundation for fertile human resources and disciplined 
family management, apart from their equal participation in socio-economic 
and political democracy. It is only in the recent past that some middle-class 
people have been sending the girl children to co-educational institutions under 
the care of proper management and to look after the welfare and safety of 
the girls. 
Bench emphasized on greater responsibility is thrust on the management 
of the schools and colleges to protect the young children, in particular, the 
growing up girls, to bring them up in disciplined and dedicated pursuit of 
excellence. The teacher, who has been kept in charge, bears more added higher 
responsibility and should be more exemplary. His/her character and conduct 
should be more like Rishi and as loco parentis and such is the duty, 
responsibility and charge expected of a teacher. 
Testing the conduct of the appellant on the anvil of the lofty ideals 
stated above, the Court posed the question, whether the conduct of the 
appellant is befitting with such higher responsibilities and as he by his conduct 
betrayed the trust and forfeited the faith whether he would be entitled to the 
full-fledged enquiry as demanded by him. Referring to the relevant Rules, 
the Court observed that they had been "wisely devised" to give the power to 
the Director, the highest authority in the management of the institution to take 
decision, based on the fact-situation, whether a summary enquiry was 
necessary or he could dispense with the services of the appellant by giving 
36. Ibid, para 12. 
37. Ibid, para 8. 
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pay in lieu of notice. Two safeguards had been provided, namely, he should 
record reasons for his decision not to conduct an enquiry under the rules 
and also post with facts the information with Minister, Human Resources 
Department, Government of India in that behalf. 
Adverting to the material on record, the Court found that the appellant 
was given a warning for his sexual advances towards a girl student but he did 
not correct himself and mend his conduct. He went to the girls hostel at 10 
p.m. in the night and asked the hostel helper to misguide the girl by telling 
her that "Bio-Chemistry Madam" was calling her. Believing the statement, the 
girl came out of the hostel. On admitted position, she was an active participant 
in cultural activities. Taking advantage thereof, the appellant misused his 
position and made sexual advances towards her. When she ran away from his 
presence, he pursued her to the room where she locked herself inside. He 
then banged the door. When her roommates informed him that she was asleep, 
he rebuked them and took the torch from the room and went away. The 
appellant admitted his going there. He also admitted his meeting with the 
girl. However, he gave a false explanation, which was not found acceptable to 
the Enquiry Officer. After conducting the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer 
submitted the report to the Director who having examined the report found the 
appellant not worthy to be a teacher in the institution. Under these 
circumstances, the short question that had to be answered was, "Whether the 
girl and her roommates should be exposed to the cross-examination and 
harassment and further publicity. Answering the question in the negative, the 
Supreme Court observed: 
"In our considered view, the Director has correctly taken the decision not 
to conduct any enquiry exposing the students and modesty of the girl and to 
terminate the services of the appellant by giving one month's salary and 
allowances in lieu of notice as he is a temporary employee under probation." 
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The Supreme Court ultimately held it is very hazardous to expose the 
young girls to tardy process of cross-examination.^* Their statements were 
supplied to the appellant and he was given an opportunity to controvert the 
correctness thereof. In view of his admission that he went to the room in the 
night, though he shifted the timings from 10 p.m. to 8 p.m. which was not 
found acceptable to the respondents and that he took the torch from the room, 
do indicate that he went to the room. The misguiding statement sent through 
the hostel peon was corroborated by the statements of the students; but for the 
misstatement, obviously the girl would not have gone out from the room. 
Under those circumstances, the conduct of the appellant is unbecoming of 
a teacher much less a loco parents and, therefore, dispensing with regular 
enquiry under the rules and denial of cross examination are legal and not 
vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice.^^ 
VISHAKA V. STATE OFRAJASTHANAND OTHERS.^^ 
In India the term sexual harassment was first defined in a formal 
legal sense in the year 1997 by the Supreme Court in the above case. 
A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court categorically held that each 
incident of sexual harassment or sexual assault at work results in violation of the 
fundamental rights of Gender equality and the Right to life and liberty, J.S. 
Verma, CJ further held for the Bench, It is a clear violation of the rights under 
Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. One of the logical consequences of 
such an incident is also the violation of the victim's fundamental right under 
Article 1990(l)(g) 'to practice any profession or to carry out any occupation, 
trade or business'. Such violations, therefore, attract the remedy under Article 
32 for the enforcement of these fundamental rights of women." The Court 
reminded that the fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade or 
38. /bid, para 12. 
39. Ibid, para 12. 
40. (1997)6 sec 241. 
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profession depends on the availability of a "safe" working environment. 
Moreover, right to life means life with dignity. 
Apart from Articles 32 and 14, 19(1 )(g) and 21 of the Constitution of 
India, the Supreme Court also found the provisions of Articles 15, 42, 51-A, 51 
and 253 relevant as they also envisage judicial intervention for eradication of 
this social evil. The Court also held, "In the absence of domestic law occupying 
the field, to formulate effective measures to check the evil of sexual 
harassment of working women at all workplaces, the contents of 
international conventions and norms are significant for the purpose of 
interpretation of the guarantee of gender equality, right to work with human 
dignity in Articles 14, 15, 19 (1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution and the 
safeguards against sexual harassment implicit therein. Any international 
convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with 
its spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and 
content thereof, to promote the object of the constitutional guarantee."'*' 
Thus, the power of this Court, said J S. Verma, CJ under Article 32 
for enforcement of the fundamental rights and the executive power of the Union 
have to meet the challenge to protect the working women from sexual 
harassment and to make their fundamental rights meaningful. Governance of the 
society by the rule of law mandates this requirement as a logical concomitant of 
the constitutional scheme. He further categorically declared. The meaning and 
content of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India are of 
sufficient amplitude to encompass all the facets of gender equality including 
prevention of sexual harassment or abuse. 
India 
In India, in the absence of any statutory definition of the term sexual 
harassment, it was left to the Supreme Court to do the needful. Relying on 
41. Ibid, para 5 
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international conventions and norms, particularly General Recommendation of 19 
January 1992 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) constituted by the United Nations, the Supreme Court 
defined the term sexual harassment for the first time in the year 1997. The 
definition is almost in para materia with; the one proposed by the CEDAW, 
United Nations and reads: 
Sexual includes such unwelcome sexually-determined behaviour 
whether directly or by implication as: (a) physical contact and advances; (b) a 
demand or request for sexual favours; (c) sexually-coloured remarks; (d) 
showing pornography; (e) any other unwelcome physical, ,verbal or non-verbal 
conduct of sexual nature. 
Where any of these acts is committed in circumstances where under the ' 
victim of such conduct has a reasonable apprehension that in relation to the 
victim's employment' of work whether she is drawing salary, or honorarium or 
voluntary, whether in government, public or private enterprise such conduct 
can be humiliating and may constitute a health and safety problem. It is 
discriminatory for instance when the woman has reasonable grounds to believe 
that her objection would disadvantage her in connection with her employment 
or work including recruiting or promotion or when it creates a hostile work 
environment. Adverse consequences might be visited if the victim does not 
consent to the conduct in question or raises any objection thereto. 
'Sexual' Embraces a wide Range of Conduct' 
The second element of the definition requires the conduct to be 'sexual' in 
nature. Courts, including Human Rights Tribunals, worldwide have recognized a 
broad scope of conduct that may fall under the definition of sexual 
harassment, depending on the circumstances. Such conduct may be physical, 
verbal or non-verbal. The ILO has identified the following "most common forms 
of sexual harassment" at the workplace: 
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(a) "Physical harassment kissing, patting, pinching or touching in a sexual 
manner. 
(ti) Verbal Harassment unwelcome comments about a person's sex or private 
life, jokes and insinuations, sexually explicit conversation, suggestive 
comments about a person's appearance or body. 
(c) Gestural harassment sexually suggestive gestures, such as nods, winks, 
gestures with the hands, fingers, legs or arms. 
(d) Written or graphic harassment sending pornographic pictures through e-mail, 
putting up pin-ups or addressing unwanted love letters to an employee. 
(e) Emotional harassment behaviour which isolates, is discriminatory 
towards or excludes a person on the grounds of his or her sex. 
Gender equality said J.S. Verma, Includes protection from sexual 
harassment and right to work with dignity, which is a universally 
recognized basic human right. The common minimum requirement of this 
right has received global acceptance. 
In the words of Dr. A.S. Anand, CJ, said there is no gainsaying that 
each incident of sexual harassment at the place of work, results in violation 
of the fundamental right to gender equality and the right to life and liberty 
the two most precious fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of 
India. That principle finds fuller expression in relation to women in the 
Convention on the Elhjiination of All forms of Discrimination against 
women. India reified the Convention on 25-6-1993 with some reservations, 
which are however, not relevant in the present context. 
SUPREME COURT RELIED ON, 'Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination against Women.' 
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Some provisions in the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women of significance in the present context are: 
Article 11 
1. States parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, 
on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular. 
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings. 
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working 
conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction. 
Article 24 
States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the national 
level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights recognised in the 
present Convention. 
The general recommendations of CEDAW in this context in respect 
of Article 11 are, violence and equality in employment. 
Article 22, Equality in employment can be seriously impaired when 
women are subjected to gender-specific violence, such as sexual harassment 
in the workplace.'*^ 
Article23. Sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually-
determined behaviour as physical contacts and advances, sexually-coloured 
remarks, showing pornography and sexual demands, whether by words or 
actions. Such conduct can be humiliating and may constitute a health and 
safety problem; it is discriminatory when the woman has reasonable grounds 
42. Ibid., para 12. 
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to believe that her objection would disadvantage her in connection with her 
employmerit, including recruiting or promotion, or when it creates a hostile 
working environment. Effective complaints, procedures and remedies, 
including compensation, should be provided. 
24. States should include in their reports information about sexual 
harassment, and on measures lo protect women from sexual harassment and 
other forms of violence or coercion in the workplace.'*^ 
Supreme Court referred to the incidents of sexual assault on working 
women, each such incident results in violation of the fundamental rights of 
'Gender Equality' and the 'Right to Life and Liberty'. It is a clear violation of 
the rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. One of the logical 
consequences of such an incident is also the violation of the victim's 
fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g) to practice any profession or to carry 
out any occupation, trade or business'. The fundamental right to carry on any 
occupation, trade or profession depends on the availability of a 'safe' working 
environment. Right to life means life with dignity. 
Article 42 of the Constitution of India provides Provision for just and 
humane conditions of work and maternity relief. The State shall make 
provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity 
relief 
Article 51-A of the Constitution may also be referred to it.It provides 
Fundamental Duties.It shall be the duty of every citizen of India.'*'' 
(a) To abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions. 
43. Ibid., para 13. 
AA. Ibid, para 5. 
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(e) To promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all 
the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional 
diversities to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women. 
The definition of sexual harassment provided by the Indian Supreme 
Court in employs the test of reasonableness: 
"Sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually-determined 
behaviour (whether directly or by implication) as (a) physical contact and 
advances, (b) a demand or request for sexual favours, (c) sexually-coloured 
remarks,(d) showing pornography, (e) any other unwelcome physical, verbal 
or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature. 
Where any of these acts is committed in circumstances where under the 
victim of such conduct has a reasonable apprehension that in relation to the 
victim's employment or work whether she is drawing salary, or honorarium or 
voluntary, whether in government, public or private enterprise such conduct 
can be humiliating and may constitute a health and safety problem, It is 
discriminatory for instance when the woman has reasonable grounds to believe 
that her objection would disadvantage her in connection with her employment 
or work including recruiting or promotion or when it creates a hostile work 
environment. Adverse consequences might be visited if the victim does not 
consent to the conduct in question or raises any objection thereto. 
While the legislature and the executive have the primary 
responsibility to ensure a safe working environment through suitable 
legislation and the creation of a mechanism for its enforcement 
employers, employees and trade unions should also take necessary steps 
to combat sexual harassment at work. The Supreme Court of India has 
laid down certain guidelines in this regard. 
45. Ibid., para 13. 
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Sexual harassment continues to be a major obstacle to equality of 
opportunity and treatment for women. Therefore, employers are under 
increased pressure to tackle this problem. With the increasing awareness and 
emphasis on gender justice, there is increase in the effort to guard against 
violations of the fundamental rights of working women. Resentment towards 
incidents of sexual harassment is also increasing. 
Underlining the need for employers to take all necessary steps to combat 
the menace of sexual harassment at work. 
J.S. Verma, CJ said. "It shall be the duty of the employer or other 
responsible persons in workplaces or other institutions to prevent or deter the 
commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the 
resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment by taking all 
steps required."^^ 
The present civil and penal laws in India do not adequately provide for 
specific protection of women from sexual harassment in workplaces. 
Apprehending, and rightly so, that enactment of such legislation would take 
considerable time, the Supreme Court in Vishaka case thought it necessary and 
expedient to lay down certain guidelines for observance by employers and other 
responsible persons in workplaces or other institutions so as to ensure the 
prevention of sexual harassment of women and to protect their fundamental 
rights. The Court issued these guidelines in exercise of the power available 
under Article 32 of the Constitution, so as to provide for the effective 
enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and guarantee against 
sexual harassment and abuse, more particularly against sexual harassment at 
workplaces. Declaring that these guidelines and norms shall be duly 
observed at all workplaces or other institutions until legislation is enacted for the 
purpose, the Apex Court made it absolutely clear, this would be treated as the 
46. Ibid., para 16. 
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law declared by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. The Court also 
clarified that these guidelines would not prejudice any rights available under 
the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.'*'' 
J.S. Verma, CJ, for the Supreme Court whether in the pubic or private 
sector should take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment. The Apex 
Court prescribed the following preventive steps for the employers without 
prejudice to the generality of this obligation. 
(a) Express prohibition of sexual harassment as defined in this decision 
at the workplace should be notified, published and circulated in 
appropriate ways. 
(b) The rules and regulations of government and public sector bodies relating 
to conduct and discipline should include rules and regulations prohibiting 
sexual harassment and provide for appropriate penalties in such rules 
against the offender. 
(c) As regards private employers steps should be taken to include the 
aforesaid prohibitions in the standing orders under the Industrial 
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, 
(d) Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of work, 
leisure, health and hygiene to further ensure that there is no hostile 
environment towards women at workplaces and no woman employee 
should have reasonable grounds to believe that she is disadvantaged in 
connection with her employment. 
Communication Must-
Merely having a policy on sexual harassment is not sufficient. The 
employer should take necessary steps to circulate and disseminate the policy as 
well amongst all employees. Unless the policy is effectively disseminated, the 
47. Ibid, para 16 guideline no. 12. 
48. Ibid., para 16 preventive step (d). 
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employees would not even know of its existence. Communication and 
circulation of the policy would serve to spread awareness of the types of 
conduct that may fall within the mischief of sexual harassment. It would also 
make the employees aware of their rights and duties in case of commission of 
sexual harassment. Unless the policy is properly disseminated, victims of 
sexually harassing conduct would not even know whom and how to complain 
and have their grievances redressed. Nor would perpetrators or potential 
perpetrators of such conduct realize or appreciate the in appropriateness of their 
conduct, or its consequences, both for them as well as for the victims. Courts, 
adjudicators, arbitrators, academic and legal commentators and international and 
other bodies worldwide have, therefore, laid great stress on the requirement of 
effective dissemination of the sexual harassment policy. Supreme Court also 
underscored this requirement when it said Express prohibition of sexual 
harassment at the workplace should be notified, published and circulated in 
appropriate ways.The Court also said, "Awareness of the rights of female 
employees in this regard should be created in particular by prominently 
notifying the guidelines and appropriate legislation when enacted on the 
subject in a suitable manner.""*^ 
Disciplinary Offence 
The Supreme Court directed that all employers, whether in the private or 
government or public sector, should clearly provide in their conduct and 
discipline rules or standing orders where the Standing Orders Act is 
applicable, that commission of an act constituting sexual harassment would be 
treated as a disciplinary offence. The disciplinary rules should expressly 
prohibit commission of such acts and also provide for appropriate penalties 
for the offenders. The European Communities Commission has also 
recommended in its "Code of practice on measures to combat sexual 
harassment". 
49. Ibid., para 16 guideline no. 9. 
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Supreme Court has also directed, "Appropriate work conditions 
should be provided in respect of work, leisure, health and hygiene to further 
ensure that there is no hostile environment towards women at workplaces 
and no woman employee should have reasonable grounds to believe that she 
is disadvantaged in connection with her employment." 
Training 
Well conceived and implemented training strategies at the 
establishment level would go a long way to making the employees more 
gender sensitive, besides making then aware of what is inappropriate 
behaviour at work. Such training would definitely help create [a] awareness 
of the rights of female employees, as envisaged by the guidelines laid down 
by the Supreme Court. 
Guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court of India 
Guidelines 6 and 7 lay down by the Supreme Court deal with the 
employers' obligations to establish an effective complaint-mechanism for 
dealing with complaints of sexual harassment. These are reproduced below: 
Complain mechanism^"— An appropriate complaint mechanism should 
be created in the employer's organization for redress of the complaint made 
by the victim. Such complaint mechanism should ensure time-bound treatment 
of complaints. 
Complaints Committee^' — The complaint mechanism, referred to in 
(6) above, should be adequate to provide, where necessary, a Complaints 
Committee, a special counselor or other support service, including the 
maintenance of confidentiality. 
50. Ibid., para 16 guideline no. 6. 
51. Ibid., para 16 guideline no. 7 
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The Complaints Committee should be headed by a woman and not less 
than half of its members should be women. Further, to prevent the 
possibility of any undue pressure or influence from senior levels, such 
Complaints Committee should involve a third party, either NGO or other body 
who is familiar with the issue of sexual harassment. The Complaints Committee 
must make an annual report to the Government Department concerned of the 
complaints and action taken by them. The employer and person-in -charge will 
also report on the compliance with the aforesaid guidelines including on the 
reports of the Complaints Committee to the Government Department.^ 
The Supreme Court has said that the complaint committee should be 
headed by a woman and not less than half of its members should be woman. 
The Court has also recommended preventing the possibility of any under 
pressure or influencing from senior level, such. Complaints committee should 
involve. A third party, either NGO or other body who is familiar with the issue 
of sexual harassment. 
The Supreme Court has not laid down any embargo against the 
participation of any insider that is to say an employee of the employer, in the 
complaint committee. 
Transfer of one Party 
The Supreme Court has said. "The victims of sexual harassment should 
have the option to seek transfer of the perpetrator or their own transfer. " 
Unilaterally transferring the victim may send a wrong message to the staff 
members that the employer has adjudged the victim to be at fault and is, 
therefore, punishing or victimizing the victim. This would discourage other 
victims from reporting acts of sexual harassment and, thus, defeat the entire 
purpose of having a policy on combating sexual harassment. 
52. Ibid, para 16 guideline no. 7 
53. Ibid, para 16 guideline no. 4. 
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Protection form Victimization or Retaliation 
Supreme Court has also made it clear, the employer should 
particularly ensure that victims, or witnesses are not victimized or 
discriminated against while dealing with complaints of sexual harassment. 
If the harasser victimizes or retaliates against the victim or victim's witnesses 
or POTC, the employer should initiate appropriate disciplinary action against 
the harasser. The employer's written policy on sexual harassment should 
unambiguously declare that any act of the harasser in victimizing or retaliating 
against the victim, etc. shall be dealt with very seriously by the employer and 
such acts would constitute a gross misconduct and, as such, entail 
appropriate disciplinary action 
Criminal Proceedings 
The Supreme Court also obligated the employers to initiate appropriate 
action in accordance with law by making a complaint with the appropriate 
authority if the harasser's conduct amounts to a specific offence under the 
Indian Penal Code or under any other law. 
The guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court obligate the employers 
to take appropriate preventive and remedial action to prevent sexual harassment 
of their employees by non-employees. Guideline No. 10 says, "Where sexual 
harassment occurs as a result of an act or omission by any third party or 
outsider, the employer and person-in-charge will take all steps necessary and 
reasonable to assist the affected person in terms of support and preventive 
action." Therefore, a harasser's status as a non-employee would not give a valid 
ground of defence to the employer in a legal action initiated by an employee 
who was a victim of sexual harassment by a third party, if the employer failed to 
fake appropriate corrective action despite being aware of the harassment. 
54. Ibid, 
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Employer-policies on sexual harassment should assure employees that 
should any employee face sexually harassing behaviour at work from a third 
party, such as a client or customer of the employer, the employer would take 
appropriate corrective or remedial action. The policy should emphasise the need 
on the part of the employees to promptly report such harassment to the employer 
or the designated officers so as to enable the employer to take appropriate 
action. Unless the recipient reports the harassment to the employer, the latter 
should not be held responsible or liable in this regard unless, of course the 
employer knew or ought to have known about such harassment and still failed to 
take appropriate corrective action. Employers should also notify the patrons, 
customers, independent contractors and others that employers shall not tolerate 
sexual harassment of employees by such third parties. According to a report by 
ILO, many employers extend the coverage of their workplace policies by 
permitting third parties to make a complaint against harassment perpetrated by 
the employer's workers. 
The Court has further obligated the employers and person incharge to 
report on the compliance with the (Supreme Courts) guidelines including on the 
reports of the complaints committee to periodically review evaluate their police 
on combating sexual harassment. 
Role of Employees, Trade Unions and Collective Braining 
Both trade unions and the individual employees have a definite role to play 
in ensuring that the employment remains free form gender discrimination in 
general and sexual harassment in particular. Specifically noting this, J.S. Verma, 
CJ said for the Supreme court of India, Employees should be allowed to raise 
issues of sexual harassment at workers meeting and in other appropriate forum 
and it should be affirmatively discussed in employer-employee meetings. 
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CHAIRMAN, RAILWAY BOARD AND OTHER, V. MRS. CHANDRIMA 
DAS AND OTHER'S.^^ 
The victim came from Bangladesh. She arrived at Howrah Railway 
Station to avail Jodhpur Express for paying a visit to Ajmer Sharif, She had a 
waitlisted ticket. Therefore, she approached a Train Ticket Examiner at the 
station for confirmation of berth against her ticket. The Train Ticket Examiner 
asked her to wait in the Ladies' Waiting Room. She accordingly came to the 
Ladies' Waiting Room and rested there. About 5 p.m., two persons later 
identified as one AS, a tout who posed as a very influential person of the 
Railways and SR, a railway ticket broker having good acquaintance with 
some of the railway staff of (Howrah Station) approached her, took her 
ticket and returned the same after confirming reservation. About 8:00 p.m. SR 
came again to her with a boy K and told her to accompany the boy to a 
restaurant if she wanted to have food for the night. Accordingly, about 9:00 
p.m. she went to a nearby eating-house with K and had her meal there. Soon 
after she had taken her meal, she vomited and came back to the Ladies' 
Waiting Room. About 11:00 p.m. AS along with RA, a Parcel Supervisor at 
Howrah Station came to the Ladies' Waiting Room. The victim appeared to 
have some doubt initially, but on being certified by the lady attendants 
engaged on duty at the Ladies' Waiting Room about their credentials she 
accompanied them to Yatri Niwas. S, a khalasi of Electric Department of 
Howrah Station, joined them on the way to Yatri Niwas. She was taken to a 
room on the first floor of Yatri Niwas. The room was booked in the name of 
AS against Railway Card Pass. In the room two other persons viz. one L, 
Parcel Clerk of Howrah Railway Station and A, Parcel Clearing Agent were 
waiting. The victim suspected something amiss when AS forced her into the 
room. AS bolted the room from outside and stood on guard outside the 
room. The remaining four persons took liquor inside the room and also 
forcibly compelled her to consume liquor. All the four persons who were 
55. (2000) 2 sec 465. 
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present inside the room brutally violated the victim. Somehow, at a 
subsequent point of time, she managed to escape from the room of Yatri 
Niwas and came back to the platform where again she met SR and found him 
talking to AS. Seeing her plight SR pretended to be her saviour and also abused 
and slapped AS. Since it was well past midnight and the Jodhpur Express had 
already departed, SR requested the victim to accompany him to his residence to 
rest for the night with his wife and children. He assured to help her to board 
another train on the following morning. Thereafter, SR, accompanied by his 
friend took her to a flat where both of them raped her and when she protested 
and resisted violently, they gagged her mouth and nostrils intending to kill 
her. As a result, she bled profusely. On being informed by the landlord of the 
building following the hue and cry raised by her. She was rescued by Jorabagan 
Police.^^ 
Mrs. Chandrima Das a practicing advocate of the Calcutta High 
Court, filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the 
Chairman, Railway Board and some other officers of the Eastern Railway, 
besides the State of West Bengal and Senior Police Officers and the Deputy 
High Commissioner, Republic of Bangladesh. She claimed compensation 
for the victim. The petitioner also sought a direction to the respondents to 
eradicate anti-social and criminal activities at Howrah Railway Station. The 
Calcutta High Court awarded a sum of Rs 10 lakhs as compensation for the 
victim as the High Court was of the opinion that the rape was committed at the 
building (Rail Yatri belonging to the Railways and was perpetrated by railway 
employees. 
The Supreme Court rejected the contention that proceedings under Article 
226 of the Constitution could not have been legally initiated for claiming 
damages from the Railways for the offence of rape committed on the victim or 
that the victim herself .should have approached the civil court for damages in 
56. Ibid., para 3. 
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the realm of Private Law so that all the questions of fact could have been 
considered on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties to record a 
finding whether all the ingredients of the commission of "tort" against the 
victim were made out. The Court also rejected the contention challenging the 
locus Standi of the petitioner to legally institute the proceedings, "Where public 
functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation of Fundamental 
Rights or the enforcement, of public duties," said S. Saghir Ahmed J, "the 
remedy would still be available under the Public law notwithstanding that a suit 
could be filed for damages under Private law. 
There has, thus been said S. Saghir Ahmed, J "a spectacular expansion 
of the concept of locus Standi. The concept is much wider and it takes in its 
stride anyone who is not a mere 'busybody'. Having regard to the nature of the 
petition filed by the respondent and the relief claimed therein, S. Saghir 
Ahmed, J concluded that the petition was filed in public interest, which could 
legally be filed by the respondent. 
Supreme Court relied on human rights jurisprudence based on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 has acquired recognition as the 
"Moral Code of Conduct", having been adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations.^ ^ Before adverting to domestic jurisprudence, it would 
therefore be pertinent to consider the principles and objects behind the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted and proclaimed by the 
United Nations General Assembly by its resolution dated 10 December 1948. 
The Preamble, inter alia, sets out as under:^ ^ 
"Whereas recognition of the INHERENT DIGNITY and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world. 
51. Ibid, para 1. 
58. Ibid, para 19. 
59. Ibid, para 20. 
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Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent 
of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and 
freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the 
common people. 
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations 
between nations. 
Whereas the people of the United Nations have in the Charter affirmed 
their faith in fiindamental human rights, IN THE DIGNITY AND WORTH OF 
THE HUMAN PERSON AND IN THE EQUAL RIGHTS OF MEN AND 
WOMEN and have determined to promote social progress and better standards 
of life in larger freedom. 
Whereas member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in 
cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fiindamental freedoms. 
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the 
greatest importance for the frill realization of this pledge." Thereafter, the 
Declaration provides, inter aliUh-^in various Articles,^^ of Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights are. 
Article 1, All human beings are bom free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards 
one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
Article2, Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, NATIONAL OR SOCIAL 
60. Ibid, 
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ORIGIN, PROPERTY, BIRTH OR OTHER STATUS Furthermore, NO 
DISTINCTION SHALL BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE POLITICAL, 
JURIS DICTI ONAL OR INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE COUNTRY 
OR TERRITORY to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, 
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 
Article 3, everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
Article 5, No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
Article 7, all are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal 
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against 
any incitement to such discrimination. 
Article 9, No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile."^' 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women 
The General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence against Women, by its resolution dated 20.12.1993. It provides in 
Article I that violence against women' means any act of gender-based 
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or, 
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, 
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in 
private life". Article 2 of the Declaration it was specified that violence against 
women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to.^ ^ 
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family 
61. Ibid, para 21. 
62. Ibid, para 22. 
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including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, 
dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other 
traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence 
related to exploitation; 
(b) physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general 
community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and 
intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking 
in women and forced prostitution; 
(c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned 
by the State, wherever it occurs. 
Article 3, of the Above Declaration Provides 
Women are entitled to the equal enjoyment and protection of all 
human rights, which would include, inter alia. 
(a) The right to life. 
(b) The right to equality and 
(c) The right to liberty and security of person.^ "' 
Constitution guarantees all the basic and fundamental human rights set 
out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, to its citizens and other 
persons. The chapter dealing with fundamental rights is contained in Part III of 
the Constitution.^'' Fundamental rights are available to all "citizens" of the 
country. However, a few of them are also available to "persons". While Article 
14, which guarantees equality before law or the equal protection of laws within 
the territory of India, is applicable to a "person" which would also include the 
"citizen" of the country and "non-citizen", both, Article 15 speaks only of 
"citizen" and it is specifically provided therein that there shall be no 
discrimination against any "citizen" on the ground only of religion, race, caste, 
63. Ibid, para 23. 
64. Ibid, para 28. 
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sex, place of birth or any of them, nor shall any citizen be subjected to any 
disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to access to shops, 
public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment, or the use of 
wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort on the 
aforesaid grounds. Fundamental right guaranteed under Article 15 is, 
therefore, restricted to "citizens". So also, Article 16 which guarantees 
equality of opportunity in matters of public employment is applicable only to 
"citizens". The fundamental rights contained in Article 19, which contains 
the right to "basic freedoms", namely, freedom of speech and expression; 
freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms; freedom to form 
associations or unions; freedom to move freely throughout the territory of 
India; freedom to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India and 
freedom to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or 
business, are available only to "citizens" of the country.^^ 
The rights under Articles 20, 21 and 22 are available not only to 
"citizens" but also to "persons", which would include "non-citizens". 
Article 20 guarantees right to protection in respect of conviction for offences. 
Article 21 guarantees right to life and personal liberty, while Article 22 
guarantees right to protection against arbitrary arrest and detention. "These 
are wholly in consonance with Article 3, Article 7 and Article 9 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948."^^ 
The word "LIFE" has been used prominently in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. The ftmdamental rights guaranteed by the 
Indian Constitution "are almost in consonance with the rights contained in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as also the Declaration and the 
Covenants of Civil and Political Rights and the Covenants of Economic, Social 
arid Cultural Rights, to which India is a party, having ratified them." Since 
65. Ibid, para 29. 
66. /bid, para 32. 
281 
Chapter-V 
"LIFE" is recognized as a basic human right, both in the Indian Constitution 
and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
Supreme Court has assigned the word as used in the Declaration the 
same meaning and interpretation as placed on that word by the Court in its 
various decisions relating to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.^^ 
As seen above, right to LIFE in terms of the language used in Article 
21 is available not only to every citizen of this country, but also to a 
"person" who may not be a citizen of the country. On this principle, even 
those who are not citizens of this country and come here merely as tourists or 
in any other capacity would be entitled to the protection of their lives in 
accordance with the constitutional provisions. They also have a right to 
"life" in this country. Thus, they also have the right to live, so long as they 
are here, with human dignity. Just as the State is under an obligation to 
protect the life of every citizen in this country, so also the State is under an 
obligation to protect the life of persons who are not citizens. 
It may also be noted that initially a petition under Article 226 of the 
Constitution relating to contractual matters was held not to lie. However, the 
law underwent a change by subsequent decisions and it was held that even 
though the petition may relate essentially to a contractual matter, it would still 
be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The 
Public Law remedies have been extended to the realm of tort. The Supreme 
Court has entertained petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution on a number 
of occasions and awarded compensation to persons who suffered personal 
injuries at the hands of the officers of the Government. 
Being aggrieved by the High Court's judgment, the Railways appealed 
to the Supreme Court. The only question argued before the Supreme Court 
was that the Railways were not liable to pay compensation to the victim who was 
67, Ibid, para 37. 
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a foreigner and was not an Indian national; and that the Railways or the Union of 
India was in no case liable to pay compensation to the victim for the offence. 
The specific contention was that since it was the individual act of those persons, 
they alone could be prosecuted and on being found guilty could be punished and 
may also be liable to pay fine or compensation; but on the facts of this case the 
Railways or the Union of India would not even be vicariously liable. It was also 
contended that for claiming damages for the offence perpetrated on the victim, 
the remedy lay in the domain of private law and not under public law and, as 
such, the High Court could not have legally awarded any compensation under 
Article 226 of the Constitution and, that too, at the instance of a practicing 
advocate who in no way, was concerned or connected with the victim. 
The Supreme Court also rejected the contention that the victim being a 
foreign national was not entitled to any relief under Public Law. This 
contention was based on the reasoning that the Fundamental Rights in Part III 
of the Indian Constitution are available only to citizens of India and since the 
victim was a Bangladeshi national, she could not complain of violation of 
Fundamental Rights and, as such, could not be granted any relief on that basis. 
In rejecting the above contention, the Supreme Court relied upon both the 
"Domestic Jurisprudence based on Constitutional provisions" as well as 
"Human Rights Jurisprudence based on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948, which has international recognition as the 'Moral Code of 
Conduct' having been adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations." 
The Court also relied upon the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations., ^^  
C.S. USHA, V. MADRAS REFINERIES LTD, CHENNAI AND OTHERS 69 
The petitioner-appellant-complainant, a female, worked with the first 
respondent, a public sector undertaking as an officer. She was last 
68./5/rf, para 19. 
69. (2001)2 CLR 136. 
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promoted in 1992 as Deputy Manager. She alleged that the second 
respondent sexually harassed her by means of sexual advances and 
propositions. She suffered the problem silently and did not complain to any 
one officially at that time. The second respondent refused to fill up 
performance appraisal for the year 1994-95 and she was not given her 
promotion due in the latter half of 1995, as one of the members, who was a 
close friend of the second respondent, saw to it that she was not 
promoted. She also alleged that she got her admission to Ph.D. and applied for 
grant of study leave with pay in January, 1996, but got no response from the 
Management. The complainant alleged that she was denied her pay from 
February 1996 and only the second respondent was the root cause behind the 
Company's denial of her salary, promotion and study leave. Subsequently, the 
first respondent issued a charge-sheet alleging that the complainant was absent 
without leave. She sent her reply denying the charges. Even then her dues were 
not released and her salary fi-om February 1996 was stopped. At this stage, she 
caused a lawyer's notice to be issued in April, 1998 to the first respondent 
alleging sexual harassment by the second respondent and also the denial of 
promofion, salary, leave and medical benefits. She also called upon the first 
respondent to take disciplinary action against the second respondent. 
Subsequently, she received a letter from the first respondent/company 
informing that a Complaints Committee had been formed to look into the 
allegations set out in her lawyer's notice. Thereafter, the Committee sent a 
notice to the complainant asking her to appear before it. 
The complainant, thereafter, filed a writ petition before the Madras High 
Court, praying to quash the charge-sheet and to grant the benefits of revision of 
salary with arrears of pay, promotion and for the grant of study leave with pay. 
She also filed a separate writ petition for quashing the order constituting the 
Complaint Committee and for constituting "an independent Complaint 
Mechanism after framing proper rules". 
70. Ibid., para 2. 
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The Complaints Committee consisted of three members. All of them 
were outsiders. The majority of members, namely, two were women. The 
Chairperson of the Committee was also a woman. The credentials of the 
Chairperson were absolutely without blemish. The complainant-appellant 
could not specify any particular objection regarding the qualifications of the 
Chairperson. One of the members against whom the appellant made 
allegations of attitudinal bias, subsequently resigned. As per the directions of 
the Single Judge, the first respondent company appointed another 
experienced bureaucrat in the place of the member who had resigned. The 
appellant alleged nothing against this new member. In the circumstances, 
the Division Bench of the Madras High Court dismissed the objections 
made by the appellant regarding the composition of the Committee. The 
Bench categorically rejected the appellant's contention that the company 
should not at all be involved or should not have a say in the constitution of the 
Committee. The Court also rejected the appellant's demand that the company 
should appoint the particular person chosen by her as the Chairperson of the 
Complaints Committee, We are of the opinion, said N.K. Jain, CJ, "that if a 
Complaint Committee is constituted according to the whims and fancies of the 
appellant, the administration will get stuck. Enough safeguards were provided 
by the Supreme Court. The appellant's counsel cannot be allowed to interpret 
in her own way to suit the convenience of the appellant." However, in view 
of the appellant's submission that she had suffered "enormous mental agony 
and pain" and her plea for being allowed assistance, by her chosen 
representative at the enquiry, the Division Bench directed the Complaints 
Committee "to consider allowing the appellant to face the enquiry with the 
assistance of (her chosen representative)." 
Division Bench of the Madras High Court rejected the contention that 
the Complaint Committee should consist of outside agency only. We are of the 
considered opinion, said N.K. Jain, CJ, for the Bench, maintained that the 
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constitution of Complaints Committee is only for finding out the truth or 
otherwise of the facts and also to award compensation. Then it has to be 
followed by domestic enquiry. It is seen that the Complaints Committee should 
be headed by a woman and not less than half of its members should be 
women. It has to be ensured that there is no undue pressure or influence from 
senior levels, To achieve this, the Supreme Court has suggested that the 
Complaints Committee should involve a third party, either a Non-Government 
Organization or other body who is familiar with the issue of sexual 
harassment.^' 
Duty of Complainant to Substantiate Complaint 
Women work at workplaces with more strain laws therefore, 
including our Constitution and the Supreme Court's decisions, provide various 
safeguards to women, particularly to the women at workplaces, so as to enable 
them to work with human dignity. While there can be no two opinions, 
therefore, that wrongdoers should not be allowed to go scot-free, but at the 
same time, the employer, who is supposed to keep a vigilant eye on the 
victim and the delinquent, is not expected to allow the women to use the 
shield so presented by the Supreme Court as a weapon to wreak vengeance. 
Therefore, when in view of complaints of sexual harassment made by a 
female employee the employer constitutes a complaint committee to 
enquire into the allegations, the complainant cannot be permitted to seek any 
relief or directions in her favour without participating in the enquiry and 
substantiating her allegations. Merely because a female employee has made 
allegations of sexual harassment against a male co-employee or officer, 
there does not arise any presumption for the complainant or against the 
71./6/V/., para27. 
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respondent. The complainant, therefore, cannot shirk from her duty to 
substantiate her allegations. 
A Single Judge of the Madras High Court found that the petitioner was 
not entitled to study leave with pay and, therefore, the action of the first 
respondent/Company in refusing study leave with pay was in accordance with 
law. The Single Judge also concluded that qualified persons excluding the 
second respondent had duty considered the appellant's claim for promotion. 
Since she did not secure sufficient marks to get selected to the post of Manager, 
which was a selection post, she was not selected. The Single Judge held that 
depending on the outcome of the enquiry, the first respondent Company would 
settle the non-payment of arrears of pay, if there was anything due. As regards 
allegations of sexual harassment, the Single Judge found that the appellant had 
no cause for complaint and the Committee had been properly constituted in 
accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court. 
Being aggrieved with the judgments of the Single Judge, the petitioner-
appellant appealed against them. The appellant contended that without first 
deciding the allegation of sexual harassment against the second respondent and 
the complicity of the Company in it, the charge-sheet against the appellant could 
not be proceeded with. She also contended that she had joined the Doctorate 
course not only to acquire better qualifications and knowledge, but also to be 
away fi"om the uncomfortable and hostile atmosphere at work created by the 
second respondent. 
Dismissing the appeals, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court 
made it absolutely clear that the charge-sheet could not be quashed, nor could 
the complainant be held entitled to revision of salary, without appearing before 
the Complaints Committee. "It is true", said N.K. Jain, CJ for the Division 
Bench, "that we are bound by the directions of the Apex Court (made in 
Vishaka case), but that does not mean that they can be allowed to be interpreted 
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to suit the convenience of the woman like the petitioner, for personal gain." 
Strongly depreciating the entire approach adopted by the complainant-
petitioner (appellant), the Division Bench said: 
"The Court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not 
sought to be abused by woman like the petitioner, who desires to persist with the 
point of view, almost carrying it to the point of obstinacy. Keeping all these 
aspects, in mind, we are of the considered opinion that what the Supreme Court 
has held in Vishaka case (supra) has to be construed as a double edged weapon 
to shield the women at working place from sexual harassment. At the same time, 
it should not be taken that all complaints by women should be presumed to be 
correct without referring to the Committee. If it is presumed so before 
investigation, then the very object will be defeated. Mere averment will not 
carry much weight. Averment should be supported and supplemented by 
impassable proof, both oral and documentary. Complaints of harassment that 
too sexual harassment to working women have to be dealt with instantly. So, 
the employer, by taking more care and caution, has to weigh the truth and 
falsehood of the complaint so made, taking all the pros and cons into account. 
Here it is not the case that the complaint of alleged sexual harassment is not 
considered by the Committee. But merely on the basis of averments, as stated 
above, it cannot be presumed and no direction can be issued or the other 
enquiry can be stayed till the Committee decides the complaint relating to 
sexual harassment."^^ 
The Division Bench noted that while according to the complainant-
appellant she had been subjected to sexual harassment by the second respondent 
from 1992 and even before, but even "a cursory perusal of the correspondence 
which took place in the various letters and communications made by the 
appellant with the Company and also with the Petroleum Ministry regarding her 
request for study leave with pay and the refusal by the respondent clearly 
12. Ibid., para 23. 
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reveal that not even a whisper was made by her about the alleged sexual 
harassment alleged to have been done by the second respondent." Her 
complaint of sexual harassment by the second respondent surfaced only in the 
lawyer's notice issued in 1998 for the first time. Declining to accept the "new 
case" sought to be put forward by the complainant during her arguments that 
she intended prosecuting her Ph.D. not only to acquire further qualification but 
also to keep herself away from the alleged advances of the second respondent, 
the Division Bench commented. 
The petitioner/appellant before us is not an ordinary working woman, 
instead she was carrying on the Research by joining the Ph.D. course. Had 
there been any harassment much less a sexual harassrnent, a woman like her 
would not have kept quiet for a period of about six years. She was not able to 
convince us, by reliable materials, as to what prevented her from making a 
complaint for all these years prior to the issuance of the lawyer's notice. 
N.K, Jain, CJ said for the Bench that any more resistance on the part of 
the appellant to get on with the enquiries would cast serious doubts about her 
bona fides. It is up to her to face the charges against her and satisfy the 
Committee enquiring into the charges against her that she was entitled to study 
leave with pay and that she was justified in staying away. She should not be 
dragging her feet. The enquiry into charges against her need not await the 
decision of the Complaints Committee. Both can proceed simultaneously 
and independently. The proceedings in one need not impinge on the 
proceedings in the other. 
The Division Bench of the Madras High Court categorically rejected the 
appellant's contention that till such time the Complaints Committee decided her 
allegation of sexual harassment, the other enquiry regarding her alleged 
unauthorized absence, etc. should not be proceeded with. The Division Bench 
said, "The two enquiries are not related to each other. One relates to the 
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appellant absenting herself without leave and, her entitlement to arrears, pay, 
promotion, etc. and the other relates to sexual harassment. The appellant is not 
at all justified in contending that till such time the enquiry pertaining to sexual 
harassment is over the charges against her should not be enquired into. It is well 
settled that a person who seeks equity must come with clean hands. In such a 
factual situation as mentioned above, we cannot brush aside the arguments of... 
Respondents 1 and 2 that only because of the refusal of promotion, study leave 
with pay, etc. the appellant had come out with a complaint with vengeance." 
Advising the appellant to cooperate and have the enquiries concluded. 
ASMA PARVEEN, V. ALIGARHMUSLIM UNIVERSITY. '^ 
The petitioner was a lady lecturer in the department of Psychology in 
the Women's College, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. Both she and the 
victim resided in the premises of Abdullah Hall, The petitioner was issued a 
charge sheet alleging that on a particular date she illegally confined the 
victim in her residence with the active connivance of a male Ph.D. student, 
B. The victim was a student of B.A. and was preparing for her examination. 
She had offered psychology as one of her subjects. Her allegation was that 
she used to take help of the petitioner. On a particular date, the petitioner 
asked the victim to come to her room, as she wanted to give her some 
important teaching material. The victim, therefore, went to the petitioner's 
residence. When she reached there, she found the petitioner in the company 
of B to whom she had earlier been introduced by the petitioner. After some 
time the petitioner left the room on the pretext of doing some important work 
with a promise to return within a short while. Soon, thereafter, B started 
talking to the victim in indecent language and even tried to outrage her 
modesty. The victim, whose name was not disclosed but was indicated by 
Miss K tried to flee from the room but found that the door was locked from 
outside and she had been put to illegal confinement. However, when B 
73. (2001) Lie 3121 All. 
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went inside the bathroom, Miss K had the presence of mind to lock the 
bathroom from outside. The petitioner returned to the room after about an 
hour. She opened the room and found that the bathroom was locked from 
outside by Miss K. The petitioner opened the bathroom. B came out of the 
bathroom in a furious mood, caught hold of Miss K by her hair and tried to 
molest her in the petitioner's presence. Miss K then slapped B due to which 
the grip on her became loose and she ran out of the room. On complaint 
being made by her, the matter was probed by the Provost and Assistant 
Proctor, Abdullah Hall, and by the Principal of the Women's College, 
The petitioner was suspended and directed to vacate the accommodation 
provided to her in Abdullah Hall. The charge sheet directed the petitioner not 
to reveal the name of the victim at any stage, as the victim was well known to 
her, and also not to publicize the document in order to save the honour and 
dignity of Abdullah Hall.^" 
Rejecting the petitioner's contention that unless the name of the girl was 
disclosed it was difficult for her to submit her defence, the Division Bench of 
the Allahabad High Court concluded from the material on record that it could 
not be said that the petitioner did not know the girl. The Bench also noted that 
before the Enquiry Authority the petitioner made a statement. "I wanted to 
bring the girl concerned and Mr B as my defence witnesses but because I have 
been banned to visit Abdullah Hall Campus and Mr [B] for whom the 
University campus has been banned, therefore, I could not contact them and 
produce them." The Bench inferred from this statement that the petitioner 
knew the girl concerned. The Bench also concluded that the respondents 
did not disclose the name of the girl to save the honour and dignity of the girl 
and the reputation of Abdullah Hall where many girls resided. The Bench 
perused the record relating to the enquiry proceedings, which included a 
sealed envelope. The envelope was opened and it disclosed the name of the 
74. Ibid., para 2. 
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girl. The Bench held that the non-disclosure of the name of the girl did not 
prejudice the petitioner in any rnanner.^^ 
Though the victim was not produced in the enquiry, the Division 
Bench of the Allahabad High Court found that there was material evidence 
to support the charges against the petitioner. The provost, the assistant proctor 
and the principal to whom the victim had narrated the incident duly deposed 
about the incident as told to them separately by the victim. These witnesses 
were respectable persons. There was nothing to show that their statements 
were concocted. The petitioner was permitted to cross-examine them. 
However, she refiised to cross-examine them. She was also given opportunity to 
make her own statement and produce witnesses. Once again, she declined to 
produce any evidence. She did not even examine herself 
The Division Bench also rejected the petitioner's contention that she 
could not get assistance of Defence Assistant. The Enquiry authority gave 
two days notice to the petitioner asking her to appear for hearing along with 
her Defense; Assistant. However, on the date fixed, she wanted further time 
to engage a Defense Assistant. This was rejected. Refusing to find any 
fault with the procedure, the Bench observed; The complainant girl was 
under the constant threat and taking into consideration the entire 
circumstances it was advisable that the enquiry should be conducted 
expeditiously. 
In her brief statemen of defence the petitioner denied that any event, as 
stated in charge sheet, took place. She also contended. The so called reason 
for not revealing the name of the girl is unjustified and is bad in law since it 
deprives me of the identity of the complainant and therefore, hampers the 
preparation of my statement of defence. I, therefore, in view of the above lack 
of evidence claim that the entire matter is concocted and reeks of mala fides. 
75. Ibid, para 9. 
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Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court comprising, Sudhir Narain 
and Krishna Kumar, JJ. Concluded that the non-disclosure of the name of the 
victim, who was a girl student, did not prejudice the case of the petitioner. 
Discountenancing the plea of violation of the principles of natural justice, the 
Bench refused to interfere with the action of dismissal taken against the 
petitioner. The Bench also rejected the contention that as the victim-girl 
student was not examined at the enquiry, the charges could not be held to be 
established against the petitioner. 
NARENDRA KUMAR KHASE V. S, GOPALKRISHNAN AND OTHERS. ^^ 
The petitioner was a very senior officer in the Bank of India. He was 
promoted as Deputy General Manager and transferred to Tokyo as Chief 
Executive of the Bank of India, Japan Branches. While posted in Japan, it was 
alleged that he misbehaved in the office premises with two female employees 
and also raped one of them at his residence in the evening hours when she was 
purportedly called to his residence for teaching him the Japanese language. 
The Foreign Bank Employees Union leaders took up the matter with the Bank, 
and a complaint was lodged against the petitioner. Subsequently, the Attomey-
in-law for the alleged victims submitted a report to the Bank alleging 
sexual harassment of the two female employees, and calling upon the Bank 
to take appropriate action in the matter. The Bank deputed an officer to 
investigate into the alleged episodes, who submitted a report, finding that the 
complaint against the petitioner was vague and concocted. The two female 
employees thereafter filed a suit in the District Court at Tokyo alleging that the 
petitioner had caused sexual harassment to them, and claimed compensation 
against him as well as the Bank, who were imp leaded as defendants in the suit. 
The petitioner as well as the Bank appeared in the suit proceeding, and the Bank 
sanctioned the necessary amount for legal expenses. In the suit, both the 
female employees were examined and cross-examined. The petitioner was 
76. (2000) 3CLR 556. 
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also examined and cross-examined in the proceeding, and he also examined 
one defence witness. Though a Single Judge initially tried the suit, it was 
thereafter referred to a Collegiate Court of three Judges. Thereafter the 
plaintiffs led additional evidence. The Court decreed the suit, awarded 33, 
00,000 yen as damages and compensation to one female employee and 
700,000 yen as damages and compensation to the other, apart from costs and 
77 
interest at the rate of 5% per annum. 
The Bank was not inclined to appeal against the judgment of the 
Japanese Court. It accordingly informed the petitioner that if he wished to 
prefer an appeal, he might do so in his individual capacity. The petitioner was 
also called upon to deposit the amount to be paid to the plaintiffs by way of 
compensation. The petitioner wrote to the Bank stating that he was not 
interested in preferring appeal in his individual capacity. The Bank thereafter 
issued two notices to the petitioner. The first notice was issued under the 
Bank's Regulations. It referred to the suit filed by the above female employees 
and the judgment passed therein. The notice further referred to the fact that the 
damages were awarded not only against the petitioner but also against the 
Bank. There was, therefore, a judicial finding by a competent Court of law 
that he had committed the acts of sexual molestation of two female employees 
of the Bank, and rape of one of the female employees. The notice fiirther stated 
that by his conduct, the petitioner brought the Bank to ignominy and financial 
loss; that he did not act with integrity and honesty, and committed a grave act, 
which was highly unbecoming of a Bank's Officer; and that he did not maintain 
good conduct and discipline, and instead of showing courtesy and attention to 
employees of the Bank, he took advantage of his position and committed grave 
and reprehensible acts. Therefore, the notice stated that the Bank had come 
to the conclusion that the petitioner had committed various acts of 
misconduct, which justified imposifion of a major penalty under the 
Regulations. The attention of the petitioner was drawn to the Special Procedure 
77. Ibid., para 3. 
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provided in the Regulations, which waived the detailed procedure for 
disciplinary action where, inter alia, the Disciplinary Authority decided to 
take action on the strength of facts and conclusions arrived at by a Judicial 
Tribunal. Such a special procedure was applicable to the case of the petitioner 
as well. A Court of competent jurisdiction had tried the petitioner, and found 
him guilty of rape and sexual harassment after giving him full opportunity to 
put forward his defence.'^ 
The charges proved were so grave that they justified imposition of 
major penalty of dismissal. The petitioner was called upon to submit his 
representation within 30 days of the receipt of the communication. 
By the second notice, the Bank informed the petitioner that the Court had 
directed him and the bank to pay compensation, which came to Indian Rs 18, 
62,024.80. Since the Court's decision had become final, no appeal having been 
preferred against it, the Bank had incurred heavy financial loss to the extent 
of Rs 18 lacs and odd. This amount, said the Bank, was recoverable from the 
petitioner as reimbursement of financial loss and as contribution for 
satisfaction of the judgment of the Japanese Court. The Bank informed the 
petitioner that the financial loss caused to it would be recovered from him both 
on grounds of reimbursement and contribution; and the Bank would also 
exercise its right of general lien and set off in respect of any amount lying with 
the bank in the petitioner's name. 
There was some exchange of correspondence between the petitioner and 
the Bank thereafter. Ultimately, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the 
Bombay High Court. The petitioner sought a declaration that the relevant 
regulation entitling the Bank to dispense with the requirement of holding 
enquiry before imposing punishment was unconstitutional, inoperative, void and 
illegal. He also sought directions for holding and declaring the Bank's action in 
78. Ibid, para 4. 
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and bad in law"/^ 
The impugned regulation of the Bank read as follows: 
Special procedure in certain cases, Notwithstanding anything 
contained in Regulation, the Disciplinary Authority may impose any of the 
penalties if the officer employee has been convicted on a criminal charge, or 
on the strength of facts or conclusions arrived at by a judicial trial. Provided 
that the officer employee may be given an opportunity of making 
representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed before any order is 
made." While not seriously pressing his objection to the constitutionality and 
validity of the above regulation, the petitioner made, inter alia, the following 
contentions. 
The judgment of the Japanese Court was not conclusive (he relied 
upon Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure in this regard). 
1. No disciplinary proceeding was held. At the same time, the order did not 
proceed on the basis that it was not practicable to hold an enquiry. In the 
absence of a conviction recorded in a criminal trial, the bank could not 
dismiss the petitioner from service on the basis of findings recorded in a 
civil suit in a foreign country. 
2. Merely because the petitioner did not prefer an appeal did not mean that he 
accepted the judgment of the Japanese Court as final. 
3. There was no debt due to the Bank from the petitioner, and there was no 
adjudication by a Court of law. The decree had been passed against 
the Bank as well as the petitioner, and, therefore, the Bank could not 
claim reimbursement from the petitioner. Further, the Bank had no right of 
reimbursement against the petitioner for recovery of loss and damages 
in the absence of adjudication by a Court of competent jurisdiction. In 
79. Ibid, para 4. 
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any event, the joint accounts, which he held with his wife and daughter, 
could not be frozen, and the amounts therein could not be adjusted 
against the amount claimed by the Bank by way of reimbursement and 
contribution for satisfaction of the decree. 
4. The procedure adopted by the Japanese Court was not exactly the same 
procedure as is adopted by the Courts in India. Initially a Single Judge was 
hearing the matter, but later, the Court was converted to a Collegiate 
Court of three Judges after the defence had examined its witnesses. 
Even after the petitioner had examined himself as a defendant, and 
even after his witness was examined, the plaintiffs were allowed to 
examine witnesses. In fact, one plaintiff was again examined and cross-
o n 
examined after the defence had closed its case. 
The Bank submitted, inter alia, as follows-
1. Though the facts established would justify the petitioner's conviction on a 
criminal charge, since the female employees concerned did not lodge a 
prosecution, but took recourse to a civil proceeding, while awarding 
damages and/or compensation the Court had recorded findings of fact 
holding the petitioner guilty of raping one of the female employees, 
and subjecting both the female employees to sexual harassment. The 
bank had, therefore, issued notice to the petitioner to show cause why 
he should not be dismissed from service. This notice proceeded on the 
strength of facts or conclusion arrived at by a judicial Tribunal. 
2. In view of the findings recorded by the Japanese Court, there was no need 
to hold an enquiry, since the Bank proceeded on the strength of facts and 
conclusions arrived at by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The fact that 
the petitioner was not convicted in a criminal trial made no difference 
whatsoever. 
3. A fair trial was conducted by the Japanese Court, in which the 
80. Ibid, para 5. 
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petitioner had full opportunity of defending himself against the 
accusations made against him. The Court, after considering the 
evidence on record, by a reasoned judgment, found the petitioner guilty 
of misconduct, and awarded damages against him as well as the Bank, 
which was a co-defendant. In the circumstances, the Bank was justified 
in acting under its Regulations, and calling upon the 
petitioner to reimburse the Bank, and contribute for the satisfaction of the 
judgment of the Japanese Court. 
4. Since the petitioner did not prefer an appeal, the judgment attained 
finality, and therefore, there was no option for the petitioner and the Bank 
but to satisfy the judgment and decree passed by the Japanese Court. The 
Bank suffered financial loss on account of the misconduct of the petitioner. 
Therefore, it was entitled to recover from him the said amount, and for 
doing so, it could proceed against the account held by the petitioner either 
singly or jointly. 
Upholding the regulation entitling the bank to dispense with a disciplinary 
enquiry, and declining to interfere with the show-cause notice calling upon the 
petitioner to show why he should not be dismissed from service. 
B.P Singh, J. said for the Bombay High Court. In service jurisprudence, 
it is well known that the rules may provide that the Disciplinary Authority 
may, on the basis of a finding recorded by a Court of law, take action against 
an employee. What is of essence is the finding recorded by a Court of 
competent jurisdiction. If a disciplinary proceeding is necessary only to test 
the charge that the concerned employee is guilty of misconduct, law does not 
consider it necessary to conduct such a disciplinary proceeding if the same 
matter has been the subject-matter of a judicial proceeding and has been 
gone into by a Court of competent jurisdiction, which has pronounced its 
judgment in the matter on merits. It cannot, therefore be said that if the 
Disciplinary Authority acts on the strength of findings recorded in such a 
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judgment, its action is either arbitrary, irrational or unreasonable. The 
Regulation expressly provides for disciplinary action against an employee if 
he has been convicted of a criminal charge or on the strength of facts or 
conclusion arrived at by a judicial trial. The findings recorded by the Court 
against the petitioner, though in a civil suit, in reality, relate to his criminal 
conduct of sexual harassment of female employees and rape of one of the 
female employees. The proviso to the relevant Regulation however 
mandates that the employee should be given an opportunity of making 
representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed. These respondents 
have complied by issuing the notice. 
We are satisfied that the relevant Regulation is neither 
unconstitutional nor void and that the Respondents are justified in taking 
action against the Petitioner under the Regulation. 
Dealing with the contention that no proceeding was conducted against 
the petitioner, and there was no finding that it was not practicable to hold a 
disciplinary proceeding, the High Court said that in a case covered by the above 
Regulation, it was not necessary to hold a disciplinary proceeding. The Court 
also agreed with the Bank that it would be wholly impracticable to summon 
witnesses from Japan to enable them to depose in a disciplinary proceeding. At 
the same time, the Court chose not to express any opinion on this aspect, since it 
found that the above Regulation itself, in given circumstances, justified the 
imposition of punishment without insisting upon holding of a disciplinary 
proceeding.^' 
As to the decision of the Japanese Court, the Bombay High Court 
declined to hold that the trial was not a fair or that it was held in breach of 
principles of natural justice. "It may be", the Court said that the procedure 
followed by Courts in Japan is not exactly the same as in this country. It is 
81./i!)jrf, para 10. 
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not the requirement of Section 13 of the CPC that the procedure followed by the 
foreign Court, who has rendered the judgment, must be identical to the 
procedure followed in this country. It has not been submitted before us that 
the Court who tried the suit, and gave judgment, was not a Court of 
competent jurisdiction. It has also not been contended that the judgment is not 
on the merits of the case. There also appears to be nothing on the face of the 
proceeding to show that the judgment was founded on an incorrect view of the 
international law or a refusal to recognize the law of India in cases in which 
such law is applicable. 
Refusing to hold that the procedure followed by the Japanese Court was 
in breach of the principles of natural justice, and rejecting the submission based 
on Section 13 of the CPC, the Bombay High Court pointed out that the parties 
examined their witnesses, and they were permitted to be cross-examined. The 
Japanese Court gave full opportunity to the defendants to defend themselves. 
No grievance, moreover, was made before the High Court that the defendants 
were not permitted to effectively defend themselves in the suit. The High Court 
said, The mere difference in procedure, which appears to us to be insignificant, 
does not justify the criticism that the procedure followed by the Court, or the 
judgment rendered by it, was opposed to natural justice, On a fair reading of the 
judgment of the Japanese Court, we are satisfied that the procedure followed by 
the Court was fair, and the judgment rendered by the Court is a well-reasoned 
judgment discussing all aspects of the matters, and the conclusions reached are 
justified by the evidence on record.^ ^ 
The Bombay High Court, however, gave partial relief to the petitioner 
on the issue whether the Bank was justified in freezing the accounts of the 
petitioner. The Bank had frozen three such accounts, which were in Tokyo, 
Hong Kong and Jersey Islands, According to the petitioner, the account in 
Tokyo was his own account operated by him. However, the account in the Hong 
82. Ibid, para 9. 
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Kong Branch was the account of his wife who was the first signatory, while the 
petitioner was the second signatory. Similarly, the account at Jersey Islands was 
the account of his daughter jointly with the Petitioner's wife and the petitioner. 
However, the petitioner was a third signatory in this account. He, therefore, 
submitted that, in any event, the Bank had no right whatsoever to freeze the 
accounts of his wife and daughter. This was without prejudice to his contention 
that the Bank could not, without taking recourse to legal proceedings, take a 
decision to appropriate the amounts lying in the aforesaid accounts for 
adjustment against the loss said to have been suffered by the Bank.^ ^ 
As regards the question whether the Bank could exercise its right 
of general lien and set off in respect of any amount lying with the Bank in 
the petitioner's name, the High Court said that it might not be possible for 
the Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, to express any opinion in the matter. 
The petitioner denied his liability to make good the loss said to have been 
suffered by the Bank as a result of the judgment of a foreign Court in which 
the bank was a co-defendant. The Bank claimed to recover from the petitioner 
the loss suffered by it even in the absence of adjudication by a Court of 
competent jurisdiction. In these circumstances, the High Court left the parties to 
work out their rights in accordance with law" and "to take appropriate legal 
proceedings, if so advised. 
The remaining two accounts, however, the High Court said, stood on a 
different footing as those V^QXQ, prima facie, joint accounts. It is well known that 
for the sake of convenience, joint accounts are opened, even though the amounts 
deposited in such account may really belong to only one of the holders, who is, 
usually, the first signatory. Though the amounts were lying in the aforesaid two 
accounts that were joint the High Court said that it was difficult to say, on the 
basis of material on record, that the amounts, really, belonged to the petitioner. 
This being a disputed question of fact, the High Court expressed its inability to 
S3. Ibid, para 13. 
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decide the same. Nevertheless, the Court did observe that no rule or regulation 
had been shown to them under which the Bank might proceed against the 
account of the petitioner or his wife or daughter. Admittedly, the Bank had not 
initiated any proceeding before a Court of competent jurisdiction enabling it to 
proceed against the aforesaid two accounts for the recovery of loss caused to the 
Bank by the misconduct of the petitioner. Therefore, the Court said, "there 
appears to be no justification for the Bank to proceed against the aforesaid two 
accounts for the recovery of loss allegedly caused by the misconduct of the 
petitioner." The High Court, therefore, directed the Bank to withdraw the order 
freezing these two accounts. The Court, however, clarified that the Bank would 
be at liberty to seek remedy before a Court of competent jurisdiction to proceed 
against the accounts. Similarly, the petitioner would also be free to seek remedy 
before the appropriate forum if he denied his liability to make good the loss said 
to have been incurred by the Bank on account of the misconduct of the 
petitioner. 
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that it was open to 
the management to take disciplinary action against the alleged harasser based 
on facts and conclusions arrived at by a foreign Court of competent 
jurisdiction, without holding a departmental enquiry, which could be dispensed 
with under the applicable Regulations. 
R.B.S. CHAUHAN V. RESERVE BANK OFINDIA.^^ 
The harasser, the petitioner in this case, worked as Assistant Treasurer in 
the cash department of the RBI, Kanpur, The complainant was a female who 
worked as Manager in the said Department, on a post higher than that of the 
petitioner. Both these officers were deputed to visit Agra for inspection of 
currency chest. The complainant subsequently gave a written complaint to the 
management alleging that the petitioner had sexually harassed her at Agra 
S4.Ibid,pwca\5. 
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during the official visit. As per the complaint, the petitioner and the complainant 
had stayed in the same Hotel, but in different rooms. On the particular date, 
about 9.00 p.m. the petitioner rang the bell of the complainant's room. When she 
opened the door, the petitioner said that he wanted to talk to her urgently. 
Thereafter, he came into the room of the complainant and said that he wanted to 
have dinner. She gave him dinner but after dinner he refiised to go back to his 
own room and said, I am alone, you are alone, we can enjoy". The complainant 
was horrified at this 'disgusting immoral remark' and asked him to leave the 
room.^ * The following day he called up the complainant over the intercom and 
said to her. Please do not put the receiver down. Have you pardoned me or not? 
Please pardon me. I know not what happened to me yesterday. "The 
complainant immediately put the receiver down and on the same day after 
inspection of the currency chest she telephoned the General Manager saying that 
she was not feeling comfortable and wanted to come back. Thereafter she 
returned to Kanpur and informed the General Manager about the incident. She 
alleged that she was in a mental shock, tension and grief due to the act of the 
petitioner, which was unpardonable. 
The matter was referred to the Sexual Harassment Committee of the 
Bank and the Committee conducted an enquiry in which the petitioner 
participated. The Committee gave opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 
Based on the report submitted by the committee, and on examining the entire 
service record of the petitioner, the bank passed orders compulsorily retiring 
him in terms of the relevant rules. The petitioner was 55 1/2 years of age at that 
time.^ ^ In this case a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court declined to 
interfere with the order of compulsory retirement of the harasser, based on the 
report of the employer's Complaint Committee. In this case a ftill-fledged 
enquiry was not held into the charges leveled against the harasser. 
Nevertheless, the 'Complaint Committee' did hold a fact-finding enquiry in 
86. Ibid., para 6. 
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which the harasser also participated. 
ALBERT DAVIT LIMITED V.ANURADHA CHOUDHURY^^ 
A female, was employed with the appellant defendant company as a 
Junior Executive. She made a complaint to the Company's Chairman against 
Defendants 1 and 2 who were male officers working with the company. The 
plaintiff leveled very serious charges of sexual harassment against them that also 
constituted offence of outraging her modesty, According to the plaintiff, on 
particular dates during a product launch in a hotel, Defendant 1 committed acts 
amounting to sexual harassment against her. Since the highest authority of the 
company did not extend his help and co-operation, the plaintiff filed a 
formal complaint with the police. Based on her complaint, the Police 
initiated a criminal case under Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code. 
Defendant 2, however, instituted a domestic enquiry against the plaintiff 
and for that purpose appointed an Enquiry Officer. According to the 
defendant company, the plaintiff had grossly misbehaved with Defendant 1 
during the product launch in the hotel, and for which Defendant 1 had also I 
lodged a written complaint. Defendant 2 refused to make the complaints of 
sexual harassment and outraging her modesty as made by the plaintiff the 
subject-matter of the enquiry on the plea that that issue was "unconnected" 
With the charge sheet. The plaintiff, however, insisted that if the background of 
the incident was not allowed to be brought on record the very object of the 
domestic enquiry would be frustrated and she would be denied justice. The 
plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendants seeking, inter alia, a decree (i) 
of declaration that the domestic enquiry was illegal as it was instituted by 
Defendants 1 and 2 as a measure of retaliation after becoming unsuccessful in 
fulfilling their ill-desire of sexual harassment; (ii) of declaration that the defence of 
the plaintiff would be disclosed before the domestic enquiry which would affect 
the criminal case leading in turn to the exoneration of Defendants 1 and 2 who 
88. (2004) 3 LLJ 608 (Cal DB). 
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were accused in the criminal case; and (iii) restraining the defendants from 
conducting the domestic enquiry until disposal of the criminal case and a 
temporary injunction in that regard. 
While agreeing that the criminal and disciplinary proceedings were not 
initiated on the same set of facts, the Division Bench refijsed to interfere with the 
order of interim injunction passed by the trial court chiefly because: 
(1) The notice of domestic enquiry was issued by the company to the 
plaintiff after she lodged her written complaint with the Police, 
(2) As per the plaintiffs case, the disciplinary proceeding was 
initiated against her out of grudge or ill motive because of lodging 
of the written complaint by her with the Police based on which the 
criminal proceeding was started. In the view of the Court, unless the 
defendants were restrained by an order of temporary injunction from 
proceeding with the departmental enquiry till disposal of the suit, the 
plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury. 
(3) In terms of the guidelines formulated by the Supreme Court in 
the company was obliged to constitute an appropriate complaint 
mechanism such as a complaint committee for redress of complaints 
made by victims of sexual harassment, in a time-bound manner. However, 
the company formed no such complaint committee or any other 
appropriate complaint mechanism for that purpose. Further, instead of 
endeavoring to redress the complaints of the plaintiff, the Executive 
Director of the company informed the plaintiff that the allegations of 
gender harassment, besides being baseless, were unrelated to the enquiry and 
totally uncalled for. 'It is really surprising', the Bench remarked, that 
without making any enquiry into allegations of gender harassment made 
by the plaintiff-respondent before the appropriate authority such allegations 
were said to be baseless and no reason whatsoever has been assigned to 
89./6/rf, para2. 
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indicate why such allegations were baseless. Thus, even without 
enquiring into the allegations of sexual harassment made by the plaintiff 
and without giving her any opportunity, the company had already 
concluded that her complaint was baseless.^ *' 
The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court concurred with the trial 
Judge in holding that the plaintiff was able to establish a prima facie case and 
balance of convenience was in her favour. At the same time, the Bench 
clarified that legality of the departmental proceeding challenged by the plaintiff 
was "a vital issue involved in the suit and such question [could] only be 
decided at appropriate stage of trial on evidence". 
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, comprising Asit Kumar Bisi 
and Sameresh Banerjea, U. Refused to interfere with the order of temporary 
injunction passed by the City Civil Court under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure restraining the defendants fi-om proceeding with the 
departmental proceedings initiated against the plaintiff till disposal of the suit 
filed by the plaintiff 
CONCLUSION 
Law alone is not chough to root out this social evil, society has to 
change its attitude. So that women can come out and participate in public life 
without feeling threatened. A woman's dress and appearance are often cited as 
reasons why women are sexually harassed. However, this does not explain why 
women who are suitably covered as per community norm and standard are also 
targeted. 
Moreover, it does not clarify why some men harass, while others do not. 
Many women are aware that they will be automatically blamed for having 
provoked sexual harassment and stigma that is placed on women who report 
90./6/£/., paral6. 
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harassment is therefore a major deterrent for many victims. Lack of support 
form family, colleagues or peers also inhibits a victim from seeking redress. 
The view that women ask for it is so deeply entrenched in some cultural 
contexts and communities that victims of sexual harassment are cinematized 
for the rest of their lives what needs to be inculcated is a serve of mutual 
respect between women and men. There is divinity in each of us; the 
recognition of which will automatically bring forth mutual respect and that 
alone will be the base of liberation and empowerment of women. 
Women have been tremendously praised in the literature and religion of 
our country. Women are placed on a very high pedestal in Indian mythology. 
Women have been called 'Devi' and 'ShaktV. However a woman's actual 
position becomes evident at the time when she goes out of the house alone. 
It is indeed unfortunate to mention here that country which once 
importing knowledge to the world in religious philosophy and used to be 
quoted by cultural pollution and moral degradation that is visible in 
contemporary society. Historically, sexual harassment of women employees 
has been ignored, denied made to seem trivial, condoned and even implicitly 
supported with women themselves being blamed for it. 
The case of sexual harassment of women at workplace are increasing 
alarmingly because of several reasons, inter alia, poor status of women, 
increasing number of human relations and values, poor law and order position 
in the society and no adequate provisions of law to deal with the problem 
effectively. By and large, sexual harassment is not only women's issues; it is a 
human right issue, a human resource management issue, a safety and health 
issue at workplace. 
While given judgment in Vishaka Supreme Court has given due 
importance to the international conventions and norms, more particularly 
CEDAW which is ratified by our government and which is also to date, the 
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most comprehensive international instrument specifically prohibiting sexual 
harassment, A woman employee who object to sexist behaviour at the 
workplace and demands that standard of decency be observed is often 
dismissed as hypersensitive, nervous, out wrought. Beside the working capacity 
of woman is conversably reduced on being regularly harassed sexually, it 
virtually drains the self confidence of the woman employee due to this she feels 
uncomfortable at the workplace and becomes sick. 
Since there is no specific legislation in India till date that deals with 
sexual harassment at the workplace, the existing remedies whatever available 
are in Indian penal code 1860 that does not specifically contain any chapter 
either on crimes against women or a 'sexual harassment' or a 'sexual 
harassment at workplace'. The provisions which are available are unable to 
effectively combat the ever increasing problem of sexual harassment at 
workplace. 
For combating sexual harassment at the workplace Supreme Court has 
been quite proactive and has laid down exhaustive guidelines in Vishaka case. 
Till such date a separate law on the protection of women against sexual 
harassment at the workplace comes into being, these guidelines will be law of 
the land as per Article 141 of the Constitution which are to be strictly observed 
in all workplaces for the preservation and enforcement of the right to gender 
equality of the women employees but they are continued to be ignored by many 
State Governments. Above and beyond these representatives of civil society, 
the NGOs have also not made noteworthy efforts as they should have to ensure 
effectual implementation of the said guidelines. 
These guidelines are meaningless for the unorganized sector, where low 
skilled and ill paid women are the most insecure. 
The guidelines even if strictly observed and circulated in all workplaces 
can not protect a woman from sexual harassment because it overlooks the 
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ground reality that in most cases it is the employer who is responsible for the 
harassment. The Court has presumed the employer to be innocent and not 
actively engaged in sexual harassment and placed a duty upon him to prevent 
or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment. 
Article 39(A) of the Constitution of India, 1950 embodies that the State 
shall secure that the operation of the legal systems promotes justice, on a basis 
of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provides free legal aid, by suitable 
legislation or schemes or in any other way to ensure that opportunities for 
securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reasons of economic or other 
disabilities. 
Therefore, extensive efforts should be made to make women employees 
aware of free legal aid available to them under the legal services authority Act 
1986, need to be advertised at the grass root level in every nook and comer of 
the country in order to increase legal literacy. Their ignorance and poverty 
should not be an impediment in the way of their obtaining justice from the 
Courts. At once fell swoop, the legal services Authority Act should provide 
round the clock legal clinics, educate NGOs and voluntary agencies on women 
employees issues. 
Where the women employees are themselves victims of sexual 
harassment they should inform the offender that the behaviour is unwanted and 
unacceptable. If the behaviour nonetheless persists, the women employees 
should inform management and or the employee representative through the 
appropriate channels and require assistance in stopping the menace. 
Much more importantly, 'prevention' is a more effective and 
economical strategy that post harassment legal redress. It involves, the taking 
of affirmative steps at the national, employers, trade Unions, voluntary 
organizations especially NGOs and women employees level. Sexual 
harassment at the workplace is a world wide phenomenon requiring a change in 
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the social mindset to recognize women employees as equal partners it truth to 
be hold, the most effective way to stop the sexual harassment at the workplace 
is to get the root of the problems. 
Sexual harassment needs to be openly discussed as a workplace issue of 
legitimate concern to men and women. Ultimately an end to sexual harassment 
at the workplace necessitates that men and women reach social and economic 
equality and full integration in all occupations and places of work. The issue of 
sexual harassment needs understanding, assessment, sensitivity and 
commitment from all quarters for effective prevention of sexual harassment at 
workplace. 
It is imperative that a safe and gender friendly workplace environment 
must be provided which discourages sexual intimidation and unwelcome sexual 
conduct while promoting a cozy, collegial and conductive working 
environmental where the dignity of a woman employee is respected by 
everyone. There is a urgent need to protect women employees in all vistas of 
the society, not only in the interest of women but also for the progress of the 
country. 
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CONCLUSION & SUGGESTIONS 
The concept of equality and non-discrimination find its due place in the 
Constitution of India and many other legal documents, but its is the social and 
cultural factors which impede the realization of this concept and in some cases, 
even in enacting the legal prescriptions to eradicate discrimination against 
women since India is a party,to the Discrimination against women convention, 
it is obliged to give effect lo conventions provision and eliminate 
discrimination against women in'atHt^ manifestations. There are many areas, 
viz, legal, cultural and soci^ friend where necessary action is required by the 
Government. 
Towards its obligation to eliminate discrimination against women, a 
state is to pursue all appropriate means by undertaking, among other things, to 
embody the principal of equality of men and women in Constitution. To adopt 
appropriate legislative and other measures including sanctions, to establish 
legal protection of all right of women on equal basis with men. Through 
competent national tribunals and other public institutions, and to take all 
appropriate measures, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations customs 
and practices, constituting discrimination. It also mandates appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organization or enterprise. 
The basic of human rights is Dharma which is vitally concerned with 
humanity. Dharma is one word which defines and covers the totality of human 
experience and existence. Dharma derived from the root, Dhr meaning to 
uphold, to support, to nourish, to integrate etc, is the sum total of essential 
values and ideas on which the political economic cultural and religious 
expression of life are based. 
Various rights have been provided for the welfare and protection of the 
citizen by the Constitution. These rights are-
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- Right to equality 
- Right to freedom 
- Right against exploitation 
- Right to freedom of religion 
- Right to properly 
- Right to constitutional remedies and cultural and educational rights. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights explains the prescription of 
the charters of equal rights, and is concerned with the notion of equality. The 
preamble recognizes the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world. 
Still it is a stark reality that the majority of women employees are in a 
disadvantageous position very far from enjoying the rights and benefits 
guarantee to them under the Constitution as well as through various, labour 
.Jegislationr. In spite of women's valuable contribution to human being, she still 
suffers on account of numerous social, political, economic, and psychological 
barriers. Equality in employment and occupations is important for the freedom, 
dignity and well being of individuals. But, discrimination in respect of 
employment matters, namely recruitment, promotion, training and low wages 
to women employees and also deprivation of maternity benefits, nursing 
breaks, creche, and other welfare facilities as laid down in various enactments. 
The socio-economic condition of women in the unorganized sector it is worse. 
Only a few women employees have reached the level of eminence and high 
standing whereas countless other still continue to reel under underprivileged 
conditions. 
Constitution of India in its preamble provided ideals and aspirations of 
the people of India. The chief one of which was the equality of status and 
opportunity. Article 14 of the Constitution partly incorporated the Dicey's 
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principle of equality before the law and partly the American concept of equal 
protection of laws. The equality clause expressly prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of race, religion, caste, sex and place of birth and guarantees equality 
before law and equal protection of laws irrespective of race, religion, caste sex 
etc. Thus the Constitution has ensured equal status to all i.e. not only between 
men and men, women and women but also between men and women. 
Article 14 of the Constitution, Section 354 of Indian Penal Code, and 
Section 125 of Cr. P.C too provider right and protection to women. Article 15 
provides that no discrimination can be made by the state in matters of rights, 
privileges and immunities on the basis of sex. It also provides the making of 
special laws in favour of women and children. 
Article 16 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in matter of 
employment. 
The directive principles under various Articles provide special favour to 
women and direct the State to treat men and women equally. Article 38(2) 
directs the State to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities. 
Article 39 provides that equally all men and women have the right to 
have an adequate means of livelihood and further, that there shall be equal pay 
for equal work for both men and women to achieve this objective the State has 
passed Equal Remuneration Act, 1976. Article 42 provides that the labourer 
must be provided just and humane condition of work and maternity relief 
Article 43 provides that the state shall endeavor to secure a "living wage" and 
"decent standard of life" as a result of which the state has made suitable 
amendments in Factories Act, Mines Act, Plantation Act, etc. 
The elimination of discrimination at work is central to social justice. But 
discrimination at work will not vanish by itself, nether with the market on its 
own take care of its elimination. As a matter of fact elimination of 
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discrimination requires deliberate, focused, and consistent efforts by all parties 
concerned. Apart from the duty of the government to combat discrimination it 
is also the responsibility of employers, workers organizations and NGOs to 
play an active role in achieving equality at work. Sexual harassment violates 
human dignity and undermines the woman worker's self esteem. But these are 
widespread sexual abuse of women employees in establishments cutting across 
all kind of industries. 
On the one side, a woman is worshipped as Goddess and on the other 
side she is depressed, exploited and victimized by the male dominated society. 
The lack of sexual harassment laws, the difficulties encountered in accessing 
the legal system the fear of retaliation, sense of embarrassment, and the threat 
of losing their job make women employees vulnerable. It is not only a crime 
against the society and the individual, but is also a bar to achieve and exercise 
women's right to work, in a way; it is symptomatic of a larger problem of 
gender violence. Incidentally the weapon of free legal aid in this regard has not 
provided much solace to the women employees. 
Bearing in mind the far reaching and dangerous consequence of sexual 
harassment at the workplace, the punishment provided eitjier under Section 354 
or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is not adequate and deterrent 
enough. Hence the punishment under these sections should be increased 
considerably. Further offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 
1860, should be non-bailable and non-compoundable. Besides if a person is 
found guilty more than once for the same offence, then he must be awarded the 
maximum punishment provided under the Section coupled with heavy fine. In 
this backdrop, it is of great consequence to point out that the stringent penal 
provision and exemplary large compensation will be helpful to control the 
problem significantly. 
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Though the Supreme Court enunciated guidelines in Vishica's case to 
combat sexual harassment at he workplace, but sadly, the sameJiave n6t proved 
effectual. " \ , ; 
The 'Protection of Women Against Sexual Harassment at the Workplace 
Bill 2007, which is India first ever attempt to institute law against sexual 
harassment at the Workplace is still in the process of fmalization by the 
Ministry of Women and Child Development. 
Unfortunately this Draft Bill has some shortcomings. The drafters of the Bill 
have to realize that there is a need for a legal structure which not only carries 
the provisions of the guidelines of the Supreme Court in the vishaka case but 
is also able to effectively arrest the problems which women face at their place 
of work. Strict implementation of the provisions to protect a woman at her 
workplace should be one of the main objectives of the drafters and in this 
context, it may be pointed out that the Draft Bill should have provided a 
severe liability for the employer in case of his failure to comply with its 
provisions, it would, at the most, remain merely a paper tiger without any 
teeth or claws. 
The Draft Bill stipulates that the enquiry into the complaint shall be 
completed within 90 days. In this regard, it may be submitted that justice 
should be prompt, more particularly in the matter of sexual harassment at the 
workplace. In view of this, the enquiry into the complaint should be completed 
within 60 days, in place of 90 days. 
In any way, the determination of compensation factor in the Draft Bill also 
adumbrates that the offender of harassing a woman at the workplace should 
be allowed to go scot-free after paying for his misdeeds. In such an eventuality, 
will such an arrangement deter the rich and the corrupt is a million dollar 
question. 
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The Draft Bill prescribes punishment for a woman for filing false 
complaint or malicious complaint against the respondent. First of all, it is 
exceedingly difficult for the harassed woman to prove that her complaint is 
not false due to the fact that sexual harassment normally does not occur in 
public or in the presence of office colleagues or in front of the 
supervisor/executive. If, per chance, she is not able to prove the authenticity 
of her complaint, then she might have to face the punishment for absolutely no 
fault of hers. Furthermore, due to the punishment clause, the harassed woman 
is more likely to avoid the risk involved in filing a complaint against the harasser 
and because of this, the much-needed bill, avert if enacted, will, to a large 
extent, remain unfruitful. 
The Draft Bill it is mentioned that the employer shall undertake 
workshops and framing programmes at regular intervals. The term 'regular 
intervals' is vague. Whether 'regular intervals" means after every three 
months or after six months or nine months, it is not precise. It should not be 
left to the employer to decide the period of regular intervals'. Thus, there 
should be specificity of the period so that the vagueness __ 
In reality most of the sexually harassed women do not come forward to 
lodge a complaint against the harasser as they know very well that ultimately 
no one else but they themselves would be in a tight spot due to the unhelpfiil 
police and cumbersome legal procedures. Considering this the modus operands 
should be stamped out and the protection provided to the victim should be 
meaningful. Actually the environment created should be such that no harassed 
women should dither in making a complaint. Beside police should show utmost 
sensitivity in recording the statement of victim as repeated questioning ads to 
her trauma. It is better if the statement is recorded once and not over and over 
again. Above all else the perception of the men, about women's needs do 
change. 
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It is a fact that women employees have not managed to avail of much 
benefit from these statutory provisions though these have been in force for the 
last many decades. Naturally a reliable question arises as to whether these laws 
have become absolute and outmoded especially in the current scenario of 
liberalization of trade, globalization of economy,- and international 
competitiveness. Actually rjiany believed that with tl/e advert of liberalization 
and globalization, the economic as a whole woiiM'grow rapidly and 
consequently, more and imore^^^^n employees would en.er the organized 
sector but in reality it is not witnessing the growth of the organized sector but 
in its place more of flexibilities, causalization and contractualization. 
More jobs are available for women but only as unorganized labourers 
with a tag of low skilled job, low wages, long working hours, and no social 
security. As a rpswh women are becoming more and more insecure as many 
industries have benign to sub-contract to their smaller units. This is turn is 
causing detrimental inlpact on the workers, more particularly on the women 
workforce, as there is no clear cut employer-employee relationship and not 
even a fixed workplace. 
The existing laws have not successfully been enforced in the 
unorganized sector which constitutes a fairly major position of the workforce. 
That is why in the unorganized sector of employment, there is excessive 
exploitation of women employees resulting in long working hours, no 
overtime, carrying heavy loads, and unsafe working conditions further women 
employees in the unorganized sector are more vulnerable as they continue to do 
hazardous jobs without any protection. Apart from this they are not getting the 
most needed welfare facilities at the workplace. 
Law is an important as its enactment. Mere enactment of provisions for 
the women employees by providing concept of equality and non-discriminatory 
treatment safety, health and welfare provisions at workplace and maternity 
protection are not enough unless the same is implemented sincerely and are 
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eventually driven towards achievement of the desired objectives. The problem 
is that the enforcement officials consider the women employees problems at the 
work place a very minor issue. 
Therefore it is essential that gender sensitization training programmes 
for labour law enforcers must be carried out fort withl Despite various labour 
legislation and constitutional guarantee introduced long time back, it is 
unfortunate that the gigantic majority of women employees still do not know 
what legal measures have been laid down for them for augmenting their socio-
economic condition^jja^the absence of proper awareness and information they 
are unable to even asset tWeir rights, leave alone attempting to obtain justice. 
\ 
Though the^entral and State governments and National Commission 
for women have in association with NGOs, initiated several measures towards 
empowerment of women but there is still a big gap that needs to be bridged 
particularly in the economic empowerment of women above all judicial courts 
have always been the champions in maintaining the concept of equality of 
status particularly when discriminatory laws were made by the State against 
women employees. The court has shown greater enthusiasm in granting the 
constitutional provisions for women. Owing to the failure of legislation to 
protect the women, judiciary has come foreword to protect them more notably, 
equality in matters of employment their right to economic dependence and their 
right to work and to choose a life style as per their choice, their social and 
economic right by providing substantive equality, holding the principle of 
equal pay for equal pay for equal work for both men and women stressing the 
importance and neeKj for maternity protection, taking a serious note of 
increasing menace of \sexual harassment at the workplace and enunciating 
guidelines and adopting protectionist approach to gender equality. 
\ \ 
It can perhaps be ^id that in India judiciary is more sensitive than 
legislation. 
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SUGGESTIONS 
1. The cases of sexual harassment at work place and ihgd sexual 
discrimination on the basis of sex need to be distinguished very 
carefully. 
2. The person^ engaged in the administration of criminal justice be trained 
and educated about the nature of violence against women, violation of 
their human rights at workplace and gender equality. 
3. A grievance redressal cell for women employees should be established 
which may hear and try all cases of sexual harassment of women at 
workplace like a criminal court. They must be autonomous in nature. 
4. The women employees must be educated about the legal provisions and 
procedure relating to the offence of sexual harassment at workplace and 
they be provided a copy of such rules and regulations. 
5. Some protective measures are also necessary like counselling to and 
rehabilitation of victims of sexual harassment at workplace. 
6. To shed the myth of feminism and masculinism public awareness and 
educational programs, gender sensitive training of judges/ magistrate 
and other enforcement agencies is to be made. 
7. Strengthening of women cells in Women Police 3^ation, Counseling 
Centers, Legal Aid Cpitre, isiyaya Panchayats to elintinate the violence 
against women. 
8. Express prohibition of sexual harassment which includes physical 
contact and advances, a demand or request for sexual favour, sexually 
coloured remark, showing pornography or any other unwelcome 
physical, verbal/non-verbal conduct of sexual nature should be noticed, 
published and circulated in appropriate ways. 
9. The rules and regulations of government and public sector bodies 
relating to conduct and discipline should include prohibiting sexual 
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harassment and provide appropriate penalties in such rules against the 
offender. 
10. As regards private employers, steps should be taken to include the 
aforesaid prohibition in the standing orders und the Industrial 
Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946. 
11. Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of work 
leisure, health, hygiene, to further ensure that there is no hostile 
environment towards women and no woman should have reasonable 
ground to believe that she is disadvantaged in connection with her 
employment. ^ ' /• / ' ; ' ' ' 
12. Where such conduct amounts to specific offence under Indian Penal 
Code or any othep^ faw the employer shall initiate appropriate action in 
accordance with the law, by making a complaint with the appropriate 
authority. 
13. Victims of sexual harassment should have the option to seek transfer of 
the perpetrator or their own transfer. 
14. Sexual harassment should be discussed at worker's Meeting, ..employef— 
employers meeting and at other appropriate TisFuriis. 
15. To make the victim feel more comfortable and free there should be 
special courts to deal with cases of sexual harassment by women 
prosecutors and Judges. This will prevent male point of view 
determining sexual harassment of women. 
16. Court should award high sums of damages especially against 
multinational because of fear of high compensatory and punitive 
damages most of the multinational companies will prefer to settle sexual 
harassment claim soon. 
17. The definition of sexual harassment must specifically declare that it is 
unlawful for a person to create a sexually hostile or intimidating work 
environment. 
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18. Sexual harassment should be declared tort and the court should be 
empowered to award not only ordinary, but also exemplary and punitive 
damages. This would deter not only the wrong-doer from repeating his 
conduct but also other like minded people. 
19. Women employees must be educated about their rights because; in most 
of the cases of sexual harassment they do not report the imater due to 
fear of loss of reputation, loss of job, consequent hostile work 
environment, and fear of retaliation in public places. 
20. Employer should ensure confidentiality, protection of the complainant 
from victimization, timely redressal of the complaint, and a work 
environment. They empower women to raise their concerns. 
21. Law relating to indecent representation of women by the media should 
be sternly enforced to stop women being shows! is sexual object in films, 
advertisement, and hoardings. 
22. Law should be framed in such a manner that it does not give a weapon 
in the hands of women only. 
23. It should be legally ensured that women who abstain from work or are 
inefficient in their work do not misuse it. 
24. It should also be ensured that women employees do not use the law to 
get them transferred. 
25. Employer and senior officers at workplace should be given sufficient 
rights to defend themselves against the charges of sexual harassment. 
26. If it is found that the charges are false then complainant women should 
also be punished. 
27. At the time of framing the laws in favour of women it should be 
maintained that natural justice is not violated. 
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